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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
AARON EUGENE LANTIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 46171 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE GERALD F. SCHROEDER 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
ANITA M. E. MOORE 















Location: Ada County Magistrate Court
Judicial Officer: Lojek, Michael W.
Filed on: 03/07/2017
Case Number History: PRE-FILE01-17-1414
Appellate Case Number: 46171 -2018
Police Reference Number: 16-114255
Prosecutor Control Number: 2016-0003781
CASE INFORMATION
Offense Statute Deg Date
Jurisdiction: County
1.  Disturbing the Peace I18-6409 MIS 07/04/2016
Warrants
Arrest Warrant  -  Lantis, Aaron Eugene (Judicial Officer: Clerk, Magistrate Court )
05/15/2017 12:48 PM Warrant Returned Served
05/13/2017 12:42 PM Served by Sheriff- Paperwork Return Pending
04/28/2017 9:04 AM Outstanding Arrest Warrant














Court Ada County Magistrate Court
Date Assigned 07/24/2018
Judicial Officer Lojek, Michael W.
PARTY INFORMATION
Lead Attorneys
State State of Idaho Swenson, David Garrett
208-287-7700(W)
Defendant Lantis, Aaron Eugene Moore, Anita Marie Elizabeth
Public Defender
208-287-7400(W)
DATE EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT INDEX
03/07/2017 Initiating Document - Pre-File Case
03/07/2017 Criminal Complaint




ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609




03/17/2017 Summons Returned - Unserved (Criminal)
04/27/2017 Probable Cause Hearing (8:30 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Steckel, Daniel L.)
04/28/2017 Warrant/Det Order Issued - Arrest
05/15/2017 Warrant Returned - Served
05/15/2017 Bond Receipt and Court Date
5/17/17
05/15/2017 Bond Posted - Surety
AC5-7535347 Canyon County
05/17/2017 CANCELED Clerk Bond Out Appearance (3:00 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Clerk, Magistrate
Court)
Vacated
05/17/2017 Advisement of Rights
05/17/2017 Application for Public Defender
05/17/2017 Order Appointing Public Defender
05/17/2017 Notice of Hearing
05/19/2017 Request for Discovery
06/13/2017 Request for Discovery
Request for Discovery
06/13/2017 Response to Request for Discovery
Discovery response to court
06/16/2017 Response to Request for Discovery
/ Addendum
06/20/2017 Pre-trial Conference (9:15 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
06/20/2017 Trial Status Memo
06/20/2017 No Contact Order
08/03/2017 Response to Request for Discovery
/Second Addendum
08/10/2017 Amended Complaint Filed
08/11/2017 Jury Trial (8:30 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609


















08/11/2017 Motion for Reconsideration
of Motion in Limine
08/11/2017 Notice of Intent to Present 404b Evidence At Trial
08/11/2017 Jury Trial Started
08/11/2017 Pretrial Memorandum
08/11/2017 Notice of Hearing
08/11/2017 Verdict form
08/11/2017 Court Minutes
08/11/2017 Jury Instructions Filed
08/14/2017 Jury Packet
Jury Trial Work Product Documentation- Misc Documents
08/14/2017 Exhibit List/Log
08/25/2017 Motion
for judgement of acquittal
08/31/2017 Scheduling Order
09/25/2017 Objection
to Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
10/10/2017 Reply
to State's Objection to Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
10/12/2017 Notice
of Hearing




Denying Motion for Acquittal
11/28/2017 Sentencing (2:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)




ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609

















11/28/2017 Sentence (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
    1.  Disturbing the Peace
              Misdemeanor Sentence
Condition - Adult: 
1. Supervised Probation, Obey all laws. Maintain Contact w/Probation. Comply 
w/sentence including fine payment., $75, 1Y, 11/28/2017 - 11/27/2018, 11/28/2017
2. Unsupervised Probation, Obey all laws. Notify Court of change of address., 1Y, 
11/27/2018 - 11/27/2019, 11/28/2017
Confinement
Type:




Pre-Sentence Credit for Time Served
Credit Term: 2 Days
Other:





Fee Totals $ 750.00
Comment (Destroy pictures)
11/28/2017 Judgment of Conviction
11/28/2017 Supervised Probation Ordered
Charges: 1
11/28/2017 Remanded
11/28/2017 No Contact Order
11/28/2017 Court Minutes
11/28/2017 Case Final Judgment Entered





for Stay of Execution of Sentencing Pending Appeal




Staying Execution of Sentence Pending Appeal
12/08/2017 Order
ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609











Governing Procedure on Appeal





for the Record (Conditional Order Filed in Error)
01/04/2018 Order
Conditional Order Dismissing Appeal - RESCINDED
01/22/2018 Notice




to Extend Time to File Brief of Appllant
02/23/2018 Affidavit in Support of Motion
to Extend Time
02/26/2018 Objection






Reply Brief of Appellant
04/02/2018 Notice of Hearing
(4-26-18 @ 3:30pm)(Oral Argument)
04/26/2018 Oral Argument (3:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Schroeder, Gerald F.)
04/26/2018 Court Minutes
05/10/2018 Review Hearing (10:00 AM)  (Judicial Officer: Schroeder, Gerald F.)
(Judges Review / Decision)
06/14/2018 Decision or Opinion
on Appeal
06/18/2018
ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609


















06/28/2018 Review Hearing (3:30 PM)  (Judicial Officer: Hawley/Lojek, Judge)
Re: Opinion on Appeal- Defendant's Presence Excused
06/28/2018 Pretrial Memorandum
07/02/2018 Objection
to Dismissal and Memorandum in Support






Total Payments and Credits 195.00
Balance Due as of  9/14/2018 1,309.00
ADA COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT
CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CR01-17-07609









JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Whitney Welsh 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
H01----;;;iFili;,,;-t ..,.,5~s~~-:j: A.M.---- ~ 
MAR O 7 2017 
CHRISTOPh~- · ; 
8y APR1LE •-
;;t:?;.,..:--V 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 










) _______________ ) 




PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE me this _J_ day of March, 2017, Whitney 
Welsh, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State ofldaho, who, being first 
duly sworn, complains and says that: AARON EUGENE LANTIS, on or about the 4th day of July, 
2016, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did commit the crime(s) of DISTURBING THE 
PEACE, MISDEMEANOR, I.C. § 18-6409 as follows: 
That the defendant, AARON EUGENE LANTIS, on or about the 4th day of July, 2016, in 
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and maliciously disturb the peace of a person, to-
wit Hillary Henslee, by offensive and/or threatening conduct, by sending sexually suggestive 
pictures of Hillary Henslee to her employer(s). 
COMPLAINT (LANTIS) Page 1 
000009
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and against 
the peace and dignity of the State ofldaho. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: i y Welsh 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
. JI-, 
SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this I day of ~ 
Magistrate 










JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Whitney Welsh 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
MAY 1 5 ·2017 
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk 
By RACHAEL WEATHERBY 
DEPurv 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






) Case No. CR0l-17-07609 - \ 
) 
AARON EUGENE LANTIS, 
Defendant. 
) ARREST WARRANT 
) 
) 
) __________ ) 
Address: 1856 W MOUNTAIN POINTE A VE., NAMPA, ID 83651 
  
Sex: MALE Race: Height: 6 Ft. 0 In. Weight: 205 Lbs. 
Hair/Eyes: BLOND OR STRAWBERRY /BLUE 
TO ANY SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, MARSHAL OR POLICEMAN IN THE STATE OF 
IDAHO: 
A COMPLAINT UPON OATH having been this day laid before me by Brian Aune, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, stating that the crime(s) of DISTURBING THE PEACE, MISDEMEANOR, LC. 
§18-6409 have been committed, and accusing AARON EUGENE LANTIS thereof and having found 
probable cause; 
ARREST WARRANT (Lantis) Page 1 
RECEIVED 
Ada County: Sheriff 
WARAANTS 
APR 2 ! 2017 
r Stephen Bartlett, Sheriff •-· 




YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to immediately arrest the defendant named above 
\ 
at any time during the day or night, and to bring him/her before me at my office in the County of Ada, qr 
in case of my absence or in.ability to act, before the nearest or most accessible Magistrate . Ada County., : 
DATED thiffl_day of April, 2017. ,, 
Bond$ VJ OO(? -} 
Magistrate for the Distric Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, 
Magistrate Division 
RETURN OF SERVICE • . .i 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served the foregoing Warrant by arresting the defendant and 
bringing ___ into Court this __ day of _________ _, 2017. 
ARREST WARRANT (Lantis) Page 2 




COMMITMENT FOR EXAMINATION AFTER APPEARANCE 
THE WITHIN NAMED Defendant, having been brought before me under this Warrant, is 
committed for examination to the Sheriff of Ada County, State of Idaho, and is admitted to bail in the sum 
of$ ________ _, surety, cash or by undertaking of two sufficient sureties, and is committed 
to the custody of the Sheriff of Ada County until such bail is given. This Cause is continued for further 
appearance until ____ day of ____ _, 2017. 
Magistrate for the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, 
Magistrate Division 
ORDER OF RELEASE 
TO THE SHERIFF OF ADA COUNTY, IDAHO: 
YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED to release the Defendant from your custody. 
DATED: _______ _ 
NCICENTRY: (Additional Levels Inclusive) 
□ Idaho Only 
Magistrate for the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, 
Magistrate Division 
□ North West Shuttle (ID, WA, OR) 
□ Western States (ID, WA, OR, MT, CA, WY, SD, ND, UT, CO, AZ, NV) 
D Nationwide 
BY: --------
DATED: _____ _ 
ARREST WARRANT (Lantis) Page 3 
( 1 ·' 
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NOTICE SETTING DATE AND TIME FOR COURT APPEARANCE 
Case# CR011707609 
You have been released on bail bond which has been filed with the Sheriff of Canyon County for 
delivery to the Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the StatM1.!.f~Id~a~ho~,..LinL!.-:::-:;::------
and for the County of Canyon. A.M °l ,_, ~----
You are notified herewith that you MUST appear in said Court, located at: 
0 1115 Albany Street, Caldwell Idaho, second floor 
MAY 1 5 ,2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RACHAEL WEATHERBY 
DEPUTY 
@) Other County ADA COUNTY Add 
200 W FRONT ST BOISE ID 83702 ress _____________ _ 
On(date) 0511712017 atthehourof 9:00AM foryourarraignment. 
Your failure to appear will result in the forfeiture of your bond and in the 
issuance of a Bench Warrant for your arrest. 
Dated this _8 ___ day of~M_a""""y'---------'I 20 _!.:_ 
BOND & RELEASE INFORMATION 
D fi d t' N LANTIS AARON E Ph N 707-299-0026 e en an s ame__________________ one o~-----
Addres 1707 S 26TH ST NAMPA ID 83686 
Arrest N
O 
17-003407 / 334284 Charge ADA CO HOLD 
Arr . A NPD estmg gency ______ _ 
Type of Bond: @)Surety Bond Qcash Bond O Book & Release 
Surety Bonding Agent JEREMY ALVAREZ/ALADDIN 
Phone 323-2245 
Bond Amount ~$_50_0_0 ___ _ 
Copy to File .[]_ Copy to Defendant[] Copy to Court 0--
Signed: 5/19/2017 09:27 AM
000014
Filed: May 17. 2017 at 8:53 AM 
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: 'Bret\da,,'R,~ Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Case No. CR01-17-07609 State of Idaho 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Notice of Appointment of Public Defender and 
Setting Case for Hearing 
Aaron Eugene Lantis 
Defendant. 
TO: Ada County Public Defender 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you are appointed to represent the defendant in this 
cause, or in the District Court until relieved by court order. The case is continued for AC 
Pretrials (Hawley/Lojek) on June 20, 2017, at 9:15 AM Judge Hawley/Lojek. 
TO: Aaron Eugene Lantis 
IT HAS BEEN ORDERED BY THIS COURT that the defendant is to contact the Ada County 
Public Defender's Office at 200 W Front St #1107 Boise, ID 83702. Telephone: (208) 287-7400. 
If the defendant is unable to post bond and obtain his/her release from jail that the proper 
authorities allow the defendant to make a phone call to the Ada County Public Defender. 
IT HAS BEEN FURTHER ORDERED: That the parties, prior to the pre-trial conference, 
complete and comply with Rule 16 I.C.R. and that the defendant shall be personally present at 
all court proceedings, unless otherwise excused. Failure to appear may result in a bench 
warrant for the defendant's arrest. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date I served a copy of the attached to: 
Brian Taylor Aune [X] By email [ ] By mail 
200 W Front Street Rm 3191 
Boise ID 83702 
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
Ada County Public Defender [ X] By email [ ] By mail 
200 West Front Street Suite 1107 
Boise ID 83702 
public.defender@adacounty.id .gov 
Aaron Eugene Lantis 
1707 S 26th St 
Nampa ID 83686 
Dated: May 17, 2017 
Dated: ____ _ 
NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT OF PUBLIC DEFENDER 
M-CR (NO40) 7.29.16 
CR01 -17 - 07609 
NOTH 
1 Notice of Hearing 
~iii\1111111111111111 II I I I II IIIIII Ill 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 1
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Defendant
ANITA M. E. MOORE, ISB #5885
Deputy Public Defender




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA






TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff, and to the Ada County Prosecutor:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that the undersigned requests discovery and photocopies of the following 
information, evidence, and materials pursuant to ICR 16:
1) All unredacted material or information within the prosecutor’s possession or control, or 
which thereafter comes into their possession or control, which tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused or tends to reduce the punishment therefore. ICR 16(a).
2) Any unredacted, relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies 
thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecution, the existence of which 
is known or is available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence; and also 
the substance of any relevant, oral statement made by the defendant whether before or after 
arrest to a peace officer, prosecuting attorney, or the prosecution’s agent; and the recorded 
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury that relates to the offense charged.
3) Any unredacted, written or recorded statements of a co-defendant; and the substance of any 
relevant oral statement made by a co-defendant whether before or after arrest in response to 
interrogation by any person known by the co-defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the 
prosecuting attorney.
4) Any prior criminal record of the defendant and co-defendant, if any.
5) All unredacted documents and tangible objects as defined by ICR 16(b)(4) in the possession 
or control of the prosecutor that are material to the defendant, intended for use by the 
prosecutor or obtained from or belonging to the defendant or co-defendant.
6) All reports or physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments within 
the possession, control, or knowledge of the prosecutor, the existence of which is known or is 
available to the prosecutor by the exercise of due diligence. 
7) A written list of the names and addresses of all persons having knowledge of relevant facts 
who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial, together with any record of prior 
felony convictions of any such person which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting 
attorney. Additionally, the defense requests ALL statements (written or oral, recorded, or 
unrecorded) made by ALL prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to the 
prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney’s agents or to any official involved in the 
Electronically Filed
5/19/2017 2:44:33 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk
000015
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 2
investigatory process of this case (including, but not limited to police officers, investigators, 
and victim-witness coordinators).
8) A list of all benefits offered to the alleged victim for being a “victim” of crime (including, but 
not limited to financial assistance, free or reduced-cost legal representation, housing, or U-
Visa certification).
9) Unredacted copies of ALL communications between the prosecution, including the 
prosecuting attorney’s agents, and alleged victims offering benefits and accepting benefits 
(including, but not limited to, letters, emails, and informational pamphlets).
10) Unredacted copies of ALL documents provided to, and received from, alleged victims 
relating to crime victim benefits (including, but not limited to, Crime Victims Compensation 
Program applications provided to alleged victims and received by the Industrial 
Commission).
11) A written summary or report of any testimony that the State intends to introduce pursuant to 
rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing; including the 
witness’ opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and the witnesses qualifications.
12) All reports or memoranda made by police officers or investigators in connection with the 
investigation or prosecution of the case, including, what are commonly referred to as “ticket 
notes.”
13) Any writing or object that may be used to refresh the memory of all persons who may be 
called as witnesses, pursuant to IRE 612.
14) Any and all audio and/or video recordings made by law enforcement officials during the 
course of their investigation.
15) Any evidence, documents or witnesses that the State discovers or could discover with due 
diligence after complying with this request.
The undersigned further requests written compliance within 14 days of service of the within 
instrument pursuant to ICR 16.
DATED May 19, 2017.
ANTHONY R. GEDDES
Chief Public Defender
For Anita M. E. Moore
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 19, 2017, I electronically served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor via the iCourt Portal.
Debbie Florence
000016
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY (LANTIS) Page 1
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID  83702 
Telephone:  (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF


















TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Criminal 
Rules, requests Discovery and inspection of the following:  
(1)  Documents and Tangible Objects:  
Request is hereby made by the prosecution to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, 
documents, photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which are within the 
possession, custody or control of the defendant, and which the defendant intends to introduce in 
evidence at trial.  
Electronically Filed
6/13/2017 10:45:49 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk
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REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY (LANTIS) Page 2
(2)  Reports of Examinations and Tests:
The prosecution hereby requests the defendant to permit the State to inspect and copy or 
photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or 
experiments made in connection with this case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of 
the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were 
prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports 
relate to testimony of the witness.  
(3)  Defense Witnesses:  
The prosecution requests the defendant to furnish the State with a list of names and 
addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial.  
(4) Expert Witnesses:
The prosecution requests the defendant to provide a written summary or report of any 
testimony that the defense intends to introduce pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(c)(4), including 
the facts and data supporting the opinion and the witness’s qualifications. 
(5)  Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-519, the State hereby requests that the defendant 
state in writing within ten (10) days any specific place or places at which the defendant claims to 
have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon 
whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi.
DATED this the ___________ day of May, 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney






REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY (LANTIS) Page 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the _____ day of May, 2017, I caused to be served, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Request for Discovery upon the individual(s) named below in 
the manner noted:  Anita Moore, 200 W Front Street Rm 1107  Boise ID  83702
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _________







DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (LANTIS) Page 1
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone:  (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA


















COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has complied with and lodged objections to 
the Defendant’s Request for Discovery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the _____ day of May, 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney






Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk
000020
DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (LANTIS) Page 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the _____ day of May, 2017 I caused to be served, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Discovery Response to Court upon the individual(s) named 
below in the manner noted: Anita Moore, 200 W Front Street Rm 1107  Boise ID  83702
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________.
 By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel.





ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (LANTIS) Page 1
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID  83702
Telephone:  (208) 287-7700
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

















ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY 
RESPONSE TO COURT
COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Ada County, 
State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has submitted an Addendum to Response to 
Discovery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the ____ day of June, 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
By: D. Garrett Swenson




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Maura Olson, Deputy Clerk
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ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (LANTIS) Page 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this              day of June, 2017, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Addendum to Discovery Response to Court was served to the following in the manner 
noted below:  Anita Moore, 200 W Front Street Rm 1107  Boise ID  83702
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________.
 By hand.
 By iCourt eFile & Serve.
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 












Case No. C,,R£J/-/7- ()7bf/1 
TRIAL STATUS MEMORANDUM 
IT i-10-/:/--
a.,t 8:,s~m 
Appearances: Prosecutor __ a-_~--------------------
Defense Counsel 4Af/r/l /JfdO /3~~ 
D This case is ready for trial. 
D Discovery has been completed. 
'fl Cut off date for discovery is \ WE:'="- ~ 0es;::-o_e.,s ~ 14-L //4# ~ 
)ii State is to prepare a formal complaint for trial. (by ..... \...___Wl5--=-=E'-"'lc:::...=----'BS"'--.;....f"c,,,e.E'. ___ "t12--\ __ t4_L-_-J) 
D Parties are to prepare proposed jury instruction on the elements of count(s) ____ _ 
D The State does not intend to amend the charge. 
D The State may amend the charge to _________________ _ 
D The parties anticipate the case can be tried in one day. 
~ Courtroom media equipment will be needed. (The attorneys are responsible for the 
presentation of evidence.) 1r·. <?--°\ \P, -,-,-,e;-s&.S... 
□ 
~ ~ \ V..}\~,..,~s._ 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL QJ@TRICT 12..~ ~i 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY .QE ADA LPM ___ _ 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
JUN 2 0 2017 ) Case No. CR.o \- \ "l- - -:J,<,.,oG\ 
) 
) DR# I ~ - I I Y ?, SS CHRISTOPHER D RICH, Clerk 
) v, ..:.. By LISA POSEY 
) Law Enforcement Agency _,tt:._,__l-_ ->_D ___ __:D:..::E::....Pu::....r .c..v ___ _ 
~ Expires at 11 :59 P.M. on b c cJ...tJ✓ /IL 
) or upon dismissal of this case. 
) 
) NO CONTACT ORDER O AMENDED 
The Cou finds that a no contact order is appropriate in this case, therefore, it is hereby ordered that you , the above-named 
Defenda t, shall not engage in any of the following conduct with regard to the person(s) listed below. You shall not contact or 
attempt t contact (including in person or through another person , or in writing or email , or by telephone, pager, or facsimile) the 
person(s) named below in any manner. Prohibited contact includes that you shall not harass, stalk, threaten , engage in any 
other con uct that would place the person(s) named below in reasonable fear of bodily injury, knowingly follow and knowingly 
remain wi hin 100 feet of the followi g person(s) : 
~ . Exceptions are as follows: 
no exceptions 
to contact by telephone between ______ .M. and ___ _ .M. on __________ _ 
for the following purposes: ____________________________ _ 
to participate in counseling/mediation 
to provide for the exchange of children between the parties through : ______________ _ 
to retrieve personal necessities from the residence/protected address one time through : ________ _ 
to meet with or through attorneys and/or during legal proceedings 
to respond to emergencies involving the parties' natural or adopted children 
other:------------------------------------
r ordered that you shall not go within 900 feet (300 yards) of the following address(es) : 
Residenc Address Work Address 
Defenda appeared or had actual notice of this hearing and had the opportunity to participate, present evidence, and make 
argument against the entry of th is order. D YES / D NO 
A violatio of this order is a separate crime under Idaho Code § 18-920, for which no bail will be set until you appear before a 
judge. T e maximum penalty for a violation of this order is one year in jail and/or up to a $1000 fine . However, if the violation is 
a third off nse, the violation is a felony , which is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for up to five years and/or up to 
a $5000 f ne. 
Only a ju ge can modify this order. If more than one protection order/no contact order is in place, the most restrictive prohibition 
controls, hether in a civil or criminal case. 
e subject to federal prosecution if you possess, receive, or transport a firearm or ammunition while a no contact order 
18 U.S.C. § 922. 
Date 
Law Enfo cement ldentific_atioryNumbo/. 
Dateserv d: loL~ U;b 
I 
NO CONT CT ORDER XFILE X ACSO XPROSECUTOR Xo'EFENSE ATTORNEY [PROPOSED REV 06-29-2016] 
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JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
D. Garrett Swenson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, ID  83702
Telephone:  (208) 287-7700
Fax: (208) 287-7709
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

















SECOND ADDENDUM TO 
DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO 
COURT
COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for Ada County, 
State of Idaho, and informs the Court that the State has submitted an Addendum to Response to 
Discovery.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this the ____ day of August, 2017.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
By: D. Garrett Swenson




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk
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SECOND ADDENDUM TO DISCOVERY RESPONSE TO COURT (LANTIS) Page 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this              day of August, 2017, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Addendum to Discovery Response to Court was served to the following in the manner 
noted below:  
Anita Moore, Ada County Public Defender, Boise ID  83702
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________.
 By hand.
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
D. Garrett Swenson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Fax: (208) 287-7709 
NO·-----,---------==----
FILED < 
A.M ____ _,-.. M.__...V---
AUG 1 0 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYSHA ZUBER 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 










) ___________ ) 




PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE me this \ 0 day of August, 2017, D. Garrett 
Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, who, being 
first duly sworn, complains and says that: AARON EUGENE LANTIS, on or about the 4th day of 
July, 2016, in the County of Ada, State ofldaho, did commit the crime of: I. DISTURBING THE 
PEACE, MISDEMEANOR, J.C. 18-6409 as follows: 
That the Defendant, AARON EUGENE LANTIS, on or about the 4th day of July, 2016, in 
the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and maliciously disturb the peace of a person, to-
wit: Hillary Henslee, by offensive conduct by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to Hillary 
Henslee's employer. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT (LANTIS) Page 1 
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All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case and against 
the peace and dignity of the State ofldaho. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
y:D.Garrett' Swenson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
I ~ SUBSCRIBED AND Sworn to before me this ___E__ day of August, 2017. 
Jm7t 
Magistrate 
AMENDED COMPLAINT (LANTIS) Page 2 
Electronically Filed
8/11/2017 7:52:08 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
D. Garrett Swenson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 










) _______________ ) 
Case No. CR0l-17-7609 
STATE'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Ada, 
State of Idaho, and moves this Court to reconsider its order excluding Defendant's statements and 
evidence of conduct on or around July 4, 2016, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). The 
statements and conduct at issue are inextricably intertwined with the criminal conduct alleged in the 
complaint and are part of the same criminal episode. As such, they are not subject to the 
requirements of l.R.E. 404(b ). 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER (LANTIS), Page 1 
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On June 30, 2016, Hillary Henslee and William Doyle were at the home of Hillary's boss, 
Nancy Van Winkle. The Defendant, Aaron Lantis, crone to the home and, upset to find Hillary there 
with William, told Hillary that he would end her. On July 1, the Defendant told Hillary that he had a 
plan to ruin her life and that her actions would dictate if he carried out his plan. On July 3, the 
Defendant sent Hillary a screenshot of an email that he said he intended to send to Hillary's 
employer. On July 4, the Defendant texted Hillary that he had discovered that Hillary had deleted 
William's phone nwnber from the Defendant's phone, and that Hillary would regret doing that. 
Hillary subsequently deleted the text messages and screenshot from her phone. 
At 9:42 A.M. on July 4, 2016, Nancy Van Winkle received an email from Santa Clause 
<concemedtelleriib@gmail.com>. The email read as follows: 
As a concerned neighbor, I am wondering if you were aware that your bank 
employee who is watching your house was using it for "extra curricular activities". 
Last Thursday night 6/30/16 she had a customer Billy out in your hot tub, and her 
boyfriend showed up. Two different trucks, one a white truck, and one a grey truck, 
two different guys. So there was a huge spectacle and a lot of noise. Come to find 
out, she has a lot of outside things to show off. It is concerning that that is the face of 
the branch, your new assistant manager Hillary Henslee. There are nude photos 
floating around, and she is obviously not very lady like or christian. I am wondering 
if this is the attitude of IIBK, or if you were aware that your house was being used as 
some form of brothel? Is this going to be a every night thing? If there is that much 
noise going forward, we may need to call the police to intervene. I am not sure if 
your upper management is aware of how you conduct business, or the people you 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER (LANTIS), Page 2 
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are choosing to represent IIBK or Star in general? Do your employees sleep with all 
the customers, is that some "preferred treatment" for account holders? I am attaching 
some of the photos circulating of her so that you are aware of them. I will not bother 
with all of the completely nude ones. Obviously I am not the only person to see 
these. Some of them taken at her desk or in your bathroom even. 
State's Exhibit 2. 
There were four sexually provocative photographs of Hillary attached to the email. Nancy 
Van Winkle forwarded the email to Hillary on July 5, 2016. 
Nampa Police Department Officer Jeremy Miller contacted Aaron Lantis on July 5. In a 
recorded phone interview, Aaron Lantis admitted that he had confronted Hillary at her employer's 
home on June 30 and had, at some point, told Hillary that he was going to wreck her life. When 
asked what he was referencing, Aaron Lantis said, "The pain that you are feeling inside, you want 
them to feel that as well." He continued by clarifying that the reference was to Hillary's work. He 
said that Hillary had wanted her job so badly and that he wanted Hillary to lose her job. Aaron 
confirmed that he had sent a screenshot of the email to Hillary on the night of July 3, and had sent 
the email to Hillary's supervisor on July 4. Aaron provided a description of the email and the photos 
that were attached. He confirmed that his intent in sending the email was to cause Hillary to lose her 
job. 
On August 10, 2017, the State filed a complaint alleging that the Defendant had disturbed 
the peace of Hillary Henslee by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to her employer. This 
Court granted the Defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the Defendant's statements that he 
would end Hillary, that he would wreck her life, that he had a plan to ruin her life, and that her 
actions would determine whether his plan was carried out. The Court further excluded evidence that 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER (LANTIS), Page 3 
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the Defendant sent a screenshot of the email to Hillary on July 3, and that he sent a text on July 4 
stating that Hillary would regret deleting William's number from the Defendant's phone. 
II. ARGUMENT 
I.R.E. 404(b) states that "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith." 
Evidence is not subject to I.RE. 404 if it does not bear upon the defendant's character. State v. 
Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945,949 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190 (Ct. App. 
2011 )). Several federal courts have distinguished between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" crimes, 
wrongs, or other acts in the context of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See, e.g., US. v. Sumlin, 
489 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144 (6th Cir. 1995). In Barnes, the court 
stated: 
[F.R.E. 404(b)] does not apply where the challenged evidence is 'inextricably 
intertwined' with evidence of the crime charged in the indictment. When the other 
crimes or wrongs occurred at different times and under different circumstances from 
the offense charged, the deeds are termed 'extrinsic.' 'Intrinsic' acts, on the other 
hand, are those that are part of a single criminal episode. [F.R.E. 404(b)] is not 
implicated when the other crimes or wrongs evidence is part of a continuing pattern 
of illegal activity. When that circumstance applies, the government has no duty to 
disclose the other crimes or wrongs evidence. 
49 F.3d at 1149. 
The Barnes court found that evidence of an earlier drug shipment was directly related to the 
one for which the defendants were charged, that the evidence was therefore intrinsic to the conduct 
alleged, and that the F .R.E. 404(b) was therefore not implicated. Id Idaho courts have also used the 
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distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic acts to determine whether I.RE. 404(b) was implicated. 
See Whitaker, 152 Idaho at 949. The Whitaker court stated, "[e]vidence of an act is intrinsic when it 
and evidence of the crime charged are inextricably intertwined, or both acts are part of a single 
criminal episode, or it was a necessary preliminary to the crime charged." Id. (quoting State v. 
Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008) and Sumlin, 489 F.ed at 689). "Evidence is inextricably 
intertwined when it is 'so interconnected with the charged offense that a complete account of the 
charged offense could not be given to the jury without disclosure of the uncharged misconduct."' Id. 
(quoting State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 413 (Ct. App. 2002). The Whitaker court ultimately 
determined that evidence of the defendant viewing pornography on some occasion entirely separate 
from the charged conduct was not intrinsic to the charged offense, and was therefore subject to the 
requirements ofl.R.E. 404(b). ld. 
In the instant case, evidence of the Defendant's conversation with Hillary Henslee on June 
30 is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense. The email that is the subject of the charge 
discusses the June 30 incident and makes allegations as to Hillary's conduct thereat. As such, the 
State could not give a complete account of the charged offense without providing evidence related 
to the June 30 incident. Furthermore, the Defendant's statements that he would end Hillary or wreck 
her life are connected both to the June 30 incident and to why Hillary's peace would be disturbed 
the allegations contained in the email that was sent to Hillary's boss. The June 30 incident and the 
Defendant's statements on June 30 are intrinsic to the charged offense 
Evidence that the Defendant told Hillary that he had a plan to do wreck her life, that he had 
created an email with pictures, and that she would regret deleting William's number, as well as 
evidence that he sent a screenshot of the very email he later admitted to sending to her employers, is 
intrinsic to the charged offense because it is part of a single criminal episode. Similarly, evidence 
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that the Defendant sent one of the pictures included in the email to Hillary on July 5 is part of the 
same criminal episode as the charged offense. Unlike the evidence in Whitaker, the evidence of the 
Defendant's statements and actions relate directly to the email that was sent to Hillary's boss. It is 
not evidence of other instances or emails the Defendant had created that could lead the jury to 
believe that he had the character for sending such emails, but rather evidence that the Defendant 
created and sent the specific email referenced in the complaint. The statements are one course of 
conduct, essentially contemporaneous in time, that culminated in the Defendant sending the email 
and pictures to Hillary's boss. As such, this evidence is intrinsic to the charged offense and is not 
subject to the requirements of I.R.E. 404(b ). 
The State respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its ruling on the Defendant's 
motion in limine, and that the Defendant's motion be denied on the grounds that the statements are 
not character evidence subject to the requirements of l.R.E. 404(b). 
DATED this 1Q day of August 2017. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
clOb-~ 
D. Garrett Swenson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER (LANTIS), Page 6 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this the __.I,....\~_ day of August 2017, I delivered a copy 
of the State's Motion to Reconsider to Anita Moore, Ada County Public Defender's Office, by the 
method indicated below. 
□ By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
□ By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel. 
□ By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
□ By Hand Delivering said document to defense counsel. 
□ By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available/or pickup at 
the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
□ By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: - - --
~ By iCourt eFile and Serve 











Thursday, July 07, 2016 9:05 AM 
Erin Pon 
Fwd: Hillary Henslee 
10076Jpeg;25S78Jpeg;25591Jpeg;27340jpeg 
Sent from my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy smartphone 
•···---· Original message ----·--
From: "Nancy L. VanWinkle11 <Nancy.Van:W:inkle@IIBK.NET> 
Date: 7/5/16 8:45 AM (GMT-07:00) 
To: Hillary <Bvinkwln1ife03@yahoo.in> 
Subject: Fwd: Hillary Henslee 
Sorry you are going through this messy stuff .. ,glad you have loving support around you though 
Sent li'om my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy srnartphonc 
•······· Original message ------
From: Santa Claus <concemedteHeriib@gmail.com> 
Date: 7/4/16. 9:42 AM (OMT-07;00) 
To: "Nancy L. VanWi'nkle" <Nancy.VanWinkle@IIBK.NET> 
DR# 2016-114255 
i\/J{p , J0u,f7 
Cc: Kurt Oustavel, <Kurt.Gusta:vel@IIBK.NET>, "Spring H. Alexander" <Spring.Alex:ander@IlBK,NET>, 
Richard.Ambrosio@iibk.net, i\!iciaJlitter@iibk.net. Jcrald.Jaeger@jibk.net 
Subject: Hillary Henslee 
••• External Email ••· 
Nancy. 
As a concerned neighbor, I am wondering if you were aware that your bank employee who is watching your 
house was using it for "extra curricular activitles11 • last Thursday night 6/30/16 she had a customer Billy out In 
your hot tub, and her boyfriend showed Up. Two different trucks, one a whlte truck, and one a grey truck, two 
different guys. So there was a huge spectacle and a lot of noise. Come to find out, she has a lot of outside 
things to show off. It Is concerning that that is the tace of the branch, your new assistant manager Hillary 
Henslee, There are nude photos floating around. and she is obviously not very lady like or chrlstian. I am 
wondering if this is the attitude of rIBK, or if you were aware that your house was being used as some fonn of 
brothel? Is this going to be a every night thing? If there is that much noise going forward. we may need to call 
the police to intervene. I am not sure if your upper management is aware of how you conduct business, or the 
people you are choosing to represent IIBK or Star in general? Do your employees sleep with all the customers, 







that you are aware of them. I will not bother with all of the completely nude ones. Obviously I am not the only 
person to see these. Some of them taken at her desk or in your bathroom even. 
frxi1 fipjl ~ 






Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
D. Garrett Swenson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FOURTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 










Case No. CR0l-17-7609 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
USE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO 
404(b) 
COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State 
ofldaho, and makes the following declaration: in the alternative to its motion for reconsideration of 
the Defendant's motion in limine, that the State provides notice that it intends to introduce evidence 
at trial of prior conduct by the Defendant pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b ). This evidence will 
relate to statements the Defendant made to Hillary Henslee and to Officer Jeremy Miller. The 
statements are that the Defendant said he would wreck Hillary Henslee's life, that he had a plan to 
do so, that he had created an email with pictures, and that Hillary would regret deleting William 
Doyle's phone number from the Defendant's phone. The 'evidence will also include information 
regarding the Defendant's interactions with Hillary Henslee from June 30 through July 5. It will 
include information that the Defendant confronted Hillary and William on June 30, sent a copy of 
the email to Hillary on July 3, and sent one of the pictures from the email in a text message to 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO USE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO 404B Page I 
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Hillary on July 5. This evidence was previously disclosed to the Defendant on June 1, 2017, and 
June 16, 2017. 
The evidence will be introduced for the purpose of showing motive, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
DATED this _l'Q__ day of August, 2017. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
lib~ 
By: D. Garrett Swenson 
Deputy Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the JL day of August 2017 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to: Anita Moore, Ada County Public Defender by 
the method indicated below: 
NOTIFIED AVAILABLE FOR PICK UP 
__ U.S. MAIL (Postage Prepaid) 
FAX TRANSMISSION 
HAND DELIVERY 







STATE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 
• 3TRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT AUG 11 2017 • 
NO,_..,.,=~~-s:-: .. f;:;:-1~:::-;:~D;------
A.M ___ ~-- ,M, _____ ---
,TATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk 
) MAGISTRATE MINUTES/ NOTICE dr=0Ati~~~~ 
) □ PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiff, ) 
~ Case Number: C f2:D \- l "J- :J fO O Cf 
~ Event Date: _ __,:8----+-f \~\'--+-'\ '--"t ________ _ 
)) ., l/ 1:' 7 
) Judge: kOdVf,--: Clerk: _Ll~-~L---__ _ 
) Case Called: K4J 2) □ In Chambers 
Defendant. ) ________________ } □ Interpreter: _______________ _ 
~ □ BC □ EA □ GC □ MC 3uJ::eA1$-e/Y\ 
Defendant: □ Present □ Not Present □ In Custody 
~rivate _-'~'---.,,.__----=----=--------
□ PD Appointed □ PD Denied □ Waived Attorney 
□ Defendant failed to appear. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued. Bond $ _______ _ 
□ Advised Rights □ Not Guilty □ Guilty/ Admit □ Written Guilty Plea □ No Contact □ Pre-Trial Release Order 
_________________________ □ Release Defendant, This Case Only 
L NOTICE OF HEARING 
~ Sentencing on ! 0 /:,2 I CJ at 2-: :30 •e Judge /k "V /-c,~J t:k._ 
□ Court Trial Conference on _________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
□ Court Trial on _____________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
□ Pre-Trial Conference on __________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
□ Jury Trial on ______________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
□ ________ on ________ at ____ am/pm w/ Judge ______ _ 
□ Contact the Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St., Rm. 1107, Boise, ID 83702, telephone (208) 287-7400. 
You must appear as scheduled above. Failure to do so will result in a warrant being issued for your arrest, or 
default judgment may be entered if you are charged with a · tion. 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE, 200 W. FRONT STREET, SE, ID 83702 
I hereby certify that copies of this notice were served as fo.,s: 
Defendant: Hand Delivered □ Via Counsel ef' Signatur 
Defense Atty: Hand Delivered..-d" lntdept Mail □ 
Prosecutor: Hand Delivere~ lntdept Mail □ 
CHRISTOPHER Magistrate Judge (for Pre-Trial Memorandum) 
DATED 7'/t l } tl 
MAGISTRATE MINUTES/ NOTICE OF HEARING [REV 10-2013] 
000042






FILED :-5 A.M ___ __r-.M.-t::,t,,,L. __ _ 
AUG 11 2017 






CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYSHA ZUBER 
DEPUTY 
CASE No. CR01-17-7609 
We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant AARON LANTIS 
___ Not Guilty 
X Guilty 
Of the crime Disturbing the Peace 18-6409 
Dated this 11th Day of August, 2017. 
Presi~ 
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CASE No. CR01-17-7609 
We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant AARON LANTIS 
___ Not Guilty 
___ Guilty 
Of the crime Disturbing the Peace 18-6409 
Dated this 11th Day of August, 2017. 
Presiding Juror 
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Lojek Zuber 8/11/17 1A-CRT400 
Time Speaker Note 
08:47:21 AM! ! Lantis CR01-17-7609 Jury Trial 
··o°EE47:55 AM. Garreff·········-r·p·reTimfriary Issues ··································································----····················································· 
Swensen 
··os:·o"r-f1···AM~······················· ·Jury···Enfe·rs· .................................... ·························································································································· ...................... ··········· 
09:02:56 AM Judge Reads Jury Instructions 
.. 6§:·o°J":2·:fANi" .................................... Jury Roif"Call ················································································ .................. . ........... . 
.. 09: 10:24 .. AM ....................................... Jury .. Sworn .. for. Voir .. Dire ................................................................................................................................  
09:28:25 AM I Judge Lists witnesses 
::32:03 A~j~!~:e~-::~::~=:=~=~-~:~-~ -___ ----~~~:~~=~~~ 
09:45:50 AM Moves to excuse Juror #2 for cause 
09:46:36 AM i Anita Submits - ········ ............ .. 
Moore ............................. ----,r-----------G-· ................................................................................................ __ .................................................................. ____ _ 
09:46:39 AM Judge I Excuses Juror #2 
T0:05'06-:J\Ml ~!~;::~- passes panel foC_c_a_u_s_e ······················---····················---.-_~~:~~~-= 
10:05:04 AM i Anita Voir Dire 
···············--- l Moore··············'···········································································---······························································································································· 
10:29:52 AM I Passes panel for cause .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
10:36: 16 AM Peremptory 
10:42:26 AM Final 6 jurors Sworn 
····································--········································································································· 
10:42:41 AM Remaining Juror Exits 
·······················································---··························································································----··································································································· 
10:43:41 AM Final 6 jurors seated .................................................................................... , .... __ _ --.......................... ___ , ---.. ······ .................................................................... . 
10:44:14 AM Recess 
·················································································································································································································································································---
11 :04:53 AM back on the record 
11 :05:14 AM Anita I Moves to exlude witnesses 
················································ .. ~.~.~.~~··············!·······································----······················----··························------
11 :05:43 AM Garrett Victim 
Swensen 
--························--························································································································---
11 :06:08 AM I Judge Exlude witnesses- except Victim 
i Lojek . 
................................................ i' .................................... o, ............................................... _______ ............................................................................................................................ . 
11 :07:00 AM I Anita I Would like copies of exhibits 
-11:01:42AMI ~~:e':t-licanoomp1;;wiihihiil- - ---- - --- - - - ---
TF07~59AMi~:::•en-Lchib-it_s_m_a-rked··············································----··························································································· 
, Lojek i 
................................................ ,0, .................................... 0, ................................................................................................................................................. ___ ...................................................... . 
11:10:44 AM I I Jury Enters 
: : 
8/11/2017 






Lojek Zuber 8/11/17 1A-CRT400 
11:12:27 AM Judge I Jury Instructions 
..................... __ ..... Lojek i ---...................... __ _ 
11 :23:24 AM Garrett Opening Statement 
Swensen 
---...................... __ _ 
11 :25:56 AM Anita 1 Opening Statement 
............................. : Moore ... ..J ........... .. 11 :30:13 AM Garrett Call_s_S_W-#1 ...................................................................................................................................... . 
Swensen 
---...................... ---
11 :30:50 AM SW #1 Sworn By Clerk 
11 :31 :29 AM Nancy Vanwinkle DX 
___ , ___ .......................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................. , ___ .......................... --
11 :31 :39 AM States name for record 
11 :37:22 AM Anita Objection- relevance .. ____ ......................................................................................................................... .. 
Moore 
........................... ----. ________ .................................................................... . 
11 :37:25 AM Garrett Response 
Swensen 
_____ .................................................................. --
11 :38:09 AM j Judge i,. Sustained 
I Lojek . 
.. 11 :38: 13 AM! SW #1 [ Continues DX . ................................ .. .............................................................. . 
11 :38:34 AM I Garrett i Nothing further .............................. .. ...................................................................... .. 
Swensen j 
11 :38:37 AM Anita f CX 
----........................................................................................ __ _ 
Moore 1 .. f1·:38:40 .. AM. ·sw·#1 ............. t·cx ............................................................. ___ ...................................................................................  
:~:::;;::: i2!:e-n I::::::;:;::-:-:_. __ .... _ .......... _ ...... _ .. _________ ----....... -..... -...... -..... -..... ::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
.Tf: 38:49 AM 1 Judge ... I.Witness Ex·cused ............................................................................................................................... .. 
i Lojek ' 
, __ ..........., ..................... , ___________ .............................. , ____ .......................................................................................... . 
11 :39:27 AM Garrett 
Swensen 
Calls SW#2 
11 :39:46 AM SW #2 . Sworn By Clerk 
................................................ · .................................................................................. ____ _ 
11 :40: 12 AM Hillary Hensle 
______ ......................................................................... .. 
---.................................................... . 
... fr.4'6:3·2 AM DX ....................................................................................................................................................................................................  
......... .............. --.......................................................................... , ______ ................................................................ ---
11 :41 :49 AM ID's defendant ........................................................................................... __ ................................ ____ ............................................ --............................................................. .. 
11 :42:32 AM Anita . Objection- Relevance 
Moore 1 
11 :42:41 AM 1 Garrett ! Response 
!Swensen I 
I i 
... ff.42:44 AM j•Judge 't"overruieci .................................................................. , __ .......................................................................................................... . 
i Lojek i 
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11 :46:22 AM SW #2 Reviews SE #'s 3, 4, 5 and 6 
........................................... __ ............................................ ____ ......................... ·---······••00,,, ........................................... . 
11 :47:41 AM Garrett Move to admit 
Swensen 
11 :47:45 AM Anita I No Objection 
, Moore I 
11 :47:48 AMI Judge 1--: S-E-#-,s--3,-4-,-5-a-nd 6 will be admitted 
Lojek i 
·Tf)f9:2f)i~M Anita [ O-b-1e_c_ti_o-n-_a_s_k-ed-a-nd-an_s_w_e-re_d_········································································---····················· 
Moore 
-----····································· 
11 :49:29 AM Garrett Will withdraw 
Swensen 
___ ,,., .................................................... . 
11 :49:50 AM Judge Sustained 
i Lojek , 
··········•······························ ························································------································································································································· 
11 :53:29 AM Garrett Nothing further 
Swensen 
---···················································································································-----············································································································· 
11 :55:11 AM Jury Exits 
....... ...... ······································································--- ---····················································································--
11 :56: 15 AM ---· ··~·~·~·~·~~ ............................................................................................................................................................................................................  
01 :05:39 PM back on the record 
----··························································································· 
01 :05:57 PM I Judge I Ready to bring Jury back in 
: Lojek : 
··6r·o"a:3f."i=irvft·······························--r-jury· .. Ente"ii········.. ·································································· ··················································· 
··o"f :·of:4·9 .. "i:ifvff sw #2 ·••i•h~ick·on··ffi·e ... sfiind················ ·································································· 
01:08:46 PMIAnita icx ······································································ ························································· 
................................................ i .. ~.~.~E~ .............. i·······---········································································································································------
o1 :09:03 PM Garrett Objection- collective 
Swensen 





01:13:22 PM Garrett Objection- relevance 
Swensen 
·························································································································································---········································---··························································· 
01:13:28 PM Anita Response 
Moore , 
----•········· ····································---······························································--- ---
01: 13:38 PM. Judge I Overruled 
i Lojek i 
01:15:16 PMjGarrett [Objection-Relevanc-e---············································------··································· 
!Swensen I 
01: 15: 19 PM i Anita i Response 
I Moore i ................................................ · .~ ........... __ ........................................ __ ___ .......................................................... ---
01:15:20 PMIJudge :overruled 
i Lojek i 
8/11/2017 3 of 6 
000047
Lojek Zuber 8/11 /17 1 A-CRT 400 
01 :16:22 PM Garrett Objection- Relevance 
Swensen 
················································+--------. 
01 :16:24 PM Anita i Response 
___ ............................ ___ ,,,, ........................................................................ . 
: Moore I 
................................................ ½ .................................... }················· .. •••••• ........................................................................ ___ ,,., .................................................................................................... . 
01:16:35 PM\Judge \Overruled 
i Lojek I 
01:17:49 PMf Anita [Nothing further ······································································································· 
~:-i?'.53 r~J~E:~~J::::= ____ -~~~::- ----- -- ----~~~----~~:= 
01 :19:51 PM \Anita 1 Objection- asked and answered 
I Moore · 
----.....--............................................................. ·-------............................................................................................................ ---! 
01: 19:54 PM Garrett Response 
Swensen 
-------··· .................... -----.............................. __ _ ---······················--
01:19:56 PM Judge Sustained 
Lojek 
----lf---00,,00,,.,,,,,,,,.,,.,,.,.,,,, •••••• .. •••••• .. •• .......... •••••••• .... •• .. -------•• ............................ ____ .. ,,.,.,,,,.,,,,,,,,, 
01 :20:14 PM 
1 
~~:e i Objection- beyond the scope of cross 
.. o'f:·2·□-:2·2 PM j Garrett" ............. R.esponse .................................................................. . ....................................................................................................... . 
················································'·~~ensen ---................................................................ . 
1 Sustained 01 :21:10 PM Judge 
Lojek 
--+--'----;, ................................................ ·---·························· ................................................................................................................................ . 
01 :21 :37 PM Garrett 
Swensen 
Nothing further 
01 :21 :45 PM Anita I Nothing further 
Moore I 
01 :21-:-49_P_M-11•Jucige ............... f"i~xcu·sed .. from courtroom·~··subject to re·caff" .......................................................................................... . 
Lojek l 
-----1,--- .. ········ ............... ········································· ...................... .. .................................................. . 
01 :22:52 PM Garrett calls SW 
Swensen 
................................. ___ .............................................................. ___ _ 
01 :22:56 PM SW #3 Sworn By Clerk 
--··························--------
•····•·········································· .................................................................................................... ----·············· .. ······ .. ······························----
01:24:10 PM Jeremy Miller 
............................. ·······································································------································································----
o1 :24:14 PM Nampa Police Officer ......................................................................................... .. ................... ·--········································································ .............................. . 
01:24:19 PM DX 
.......................................................................................................................................... ---.......................................................................................... . 
01:28:04 PM Reviews SE #1 
-------.. ············ .. ··············································--
01 :28:49 PM Garrett Move to admit and publish SE #1 
1 Swensen I 
01 :29:00 PM! Anita I No objection 
: Moore I 
01 :29:05 PMl Judge f SE #1 will be admitted 
i Lojek i 
---························································· 
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01 :30:51 PM Plays audio 
-----····················································· 01 :32:43 PM Garrett Nothing further 
Swensen 
·····························································--··········································································································································································-----01 :32:46 PM. Anita No questions 
I Moore 
................................................ .$, ....... __ _ 
01 :32:51 PM I Judge i,,! Excused from courtroom- subject to recall 
i Lojek ................................................. 





01 :34:01 PM Anita Would like to be heard outside presence of Jury 
: Moore , ........................... . .................................... ~ ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... . 
01 :34: 18 PM! ! Jury···~~~~~···-----······································································--··························································· ··01 :34:49 Pfvfl°A.n"ifa····· ! Moves for Judgment of aquittal/Judgment of dismissal 
i Moore \ 
----------················································································································································· 01 :39:57 PM i Judge I response 
..................................... i Lojek·························································--······························----- --··························································· 01 :47:31 PM Garrett Reponse 
Swensen 
___ .......................................................................................................................... ----------····--··••00 .. ,, ................................................ . 
01 :51 :29 PM Anita Final word 
Moore ___ .......................... __ ,,,,,,,,,, .. ,, ............ ,, .. .,,,.,,,., .. ,.,. .. ,. .. ,.,.,.,.,. .. ,. .... ,. .. ,. .. ,.,.,,,. .. ,.,.,.,.,. .. ,. .. . 
01 :53:03 PM i Judge motion denied Re Rule 48 
~!i!~r~~1:::::-;1t~~~~:~v?- -- ---- ---===;~~=-~= 
i Lojek i 
··,12·:·32:03 .PMTAn"ita·····-..... 1-0-ef-ense will rest 
i Moore : 
::q?.:):~~?.J::·PM. ······· ! Jury_E_n_te_rs _____ .................................. ::············ .. ······························:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ...................................... . 
----····························································································································· 
02:36:48 PM Anita i Defense Rests 
Moore I 
02:36:5_8_P_M_,i Judge f lnst-ru-ct_s_J_u_ry---······················---······························································--
................................................ l .. ~.?.J~.~ ................. ·. ___ .............. ___ _ 
02:38:01 PMJ Jury Exits 
----··········································································································· 
··02·:·39:44 ·i=>rvi·1 ·······Recess··················································· ················································································· 
················································•·········································································································---············································---······················································· 
.. o3:03:55···PM i Back on the record ······················---······························································----03:04:00 PM l Judge Jury instruction discussion with counsel 
i Lojek , 
03:12:01 PM Anita f Proposed demonastrative 
Moore 
················································ ·····················································---······························----····························································································---03:15:11 PM Garrett Objection 
Swensen 
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03: 15: 17 PM l Judge Overruled 
i Lojek 
03:20:28 PM __ Recess .. 
03:33:37 PM Jury Enters 
·---··································································· 
----················································· 03:38:50 PM Jury Instructions 03:42'"38PM]~=~!en ClosinQACQ,_um_e_n_t--··········· .... ··· ............................................................................................................... . 
03:53:52 PM i Anita j Closing Argument --······················---
l Moore l 
......................................... : ······················ .. ····---- ---··························--····························································---04:04:03 PM Garrett Final Word 
Swensen 
---································································· 04:08:17 PM Bailif Sworn by clerk ..................................... ---················································································· 04:09:07 PM Jury Exits 
---························ .. ··································•·············· 04: 10: 13 PM Deliberation 
Iti¾~i~~~~~l~~;1;:c-¥-.:-:-:-~~-d-ic-t --- - ~===~ --~~~~ ·· -=: 
..................................................................................................................................... 
05: 15:07 PM Clerk Reads Verdict- Guilty ··o"s:··1·"effY·P·ivf ·Jury···i=io"iied···· ·································································· ····················································· 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ·-----a 
05: 17:29 PM Jury Exits 
···························•············· ····································------··········································································--····································--05:20:21 PM End Of Case 
···························································································································································---····························································································--o5:20:21 PM 
.. ::::: .....::::: ...... :::::: .....::::: .....::::: ...... :::::: .....::::: .....=-l--··························------······························································--························--····················· 
05:20:21 PM 







A.M ___ _. .. M.-.-L...-c---
AUG 11 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DAYSHA ZUBER 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA, STATE OF IDAHO 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 





Case No. CR01-17-7609 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Submitted to the jury this 11th day of August, 2017. 
Judge Michael Lojek 
Magistrate Judge 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER ! 
In a moment the Clerk will call the roll of the jury. When your name is 
called you will also be identified with a number. Please remember your number 
as we will be using it later in the jury selection process. 
The Clerk will now call the roll of the jury. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, you have been summoned as prospective jurors 
in the lawsuit now before us. The first thing we do in a trial is to select 6 jurors 
from among you. 
I am Judge Michael Lojek, the judge in charge of the courtroom and this 
trial. The deputy clerk of court is Daysha Zuber. She will mark the trial exhibits 
and administers oaths to you jurors and to the witnesses. 
Each of you is qualified to serve as a juror of this court. This call upon 
your time does not frequently come to you, but is part of your obligation for your 
citizenship in this state and country. No one should avoid fulfilling this obligation 
except under the most pressing circumstances. Service on a jury is a civic and 
patriotic obligation, which all good citizens should perform. 
Service on a jury affords you an opportunity to be a part of the judicial 
process, by which the legal affairs and liberties of your fellow men and women 
are determined and protected under our form of government. You are being 
asked to perform one of the highest duties of citizenship, that is, to sit in 
judgment on facts, which will determine the guilt or innocence of persons 
charged with a crime. 
To assist you with the process of selection of a jury, I will introduce you to 
the parties and their lawyers and tell you in summary what this action is about. 
When I introduce an individual would you please identify yourself for the jury 
panel. 
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The state of Idaho is the plaintiff in this action. The lawyer representing 
the state is Garret Swenson, a member of the Ada County Prosecutor's Office. 
The defendant Aaron Lantis is represented by Anita Moore. I will now read you 
the pertinent portion of the complaint which sets forth the claim against the 
defendant. The complaint is not to be considered as evidence but is a mere 
formal charge against the defendant. You must not consider it as evidence of 
his guilt and you must not be influenced by the fact that a charge has been filed. 
With regard to Aaron Lantis, the complaint charges that he, on or about 
the 4th day of July, 2016 did commit the crime of Disturbing the Peace, A 
violation of Idaho State Code 18-6409. To this charge, a plea of not guilty has 
been entered. 
The initial 14 jurors have been randomly selected by the Jury Commission 
and are properly seated in the jury box. 
In this part of the jury selection, you will be asked questions touching on 
your qualifications to serve as jurors in this particular case. This part of the case 
is known as the vior dire examination. 
Voir dire examination is for the purpose of determining if your decision in 
this case would in any way be influenced by opinions which you now hold or by 
some personal experience or special knowledge which you may have concerning 
the subject matter to be tried. The object is to obtain six persons who will 
impartially try the issues of this case upon the evidence presented in this 
courtroom without being influenced by any other factors. 
Please understand that this questioning is not for the purpose of prying 
into your affairs for personal reasons but is only for the purpose of obtaining an 
impartial jury. 
Each question has an important bearing upon your qualifications as a 
juror and each question is based upon a requirement of the law with respect to 
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such qualifications. Each question is asked each of you, as though each of you 
were being questioned separately. 
If your answer to any question is yes, please raise your hand. You will 
then be asked to identify yourself by both your name and juror number. 
At this time I would instruct both sides to avoid repeating any question 
during this voir dire process which has already been asked. I would ask counsel 
to note, however, that you certainly have the right to ask follow-up questions of 
any individual juror based upon that juror's response to any previous question. 
The jury should be aware that during and following the voir dire 
examination one or more of you may be challenged. 
Each side has a certain number of "peremptory challenges", by which I 
mean each side can challenge a juror and ask that he or she be excused without 
giving a reason therefore. In addition each side has challenges "for cause", by 
which I mean that each side can ask that a juror be excused for a specific 
reason. If you are excused by either side please do not feel offended or feel that 
your honesty or integrity is being questioned. It is not. 
The clerk will now swear the entire jury panel for the voir dire examination. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER ,2. 
During the course of this trial, including the jury selection process, you are 
instructed that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or with anyone 
else, nor to form an opinion as to the merits of the case until after the case has 
been submitted to you for your determination. 
000055
INSTRUCTION NUMBER ~ 
Now that you have been sworn as jurors to try this case, I want to go over 
with you what will be happening. I will describe how the trial will be conducted 
and what we will be doing. At the end of the trial I will give you more detailed 
guidance on how you are to reach your decision. 
Because the state has the burden of proof, it goes first. The state will 
begin by making an opening statement of the case. After the state's opening 
statement, the defense may make an opening statement, or may wait until the 
state has presented its case. 
The state will offer evidence that it says will support the charge(s) against 
the defendant. The defense may then present evidence, but is not required to 
do so. If the defense does present evidence, the state may then present rebuttal 
evidence. This is evidence offered to answer the defense's evidence. 
After you have heard all the evidence, I will give you additional instructions 
on the law. After you have heard the instructions, the state and the defense will 
each be given time for closing arguments. In their closing arguments, they will 
summarize the evidence to help you understand how it relates to the law. After 
the closing arguments, you will leave the courtroom together to make your 
decision. During your deliberations, you will have with you my instructions, the 
exhibits admitted into evidence and any notes taken by you in court. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER ~ 
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to 
be innocent. The presumption of innocence means two things. 
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The 
state has that burden throughout the trial. The defendant is never 
required to prove his or her innocence, nor does the defendant ever have 
to produce any evidence at all. 
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible or 
imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It 
may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or 
from lack of evidence. If after considering all the evidence you have a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER § 
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my 
instructions to those facts, and in this way to decide the case. In so doing, you 
must follow my instructions regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or 
should be, or what either side may state the law to be. You must consider the 
instructions as a whole, not picking out one and disregarding others. The order 
in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the 
evidence before you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in 
your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital to the 
administration of justice. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in 
this trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits 
offered and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of 
evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At times during the trial, an 
objection may be made to a question asked a witness, or to a witness' answer, 
or to an exhibit. This simply means that I am being asked to decide a particular 
rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed to aid the 
Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I 
sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may not answer 
the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to guess what 
the answer might have been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly, if I 
tell you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of 
your mind, and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations. 
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law 
which should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At 
other times I will excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable 
while we work out any problems. You are not to speculate about any such 
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discussions. They are necessary from time to time and help the trial run more 
smoothly. 
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," 
"direct evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these 
terms. You are to consider all the evidence admitted in this trial. 
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the 
sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and 
what weight you attach to it. 
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You 
bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your 
lives. In your everyday affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, 
what you believe, and how much weight you attach to what you are told. The 
same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in making these 
decisions are the considerations which you should apply in your deliberations. 
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because 
more witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your job is to think 
about the testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you 
believe of what he or she had to say. 
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give his 
or her opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such 
opinion, you should consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness and 
the reasons given for his or her opinion. You are not bound by such opinion. 
Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it entitled. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2 
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am 
inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to 
be influenced by any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, 
nor will I intend to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not 
worthy of belief; what facts are or are not established; or what inferences should 
be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine seems to indicate an 
opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER Z 
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That 
subject must not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the defendant guilty, it 
will be my duty to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment. 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER I 
If you wish, you may take notes to help you remember what witnesses 
said. If you do take notes, please keep them to yourself until you and your fellow 
jurors go to the jury room to decide the case. You should not let note-taking 
distract you so that you do not hear other answers by witnesses. When you 
leave at night, please leave your notes in the jury room. 
If you do not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was 
said and not be overly influenced by the notes of other jurors. In addition, you 
cannot assign to one person the duty of taking notes for all of you. 
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. . 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER .i 
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following 
instructions at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the 
court during the day or when you leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the 
attorneys, parties, witnesses, your friends, or members of your family. "No 
discussion" also means no emailing, text messaging, tweeting, blogging, posting 
to electronic bulletin boards, and any other form of communication, electronic or 
otherwise. 
Do not discuss this case with other jurors until you begin your deliberations at 
the end of the trial. Do not attempt to decide the case until you begin your 
deliberations. 
I will give you some form of this instruction every time we take a break. I do 
that not to insult you or because I don't think you are paying attention, but 
because experience has shown this is one of the hardest instructions for jurors to 
follow. I know of no other situation in our culture where we ask strangers to sit 
together watching and listening to something, then go into a little room together 
and not talk about the one thing they have in common: what they just watched 
together. 
There are at least two reasons for this rule. The first is to help you keep an 
open mind. When you talk about things, you start to make decisions about them 
and it is extremely important that you not make any decisions about this case 
until you have heard all the evidence and all the rules for making your decisions, 
and you won't have that until the very end of the trial. The second reason for the 
rule is that we want all of you working together on this decision when you 
deliberate. If you have conversations in groups of two or three during the trial, 
you won't remember to repeat all of your thoughts and observations for the rest 
of your fellow jurors when you deliberate at the end of the trial. 
Ignore any attempted improper communication. If any person tries to talk to 
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you about this case, tell that person that you cannot discuss the case because 
you are a juror. If that person persists, simply walk away and report the incident 
to the marshal. 
Do not make any independent personal investigations into any facts or 
locations connected with this case. Do not look up any information from any 
source, including the Internet. Do not communicate any private or special 
knowledge about any of the facts of this case to your fellow jurors. Do not read 
or listen to any news reports about this case or about anyone involved in this 
case, whether those reports are in newspapers or the Internet, or on radio or 
television. 
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for information on-line and to 
"Google" something as a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting 
for jurors to do their own research to make sure they are making the correct 
decision. You must resist that temptation for our system of justice to work as it 
should. I specifically instruct that you must decide the case only on the evidence 
received here in court. If you communicate with anyone about the case or do 
outside research during the trial it could cause us to have to start the trial over 
with new jurors and you could be held in contempt of court. 
While you are actually deliberating in the jury room, the marshal may 
confiscate all cell phones and other means of electronic communications. 
Should you need to communicate with me or anyone else during the 
deliberations, please notify the marshal. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. I 0 
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to 
the law. 
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some 
and ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the 
rules, you are bound to follow them. If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell 
you, it is my instruction that you must follow. 
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INSTRUCTION NO 11 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Disturbing the Peace, the state 
must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about July 4, 2016, 
2. in the state of Idaho, 
3. the defendant, Aaron Eugene Lantis, maliciously and willfully 
4. disturbed the peace or quiet of Hillary Henslee 
5. by offensive conduct. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
000066
1.:z.. INSTRUCTION NO. __ _ 
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If 
you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on 
that precise date. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1. 2> 
"Malice" and "maliciously" mean the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to 
do a wrongful act. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ,i L( 
An act is "wilful" or done "wilfully" when done on purpose. One can act wilfully 
without intending to violate the law, to injure another, or to acquire any advantage. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. .1.r;-
As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply 
those facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the 
evidence presented in the case. 
The evidence you are to consider consists of: 
1. sworn testimony of witnesses; 
2. exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and 
3. any facts to which the parties have stipulated. 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
1. arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. 
What they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other 
times is included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If 
the facts as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have 
stated them, follow your memory; 
2. testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been 
instructed to disregard; 
3. anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ) 6 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. 
The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice and 
assistance of the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the 
fact that the defendant does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or 
enter into your deliberations in any way. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of 
some of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the 
facts. In a few minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you, and then you will 
retire to the jury room for your deliberations. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are 
important. It is rarely productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of 
your opinion on the case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the 
beginning, your sense of pride may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your 
position even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or 
advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the 
ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before 
making your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all 
of the evidence you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with 
the law that relates to this case as contained in these instructions. 
During your deliberations, you each have a right to re-examine your own views and 
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest 
discussion that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw 
and heard during the trial and the law as given you in these instructions. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the 
objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual 
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after 
a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
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However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or 
effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of 
the jury feels otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. .18 
The original instructions and the exhibits will be with you in the jury room. They 
are part of the official court record. For this reason please do not alter them or mark on 
them in any way. 
The instructions are numbered for convenience in referring to specific instructions. 
There may or may not be a gap in the numbering of the instructions. If there is, you 
should not concern yourselves about such gap. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. j_ 4 
You have been instructed as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you 
to reach a verdict. Whether some of the instructions apply will depend upon your 
determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of 
facts which you determine does not exist. You must not conclude from the fact that an 
instruction has been given that the Court is expressing any opinion as to the facts. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2D 
Upon retiring to the jury room, select one of you as a presiding juror, who will 
preside over your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; 
that the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every 
juror has a chance to express himself or herself upon each question. 
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you all arrive at a verdict, the 
presiding juror will sign it and you will return it into open court. 
Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise. 
If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully 
discussed the evidence before you, the jury determines that it is necessary to 
communicate with me, you may send a note by the marshal. You are not to reveal to me 
or anyone else how the jury stands until you have reached a verdict or unless you are 
instructed by me to do so. 
A verdict form suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you 
with these instructions. 
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Criminal No. CR0l-17-7609 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF 
ACQUITTAL 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, AARON LANTIS, by and through his 
Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender's Office, Anita Moore, handling attorney, 
and, pursuant to Rule 29( c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules, hereby moves this Honorable Court for 
its order acquitting Mr. Lantis of the charge of disturbing the peace in violation of§ 18-6409, 
Idaho Code, the court having previously denied his pre-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal 
under Rule 29(a) and dismissal under Rule 48 on August 11, 2017, and the jury having 
subsequently entered a verdict of guilty on the same day. This motion is made on the grounds 
that the state's evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction in that it fails to prove an actus 
reus that falls within the strictures of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL - 1 
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ARGUMENT 
After the state rested, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal and dismissal, 
respectively, pursuant to Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, and cited in support State 
v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct.App.2015), rev. den. State v. Pierce, _ Idaho _, 2016 Ida. 
LEXIS 28 (2016). After studying the Pierce decision, the court denied the defense's motion, 
holding that the present case was distinguishable. In support of its ruling, the court cited the 
Court of Appeals' comment, 159 Idaho at 664, that "[i]t is undisputed that the state did not 
provide evidence at trial that Pierce disturbed the peace of his ex-wife and her children, within 
the meaning of I.C. § 18-6409." The court apparently interpreted this comment to mean that the 
state in Pierce had failed to offer any evidence as to the effect of Pierce's conduct upon the 
complaining parties, since it contrasted this with the state of the evidence in the present case, 
which included Hillary Henslee's testimony that Mr. Lantis' conduct left her feeling humiliated, 
fearful for her job, and worried what recipients of the email in question thought of her. This, the 
court held, was sufficient grounds to deny Mr. Lantis' motion and send the case to the jury. The 
trial proceeded and then went to the jury; after about an hour of deliberation, the jury entered a 
guilty verdict. 
The Pierce case, however, bears closer examination. Pierce went to trial in Canyon 
County, the Hon. Dayo Onanubosi presiding, and was convicted of violating a protection order 
in violation of§ 39-6312, Idaho Code. The state's theory of the offense was that the standard-
form protection order, entered during the course of a contentious divorce, contained a clause 
directing Pierce not to disturb the protected party's peace; and that he disturbed her peace on two 
separate occasions by having the water and the electricity, respectively, shut off at his home 
where she was residing. Pierce made pre-verdict and post-verdict motions for judgment of 
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acquittal under Rule 29, which motions were denied. He then appealed to the district court, the 
Hon. Duff McKee presiding. The district court reversed on several grounds, the most pertinent 
of which for purposes of the instant case was that the conduct alleged did not constitute 
disturbing the peace within the meaning of§ 18-6409. 
The state appealed further, raising the single issue whether the district court on 
intermediate appeal erred by holding the state to the standards set by § 18-6409 when it had not 
chosen to charge Pierce with a violation of that statute. Although Pierce raised additional issues 
in his respondent's brief, the Court of Appeals did not address these; instead, it rejected the 
state's argument that § 18-6409 was inapplicable, and affirmed the district court, holding that it 
was undisputed that the state offered no evidence that Pierce had disturbed the peace within the 
meaning of§ 18-6409. The Idaho Supreme Court then, without opinion, declined the state's 
invitation to review the Court of Appeals. 
1. The Pierce Case Is Not in Fact Distinguishable from the Present Case in Its Most 
Critical Aspects; Pierce Strongly Supports the Defense's Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal. 
It is critical to note that, in the comment cited above that this court found significant, the 
Pierce court went on to add that the state did not provide evidence that Pierce disturbed the 
peace "within the meaning of I. C. § I 8-6409" ( emphasis added). In considering the clause 
"within the meaning of LC. § 18-6409" it is instructive to study Judge McKee's memorandum 
decision, which the Court of Appeals affirmed and quoted from. A courtesy copy of this 
memorandum decision is attached. 
To begin with, the memorandum decision makes clear that, so far from failing to proffer 
evidence about the effects of Pierce's conduct on the complaining party, the state elicited the 
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testimony of "several witnesses including the ex-wife on the consequences suffered on account 
of the breach." Memorandum Decision at 4. The court summed up "the turmoil all of this caused 
in the life of the protected party and her children .... ": 
Id. at 8. 
With respect to the water service, it appears there was little disruption. The 
situation was handled with several telephone calls, with the water service being 
restored within a few hours. The electrical service caused greater disruption. 
Power was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did not 
treat this as a weekend emergency, and power was not restored until sometime the 
next week. There was testimony that refrigerated and frozen foods were lost, and 
the protected party and her children had to impose upon friends for lodging for the 
several days until the power was turned back on. This, the state contends, was 
sufficient to constitute a "breach of the peace," with the jury being allowed to 
determine for themselves whether the actions in question should be deemed 
illegal .... 
The district court went on to note that disturbing the peace is a "well-recognized and 
useful catch-all" for plea bargaining purposes, but that in the absence of a stipulation to a factual 
basis, the state has to prove at least one of the "specific elements designated in the statute": 
No matter how this statute is dissected or rearranged, the circumstances of the 
case at bar do not fit. Telephoning a utility to arrange termination of service, no 
matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual noises, 
(b) tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, (d) 
anything related to guns or pistols, or (e) any use of vulgar or obscene language 
around children. 1 If the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the 
misdemeanor statute, the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred. 
Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). Thus, the key to the district court's holding on intermediate appeal 
was not that the state failed to offer evidence that the complaining party's peace was disturbed: 
the state clearly presented copious evidence to that effect. Rather, one of the problems for the 
state was that the charged conduct did not fit the legislature' s definition of disturbing the peace. 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court, of course, struck down as unconstitutional this last provision pertaining to vulgar 
language in front of children in State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885 (2004). 
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The instant case presents essentially the same problem. The amended complaint alleged 
that Aaron Lantis "did willfully and maliciously disturb the peace of a person, to-wit [sic]: 
Hillary Henslee, by offensive conduct by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to Hillary 
Henslee's employer." The charging instruction (No. 11) puts it in the following terms: "3. the 
defendant, Aaron Eugene Lantis, maliciously and willfully 4. disturbed the peace or quiet of 
Hillary Henslee 5. by offensive conduct." Judge McKee's analysis of the facts in Pierce is 
squarely on point in the instant case. Sending an offensive email to the complaining party's 
bosses, no matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual noises, (b) 
tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, or (d) anything 
related to guns or pistols. Since the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the 
misdemeanor statute, the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred, and this court should 
grant Mr. Lantis' Rule 29 motion. 
2. The Slippery Slope Is Fatal to the State's Theory of the Present Alleged Offense. 
An important issue on appeal in Pierce was the lack of a jury instruction to clarify the 
meaning of "breach of the peace" or "disturbing the peace," which the district court held - and 
the Court of Appeals agreed - is a term of art, not carrying the plain, ordinary dictionary 
meaning of those words or combination of words. Memorandum Decision at 9; Pierce, 159 
Idaho at 663-64. The jury was left to decide for itself what "disturbing the peace" meant, and, at 
one point in its deliberations, asked a question that made its level of confusion obvious. Id. at 5. 
The state's whole theory of the alleged offense in the case at bar raises substantially the same 
problem, namely, that the jury had too much scope to apply its own subjective standards in 
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determining whether the charged conduct - sending an email to the complaining party's bosses -
rose to the level of "offensive conduct" within the meaning of§ 18-6409. 
The district court in Pierce expanded on this problem, noting that it is the province of 
neither juries nor judges to make the law: the jury is there to determine facts, and the court is 
there to instruct on the law and resolve ambiguities in the law. Memorandum Decision at 9-10. 
"What a judge may not do is create law - identify new areas of conduct not included in the 
statute by the legislature, or within reach of the designated list of prohibited activities that is 
included." Id. at 10. It was impermissible for the court to leave the jury to decide what "breach 
the peace" meant, and thus whether the charged actions were prohibited by the protection order 
at issue in the case. "To allow the jury to interpret and determine the law according to the 
evidence in the case means that the jury could subjectively decide, based upon its own personal 
values, customs and standards, what is and what is not against the law at any given time, then to 
decide if what the defendant did in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law 
thus created. Under any theory oflaw, this is impermissible." Id. 
The district court then went on to elucidate the dangers of applying subjective 
assessments in determining whether a crime has been committed: 
... [T]he law is clear that where the courts do interpret the law to determine their 
application to particular facts, the interpretation must be based upon an objective 
standard relative to society generally, and not a subjective measure to the 
particular desires of any single individual. [Case cite omitted.] This is 
necessarily so, because the criminal law is an expression of what is and is not 
acceptable to society generally. It is not necessarily the measure of what is or is 
not acceptable conduct to an individual in any given situation between 
individuals. One can think of countless situations where conduct was somewhat 
sharp but not rude or tumultuous, positions that were stated firmly and with vigor, 
but were not loud or obnoxious, or conduct that was confrontational and perhaps 
contentious, but without threats, violence, firearms or the like. Few would 
seriously argue that any of these situations approach the level of misconduct 
required by the statute. Yet all of them include conduct that could be upsetting or 
unpleasant to a more sensitive individual at any given time. It would be 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL - 6 
000082
impermissible under any theory of law to allow the criminal code to be bent in 
such fashion that such a sensitive or perhaps irate individual could bring about 
the imposition of society's criminal sanctions upon nothing more than such 
personal and individual demands. 
Id. at 10-11 ( emphases added). 
The district court went on to note that courts have routinely stricken down enactments 
that sought to have illegal conduct determined on a case-by-case basis, citing the example of 
laws in the South against disturbing the peace based on general terms such as "'offensive 
conduct':" in one such case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that such a law could not be invoked to 
prosecute black people for sitting at a whites-only lunch counter, even though such conduct was 
considered by many at the time to be offensive. Memorandum Decision at 12. "The point is that 
it is not a subjective evaluation of the conduct in these cases, it is a careful catalog of objective 
elements that can be uniformly applied. This need for uniformity necessarily excludes jury 
participation in the definition of what is and what is not permitted. The jury measures the 
conduct to be sure; but only after the boundaries and intricacies in application have been defined 
by the court." Id. at 13. 
There is nothing absurd or far-fetched about the problem of the slippery slope. We 
currently live in an age when the nation is in a fever pitch of touchiness and highly overwrought 
sensibilities. We see people coming to blows over mere political differences, and destroying or 
calling for the destruction of historic monuments that they find offensive. We have even, in 
recent days, been treated to the spectacle of a popular cable sports network pulling a reporter off 
an assignment on the grounds that he bears a name very similar to that of a leading Civil War 
Confederate general. "Offensive conduct" is at present, and given the current national mood, an 
extremely big and ever-expanding tent. 
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But it is imperative that in the criminal justice system, where life, liberty and property are 
at stake, cooler heads prevail. In the instant case, we have a charge of disturbing the peace based 
solely on the theory of "offensive conduct." As we have seen, an extremely broad range of 
behaviors may be - and very often is - swept within the ambit of the word "offensive," viewed 
in isolation. Taking the word "offensive" in isolation, as the state has done in the present case, is 
the source of the slippery slope problem: it leaves the jury free to apply its own subjective 
standards to convict Mr. Lantis of a crime of the jury's own making and definition. The danger 
is all the greater when, as here, the conduct described in the complaint is of a character that is 
highly likely to arouse strong emotions. In such a situation, and with no other guidance than 
their own feelings on the meaning of "offensive conduct," the jury is free to define a crime not 
contemplated by the legislature and return a verdict of guilty. 
3. Either "Offensive Conduct" Must Be Interpreted in its Textual Context to 
Exclude the Charged Conduct or § 18-6409 is Void for Vagueness and 
Overbroad. 
Although the state's theory of the offense cannot stand without taking the word 
"offensive" in isolation, the word "offensive" does not in fact occur in isolation in the statute, 
and the canons of statutory construction require that it not be read in isolation. The statute must 
be read as a whole, with its components taken in the light of the surrounding text. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative 
body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language 
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted 
in the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a 
whole, and words should be given their plain, usual and ordinary meanings. It 
should be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of 
the statute so that none will be void, superfluous or redundant. 
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State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863 , 867 (2011) (holding that "household member" for 
purposes of the attempted strangulation statute includes only those in an intimate relationship 
and excludes the parent-child relationship), quoting Ferber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 
307, 310 (2009). Further, "[i]n determining legislative intent, this Court applies the maxim 
noscitur a sociis, which means "a word is known by the company it keeps." Schultz, 151 Idaho 
at 867, citing State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816 (2000), overruled in part by State v. Poe, 139 
Idaho 885 (2004). 
Reading the word "offensive" in its proper context as part of a whole, and recognizing the 
word by the company it keeps, supports the McKee analysis as applied above. The type of 
conduct outlawed in § 18-6409 is clearly of the loud, boisterous and tumultuous variety that 
disrupts not merely a person' s interior peace of mind but exterior quiet and tranquility: 
• Loud or unusual noise 
• Tumultuous or offensive conduct 
• Threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting 
• Firing any gun or pistol 
• Disrupting services connected with the burial of the dead 
Even the now-stricken-down provision against using profane language in front of 
children is modified by the phrase "in a loud and boisterous manner." There is not even any 
reference in the statute to email or any other kind of electronic communication. It must be the 
case, then, that the "offensive conduct" the statute contemplates needs to be tumultuous, noisy, 
and generally part of a class of behaviors that breaches the exterior peace of a person or a 
community by means of some jarring and abrupt assault on the senses, or conduct calculated to 
incite or provoke violence. That necessarily excludes the state ' s theory that Aaron Lantis 
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disturbed the peace by sending an offensive email to Hillary Henslee ' s bosses: sending an 
upsetting email to third parties simply does not fall into this category of conduct. 
If, on the other hand, the state is right, and the word "offensive" is properly read in 
isolation and outside the context of the words that surround it, and it encompasses that which 
breaches only a persons' interior peace by provoking some negative emotional response, then § 
18-6409 must be void for vagueness and overbroad, since no one, including Mr. Lantis, is on fair 
notice as to what kind of conduct is prohibited, and since there is almost no behavior that it 
would not reach, including constitutionally protected conduct. 
The United States Supreme Court "has on more than one occasion invalidated 
statutes ... because they contained no standard whatever by which criminality could be 
ascertained, and the doctrine of these cases has subsequently acquired the shorthand description 
of 'void for vagueness."' Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 (1974), citing Lanzetta v. New 
Jersey, 306 U.S. 45 (1939); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). "In these cases, the 
criminal provision is vague 'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to 
an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of 
conduct is specified at all."' Id. , quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 
(1971).The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 , 457 (2001). This "doctrine requires that a 
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citation omitted). 
"The more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other 
principle element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines 
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to govern law enforcement."' Id. at 358, quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974). 
"Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a 
' standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal 
predilections."' Id. , quoting, Smith , 415 U.S. at 575. "Legislatures may not so abdicate their 
responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law." Smith , 415 U.S. at 575. Rather, 
the "absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion or exclusion is precisely what offends 
the Due Process Clause." Id. at 578 (citation omitted). Simply put, a law is void for vagueness 
when it subjects a person "to criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that police, court, 
and jury [are] free to react to nothing more than their own preferences .... " Id. When the 
accused asserts that a statute is vague as applied to the facts of his particular case, he must 
demonstrate the that statute "failed to provide fair notice that his conduct was proscribed or 
failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in 
determining whether to arrest him." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003). 
In this case, the state alleges that Mr. Lantis disturbed the peace of Ms. Henslee by using 
email to cause her embarrassment and hurt her employment situation. Since, as noted above, 
there is no reference to email or any other electronic communication in § 18-6409, there is 
nothing in the statute that puts the accused on notice that sending an email might constitute 
disturbing the peace. The state' s reading of § 18-6409 leaves it with far too much discretion to 
use the criminal law to avenge perceived wrongs committed via email without notice to 
reasonable persons that such perceived wrongs are criminal in nature. 
If the state' s theory of the offense in this case is justified, then § 18-6409 is also facially 
overbroad. The first step in determining whether a statute is facially overbroad is to determine 
whether that statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
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U.S. 601 , 614 (1973); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714. The next step in the analysis is to determine 
whether the statute precludes a significant amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Korsen, 
138 Idaho at 713. "If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion to consider rules of statutory 
construction. The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed 
legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." State v. Dickerson, 
142 Idaho 514, 517 (Ct.App.2006) (internal quotation marks and cites omitted). Courts "are not 
free to rewrite a statute under the guise of statutory construction." State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326 
(2009). 
Speech in its various forms is obviously protected by the First Amendment. While it is 
true that the right to free speech is not 100% unqualified, nevertheless, if the state is right in this 
case, and sending an "offensive" email can constitute disturbing the peace, then anyone who 
sends an email or indeed any sort of communication that someone else might deem "offensive" 
needs to fear the risk of being charged with a crime for doing so. Thus, the state' s theory of the 
offense in this case, if justified, means that § 18-6409 is overbroad. 
CONCLUSION 
The Pierce case - both at the level of intermediate appeal and at the Court of Appeals 
level - instructs us that there are limits to the kinds of upsetting conduct that can be addressed by 
the criminal justice system. In that case, as in the case against Aaron Lantis, the state presented 
plenty of evidence as to how disturbed the complaining parties were by the conduct alleged. 
Also, as in the Pierce case, the state ' s theory of the offense in the instant case left the jury free to 
apply its own subjective standards in determining whether the act of sending an "offensive" 
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email was criminal. But, as in Pierce, the acts alleged did not fall within the strictures of§ 18-
6409, Idaho Code. 
A proper reading of § 18-6409 requires the exclusion of the actus reus described in the 
complaint in this case, which means that the state has failed to offer evidence sufficient to sustain 
a conviction. Otherwise, if the state' s reading of § 18-6409 is true, then that statute must be 
facially overbroad, as sweeping a great deal of protected conduct within its ambit, and void for 
vagueness facially and as applied, for putting no one on notice that sending an "offensive" email 
may constitute the crime of disturbing the peace. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, AARON LANTIS, respectfully requests this Court to 
enter a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules. 
DATED, thi~ day of August, 2017. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this~ ay of August, 2017, I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to the: 
Ada County Prosecutor 
by email and by depositing the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
BRIAN W. PIERCE, 
Defendnat/ Appellant 
Case No. CR-2013-13285-C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This case is before this court on appeal from a judgment of conviction entered on 
a jury verdict by the magistrate below, and the subsequent denial of a post judgment 
motion for acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29. The appellant herein, Brian W. 
Pierce, appears by and through counsel, Nolan Sorenson, Office of Public Defender, 
Caldwell. The state appears by and though counsel, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Nancy 
Hurd, Canyon County Prosecutor's Office, Caldwell. The matter has been fully briefed, 
and submitted for decision on the briefs without argument. 
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For reasons stated, the judgment of conviction entered herein is reversed. The 
motion for acquittal presented to the court under Rule 29 is granted. The defendant is 
acquitted and all charges are dismissed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
The salient facts are not in dispute. At the time of the events in question in 2013, 
Pierce was in litigation with his ex-wife over issues pertaining to their divorce. On May 
15, 2013, an order was entered in the divorce proceeding directing that the house the 
parties had been living in was Pierce's separate property. The wife and her two children 
were permitted to live there. The two children were not Pierce's children. A domestic 
violence order was entered against Pierce - the temporary order was issued May 8, 2013, 
and the permanent order replaced the temporary after hearing on May 16, 2013. This 
order was to remain in place for a full year, unless modified by the court. The operative 
provisions of this order, as are relevant here, was apparently an identical provision in 
both orders which provided: 
Personal Conduct Order: Respondent shall not harass, annoy, disturb the 
peace of, telephone, contact, or otherwise communicate with ( either 
directly or indirectly, in person or through any other person): The 
protected person [ and] The minor children residing in the Protected 
Person's household. 
Both of the orders, including this paragraph, were pre-printed forms used by the court in 
connection with domestic abuse orders in Canyon County. Other than filling in names 
and addresses, and several blanks, the magistrate made no manuscript entries on either 
form. There is no dispute in this case that this order was entered, serially on the dates 
indicated, that both orders had been served on Pierce, and that he was aware of it. 
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On May 10, 2013, service for water to the subject house was cut off by the utility. 
On May 31, 2013, service for electricity to the subject house was cut off by the utility. 
The state alleged that both shut-offs were accomplished by Pierce calling the utilities and 
requesting that the services be terminated. At trial, the only evidence of Pierce's 
involvement was the testimony of the investigating detective, who testified that Peirce 
admitted to him that he (Pierce) had called the power company to shut off the power. 
There was no direct evidence of Pierce's involvement with the water shut off. 
Pierce was charged in a single count complaint with the misdemeanor offense of 
willfully violating the terms of the domestic abuse protection order, with knowledge of 
the prohibitions contained within the protection order, by turning off the utilities at the 
residence where the protected person and her children were residing, alleging that such 
disturbed the peace of the protected person and her children. 
Following a trial that was completed in less than one day, the jury returned a 
verdict finding the defendant guilty of the charge. A post trial motion for acquittal under 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 was denied. The defendant was sentenced on January 16, 2014. 
This appeal followed. 
Analysis 
The charge was violating a domestic violence order, with the charging language 
being that the defendant breached the peace of the protected party by his action in 
causing the water and power utilities to be shut off. The magistrate ruled that the phrase 
"breached the peace" was a term of art, and that reference to the Idaho Code criminal 
provision of disturbing the peace would be the criteria for defining the offense in the 
protective order. The crime, a misdemeanor, is at LC. § 18-6409, and provides as follows: 
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Disturbing the Peace: (1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the 
peace and quiet of any neighborhood, family or person by loud or unusual noise, 
or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, 
challenging to fight or fighting, or fires and gun or pistol or uses vulgar, profane 
or indecent language within the presence of hearing of children, in loud and 
boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
The trial consisted of the testimony of the investigation detective from the Canyon 
County Sheritrs office on the occurrence of the breach, and several witnesses including 
the ex-wife on the consequences suffered on account of the breach. The trial took less 
than one day. 
The charging instruction was a single instruction to the jury. The instruction was 
p~ared by drawing some specific language from the code section on the misdemeanor 
crime of breach the peace, adding this to the standard elements instruction for violation of 
a domestic protection order. This instruction, numbered for the jury as Instruction No. 
204 and edited here slightly to emphasize the relevant portions, read as follows: 
Instruction 204 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of violating a protection order, the 
State must prove each of the following elements: 
1. That on or about May 8, 2013 and June l, 2013; 
2. In the State ofldaho; 
3. The Defendant Brian Wade Pierce; 
4. Did willfully violate the temporary domestic violence order ... and 
the amended domestic violence order ••. by turning off the utilities 
at the residence where [the protected parties] were residing which 
disturbed the peace of [ the protected parties] with knowledge that a 
domestic violence protection order prohibits him from doi 
5. Before such violation, the defendant had notice of the order. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
The jury sent a question through the bailiff that frames the issue in this analysis: 
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rue we deciding if he willfully violated the order, i.e., did he shut off the utilities 
to disturb her peace or are we deciding if he willfully shut off the utilities and it 
disturbed her peace but he didn't necessarily know he was violating the order? 
Despite this red flare from the jury that plainly demonstrated that they were confused by 
the instructions and did not understand the issues to be resolved, the solution reached by 
the court below, with the concurrence of counsel, was to advise the jury that the answer 
was within the instructions they already had, and that no further instruction would be 
given. The error in not clarifying the jury's confusion is subsumed completely by the 
errors in the instructions themselves, discussed within. 
The charging instruction is wrong. The grammatical construction of the fourth 
element awkwardly attempts to put three concepts for the jury to decide into one 
sentence: (1) did or did not the state prove that the defendant shut off the utility in 
question, which act (2) did nor did not constitute a breach of the peace of the protected 
person, and (3) of which the defendant did or did not willfully intended to breach. As is 
apparent from the jury's question, the awkward sentence was confusing. The sentence 
could be read to mean that the court has already determined that shutting off the utility 
was a breach of the peace, and the only thing to be decided is whether the defendant 
intended or knew of the consequences. The instruction set as a whole was wrong in that 
the set did not include an instruction defining what would have been necessary to find 
that acts in question did constitute disturbing the peace - something to relate the acts in 
question to the elements contained in the statute, I.C. §18-6409. 
For the jury to determine its verdict, the jury must be able to determine and 
complete answer to each of these questions from the evidence at trial: 
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(a) Do the acts described in the charge (the termination of utilities) constitute one 
or more of the enumerated elements of "disturbing the peace" under the law of 
Idaho? 
(b) Did the defendant do one of these acts ( cause termination of utilities); 
( c) If so, did he do so willfully and with malice? 
( d) Did the defendant know of the existence of a protective order that prevented 
him from doing the acts? 
In my view, there is no way the circumstances described by the evidence should 
or could constitute a crime under the criminal statute, and therefore they could not form 
the basis for a charge of breach of the protective order by disturbing the peace. There is 
no other clause or part of the protective order that comes into play, and the state has not 
alleged any. The case should not have survived the Rule 29 motions; one of the defense 
motions for a directed verdict of acquittal at close of the state's case, or at the close of 
evidence, or post-trial should have been granted. 
According to the proof at trial, when the electrical power was shut off on or about 
May 31, the house belonged to the defendant. The final divorce orders were entered on or 
about May 15, 2013, which confirmed the house as being the separate property of the 
husband. Yet the protected parties continued to remain in the house, although it is not 
clear under what authority. There was no proof that the defendant had been ordered to 
allow the protected parties to remain in the house, or that he had to provide them with 
utilities. The protected parties were, in effect, tenants at sufferance of the defendant -
continuing to occupy the house after it had been awarded to him in the divorce, but 
before any legal steps had been taken either to clarify what their rights and obligations on 
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continuing occupancy would be or to evict them. None of this was brought into evidence 
at trial. 
The situation with respect to the water service is a little different, in that it is 
alleged that this utility was shut off on or about May 10, 2013, before the final divorce 
orders were entered. While the defense maintained that the house had always been the 
defendant's separate property, no evidence was offered at the trial here and, depending 
upon what the evidence might show in this issue, this position may not appear so clearly 
defined -- the status of this property as marital property may still have been open in early 
May. But even then, it is not alleged that the defendant was legally obligated to provide 
water service to the house where is soon-to-be ex-wife and her children were living. 
Although there were allegations about the water service, there was no competent 
proof at trial that the defendant had anything to do with the termination of water service. 
In reading the complete transcript, it turns out that minutes before the trial started, the 
court struck the witness from the water utility on motion of the defense for a discovery 
rule infraction. This meant that the only proof at trial of the defendant's involvement in 
any of the acts alleged consisted of the investigating detective's testimony that the 
defendant admitted to calling the power company on or about June 1, because be did not 
want to be liable for the power bills. (Tr. p. 110, 1. 1-5.) The detective did not follow up 
with any specific inquiry about the water utility. 
The defendant's admission to the sheriff's detective as to the power was the sum 
total of the evidence on defendant's guilt. The rest of the testimony was devoted to proof 
of the consequences - the turmoil all of this caused in the life of the protected party and 
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her children. On this proof, the issue of the water utility termination should not have 
gone to the jury. 
With respect to the water service, it appears there was little disruption. The 
situation was handled with several telephone calls, with the water service being restored 
within a few hours. The electrical service termination caused greater disruption. Power 
was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did not treat this as a 
weekend emergency, and power was not restored until sometime the next week. There 
was testimony that refrigerated and frozen foods were lost, and the protected party and 
her children had to impose upon friends for lodging for the several days until the power 
was turned back on. This, the state contends, was sufficient to constitute a "breach of the 
peace," with the jury being allowed to determine for themselves whether the actions in 
question should be deemed illegal. I conclude this to be error. 
I fully recognize that the charge of "disturbing the peace" is a well-recognized 
and useful catch-all into which all manner of questionable conduct can be cataloged for 
the purpose of closing troublesome cases. Invariably, these questionable situations turn 
up by stipulation in plea agreements whereby more significant charges are being 
dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to a disturbing the peace charge. These deals are 
usually at the defendant's request, and there is no one calling for any inquiry into whether 
the specific acts fit the statute. 
Without a stipulation, the State would be obligated to prove one or more of the 
specific elements designated in the statute had been violated or breached in order to 
sustain a conviction. No matter how this statute is dissected or rearranged, the 
circumstances of the case at bar do not fit. Telephoning a utility to arrange termination of 
Memorandum Decision Page- 8 
000097
( 
service, no matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual 
noises, (b) tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, (d) 
anything related to guns or pistols, or ( e) any use of vulgar or obscene language around 
children. If the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the misdemeanor statute, 
the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred. 
And if the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred, neither has the 
circumstance of violating a protective order by disturbing the peace. The magistrate 
below correctly observed that the term "disturbing the peace" is a term of art. It does not 
carry the plain ordinary dictionary meaning of the words, or combination of words. It 
carries the meaning of the statute -here, I.C. § 18-6409. 
The state argues that a jury can decide whether a given circumstance could be said 
to breach the peace of a given individual. The argument is wrong on two counts. The jury 
does not make the law, it is to determine the facts, and it is the responsibility of the judge 
to define the law, to set the frame for decision. State v. Golden, 61 Idaho 497, 186 P.2d 
485; State v. Bedwell, 77 Idaho 57, 61-62, 286 P .2d 641, 644 ( 1955). The judge may not 
make up law out of whole cloth but is bound by case precedent and by the acts of the 
legislature. State v. Delling. 152 Idaho 122, 131,267 P.3d 709, 718 (2011). lfthere is an 
ambiguity in the law, the judge must resolve the ambiguity - it would be improper to 
permit the jury to do so. But that is as far as it goes. The judge would also not be 
permitted to create new categories of conduct for sanction under the misdemeanor statute, 
absent a stipulation. Barnes v. Hinton, 103 Idaho 619, 620, 651 P.2d 553, 554 (Ct App. 
l 982)(Courts are empowered to resolve ambiguities in statutes, but have no power to 
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change the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature and cannot insert into 
statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not there.) 
The principle is that the legislature makes the law, the judge identifies and 
explains the law to the jury, and the jury determines whether facts exist or do not exist 
within the framework of the law as instructed by the court. The court may interpret the 
law, and break down complex provisions to provide relevant extracts for the jury's use. 
The court may fill in gaps, if such occur, but must do so consistently with what the 
legislature has enacted. What a judge may not do is create law - identify new areas of 
conduct not included in the statute by the legislature, or within reach of the designated list 
of prohibited activities that is included. 
In this case, the trial judge left for the jury to decide what the phrase "breach the 
peace" meant (which was error; this was a decision for the judge in instructing the jury); 
to then decide if what they thought the phrase meant was what the law intended when the 
phrase was used in the domestic protection order (which was error; the interpretation of 
the law is for the judge to determine and instruct). To allow the jury to interpret and 
determine the law according to the evidence in the case means that the jury could 
subjectively decide, based upon its own personal values, customs and standards, what is 
and what is not against the law at any given time, then to decide if what the defendant did 
in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law thus created. Under any 
theory of law, this is impermissible. 
The second flaw in the state's argument is that it presupposes as proper a 
subjective assessment of what might be considered a breach of the peace to a given 
individual. To the contrary, the law is clear that where the courts do interpret the law to 
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objective standard relative to to society generally, and not a subjective measure to the 
particular desires of any single individual. See State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,508, 988 
P .2d 1170, 1182 (1999). This is necessarily so, because the criminal law is an expression 
of what is and is not acceptable to society generally. It is not necessarily the measure of 
what is or is not acceptable conduct to an individual in any given situation between 
individuals. One can think of countless situations where conduct was somewhat sharp but 
not rude or tumultuous, positions that were stated firmly and with vigor, but were not 
loud or obnoxious, or conduct that was confrontational and perhaps contentious, but 
without threats, violence, firearms or the like. Few would seriously argue that any of 
these situations approach the level of misconduct required by the statute. Yet all of them 
include conduct that could be upsetting or unpleasant to a more sensitive individual at 
any given time. It would be impennissible under any theory of law to allow the criminal 
code to be bent in such fashion that such a sensitive or perhaps irate ·individual could 
bring about the imposition of society's criminal sanctions upon nothing more than such 
personal and individual demands. 
If the test here is to be under an objective standard of what is or should be 
acceptable or unacceptable to society generally, can it be said that a property owner's 
decision to notify a utility to terminate service could be considered wrongful or illegal? In 
the instant case, there was no evidence that the defendant instructed the power company 
not to tell the occupant or warn the occupant the power was being terminated. There is no 
evidence that the defendant was in any way involved with the actual action of shutting off 
the power. There is no claim that he was present to cheer on the power crew or to gloat 
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over his ex-wife's predicament The transaction was handled in the manner of hundreds 
of transactions at the power company where a property owner is telephoning in with an 
instruction for his account. 
The point here is that there is nothing about the transaction, when viewed in 
isolation, that could be consider wrong or improper or illegal in any respect. Insofar as 
defendant's expectations of his ex-wife's reaction, if the water company example applies, 
he would expect that with a few phone calls, the power would be restored in his ex-wife's 
name. Is not this exactly what a tenant moving out would think when advising the power 
company to terminate service in the tenant's name on a given date? How was the 
defendant to know that the power company would act on a Friday afternoon, or that the 
power company would not treat the issue as a weekend emergency, or that they would not 
notify he occupant if the power is being shut down. 
Where attempts have been made to leave such statutes open for case by case 
assessment of what was legal and illegal conduct, the courts have routinely stricken such 
laws as unconstitutional. The widest examples of such were the broadly drawn statues in 
the south that expressed the prohibitions in general terms such as "offensive conduct," 
without more. The United State Supreme Court, for example, held that a disturbing the 
peace ordinance could not be used where the only conduct being charged was against 
some black teenagers for sitting at a white-only lunch counter. See, Garner v. State of 
La., 368 U.S. 157, 82 S. Ct. 248, 7 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1961). It did not matter that the 
conduct was offensive to many. It would not be a jury question for the jury to decide 
whether the conduct under examination should be considered criminal. Under our law, it 
is the legislature in the first instance, and the judge where discretionary flexibility may 
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appears to exist, that is responsible to define where the division lines are between the 
merely rude and insulting and that which crosses the line into the sufficiently obnoxious 
to be criminal; between the innocently enthusiastic protest march, and one that involves 
the looting and destruction that accompanies the march that crosses the line. The point is 
that it is not a subjective evaluation of the conduct in these cases, it is a careful catalog of 
objective elements that can be uniformly applied. This need for uniformity necessarily 
excludes jury participation in the definition of what is and what is not permitted. The jury 
measures the conduct to be sure; but only after the boundaries and intricacies in 
application have been defined by the court. That was not done in this case, and the 
omission is reversible error. 
To summarize: there is no proof in this case that the defendant was involved in 
the termination of water to the property at all. For reasons not part of this appeal, the 
magistrates struck the state's witness on the water circumstance. However, for some 
reason, having stricken the witness, the state left the charge in for instructions and 
argument, and the jury apparently included it as part of their verdict Since a guilty 
verdict could have been based upon either one of the circumstances alleged, or on both, it 
was reversible error to leave this charge in through the final instruction's and argument. 
The act of a property owner asking the power company to shut off service is not, 
in the abstract, wrongful. It is a routine business decision carried out by countless 
property owners every day. There is no evidence that the defendant directed the power 
company to act in an underhanded, mean or evil manner. There was no evidence of 
whether the power company attempted to contact the occupants before the power was 
shut off. It is not explained why the power company did not treat the matter as a weekend 
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emergency when it learned the actual circumstances. There is no proof that the defendant 
knew how the power company was going to act. 
The conduct in question does not fit within any of the categories of conduct 
proscribed by the criminal statute, which is the necessary measure of action under the 
protective order. In my view, that is the end of it. Domestic protection orders are 
intended, as a matter of legislative policy, to protect the person of the protected parties-
to prevent violence and abusive misconduct. In the case of the addition of an ill-defined 
catch-all term - such as ''breach the peace" - the law requires that conduct falling into 
this catch-all be of the same general character or caliber as the conduct in the more 
clearly defined areas. This means the catch-all terms are limited to proscribing conduct 
directed at, or at least in the area of, the violent or abusive misconduct that precipitated 
this law in the first place. It would not countenance extending the law into every comer 
of commerce and business, making every business decision subject to examination over 
whether wtexpected inconveniences might spring up. 
The magistrate erred in not defining specifically the conduct that would have been 
subject to sanction wtder the criminal code or that was included within the call of the 
protective order. The magistrate was bound to explain to the jury where the lines were 
that would have to be crossed in order for what would otherwise be routine business 
decisions to be turned into criminal activity - whether under the disturbing the peace 
statute that was incorporated into the order or under any of the direct prohibitions of the 
protective order. 
The magistrate's error in failing to instruct meant that the jury was free to make 
up its own criminal bowtdaries or standards, and then determine whether this defendant 




had crossed the line or violated the standard which the jury had created. This is not 
permitted to the jury under any application oflaw. There simply was no evidence that the 
defendant acted with malicious intent or wanton disregard to harm his wife or her 
property. There was no evidence that the defendant knew the power company was going 
to act on a weekend, and then not respond to requests to restore service. There is no basis 
to place this on the back of the defendant in this case. Further, there was no reason for the 
defendant not to expect the power company to notify the occupants before the power was 
shut off, to give them time to act and restore service. Or if interrupted, not to expect that 
the interruption would have been brief, while the arrangements were made. There is no 
showing that the reasonable expectations of this case would have been any more onerous 
or inconvenient than befalls many a landlord or tenant caught up in identical situations in 
the ordinary process of moving in or out. 
Whatever the disagreements were that continued to plague these parties after their 
divorce, there is no sufficient evidence in his case that any of it crossed the line into the 
arena of the violent or abusive misconduct which is the gravamen of the protective order 
issued in this case. 
Conclusion 
For reasons stated, the judgment of conviction is and ruling denying the 
defendant's motion for acquittal are vacated and reversed. The case is remanded with 
directions to enter a directed verdict of acquittal and dismiss all charges. 
0.~ Dated thisu day of December, 2014. 
Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee 
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Aaron Eugene Lantis 
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SCHEDULING ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 
On August 25, 2017, counsel for defendant Aaron Lantis filed a Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29(c) (hereinafter "Motion"). 
On the same day, counsel served a copy of the Motion on the Ada County 
Prosecuting Attorney's Office by email and by interdepartmental mail. 
The State has until Monday, September 25, 2017, to file a written objection and/or 
other response to the Motion. 
The defendant shall then have until Monday, October 9, 2017, to file a reply to the 
State's pleading or until fourteen (14) days after the State files its pleading, 
whichever is earlier. 
The Sentencing Hearing currently scheduled for October 5, 2017, at 2:30 p.m. is 
hereby vacated and rescheduled to November 28, 2017 at 2:30 p.m. 
If either party wants to present oral argument in favor of or against the Motion, that 
party must contact the Court's clerk for an appropriate hearing date and time on or 
before November 1, 2017, and then properly file and serve a Notice of Hearing. If 
neither party requests oral argument by Monday, October 16, 2017, then the Court 
shall consider the matter to be fully submitted and will issue a decision without a 
hearing. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
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 COMES NOW, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, by and through D. Garrett Swenson, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State of Idaho, and objects to Defendant’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the State presented substantial evidence at trial upon 
which a rational trier of fact could have found the Defendant guilty of the crime alleged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Additionally, Defendant’s reliance on State v. Pierce is misplaced as Pierce is 
distinguishable from the present case. Finally, Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not impermissibly vague as 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The State charged Defendant with video voyeurism. The felony charges were dismissed at 
preliminary hearing on December 16, 2016, and refiled as misdemeanor disturbing the peace, a 
violation of Idaho Code § 18-6409. Idaho Code § 18-6409 provides: 
Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any 
neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or 
offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or 
fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, profane or indecent language 
within the presence or hearing of children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor.  
 
I.C. § 18-6409.  
 
 Specifically, the Complaint alleged that Defendant willfully and maliciously disturbed the 
peace of Hillary Henslee by offensive conduct by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to 
Hillary Henslee’s employer. Compl. ¶ 2. The case went to trial on August 11, 2017, and the jury 
returned a guilty verdict. Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 29(c) on August 25, 2017.  
ARGUMENT 
1. The Court should deny Defendant’s motion because the State presented substantial 
evidence of guilt at trial. 
 
 In reviewing a motion for acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29, a trial court uses the 
same standard applied in appellate review of convictions. State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 480, 482 
(Ct. App. 1989), citing State v. Mata, 107 Idaho 863 (Ct. App. 1984). “The trial court, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, must determine whether the inculpatory 
evidence presented as to any essential element of the crime is so insubstantial that jurors could 
not help but have a reasonable doubt.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 395 (Ct. App. 2000), 
citing Hoffman, 116 Idaho at 482. The trial judge must give full consideration to the right of the 
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jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be afforded evidence, and the right to 
draw all justifiable inferences. State v. Huggins, 103 Idaho 422, 427 (Ct. App. 1982). The 
appropriate standard, therefore, is “whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. 
Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684 (2004).  
 At trial, the State presented substantial evidence as to every element of disturbing the 
peace such that a trier of fact could have found—and did find—the Defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The elements of disturbing the peace were submitted to the jury without 
objection: (1) On or about July 4, 2016, (2) in the state of Idaho, (3) the defendant, Aaron 
Eugene Lantis, maliciously and willfully (4) disturbed the peace or quiet of Hillary Henslee (5) 
by offensive conduct. Jury Instruction 11. “Maliciously” was defined as the desire to annoy or 
injure another or the intent to do a wrongful act. Jury Instruction 13; see also I.C. § 18-101. 
“Willfully” was defined as doing an act on purpose, without necessarily the intent to violate the 
law, to injure another, or to acquire any advantage. Jury Instruction 14; see also I.C. § 18-101.  
A. The State presented substantial evidence that the alleged conduct occurred on or about July 
4, 2016. 
 
 Three witnesses testified to the date the email and pictures were sent, and it was 
confirmed by a recorded phone call with the Defendant. Both Hillary Henslee and Nancy van 
Winkle testified that the email and pictures were received on July 4, 2016. On a recorded phone 
call, Aaron Lantis admitted that he sent the email and pictures on “Monday morning.” State’s Tr. 
Ex. 1. Officer Jeremy Miller testified that, in context, that statement meant July 4, 2016. The 
State presented substantial evidence that the conduct occurred on or about July 4.  
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B. The State presented substantial evidence that the alleged crime occurred in the state of 
Idaho. 
 
 Hillary Henslee and Nancy van Winkle testified as to the bank’s location in the state of 
Idaho. Hillary Henslee testified that she was in Idaho when the email and pictures were sent. The 
State presented substantial evidence that the alleged crime occurred in the state of Idaho.  
C. The State presented substantial evidence that Aaron Lantis acted maliciously and willfully. 
 
 Hillary Henslee identified the Defendant as Aaron Lantis in court. Officer Jeremy Miller 
testified that he called the Defendant’s phone number and verbally identified the speaker as 
Aaron Lantis. The State presented a recording of a phone call with Aaron Lantis wherein Lantis 
admitted that he sent the email and pictures because he knew Hillary’s job was important to her. 
See State’s Tr. Ex. 1. Lantis admitted on the recording that his intent in sending the email and 
pictures was to cause Hillary Henslee to lose her job. Id. The State clearly provided substantial 
evidence of the Defendant’s identity and that he purposely acted with the specific intent to annoy 
or injure Hillary Henslee.  
D. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee’s peace.  
 Hillary Henslee testified that she was humiliated that the email and pictures had been sent 
to her employers and coworkers. She felt uncomfortable at work, and continues to feel 
uncomfortable every time she sees a recipient of the email. She was nervous that she would lose 
her job, or that her career would be impacted by the email and pictures. She testified that she was 
concerned because she is a single mother. She was worried about providing for her family 
because of the Defendant’s actions. The State presented substantial evidence that Hillary 
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E. The State presented substantial evidence that the Defendant’s conduct was “offensive.” 
 
  “Offensive conduct” must be defined by its plain meaning. In the absence of a statutory 
definition, words should be given their commonly understood, everyday meanings. Ada County 
Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 428 (1993); see also State v. Schulz, 151 
Idaho 863, 866 (2011) (stating that words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meanings). The Court should give effect to all words and provisions so that none would be void, 
superfluous, or redundant. Schulz, 151 Idaho at 863.  Courts frequently refer to a word’s 
dictionary definition to determine its commonly understood meaning. See State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 
885, 895-96 (2004) (using Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary to define 
“traducing,” “quarrelling,” “vulgar,” “profane,” and “indecent”); Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867 (citing 
the Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “cohabit” in addition to its 
common law meaning). “Offensive” is defined as: “1. making attack…2. Giving painful or 
unpleasant sensations…3. Causing displeasure or resentment.” See WEBSTER’S NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 790 (G&C Merriam Co. 1979); see also Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offensive (23 Sept. 2017). Moreover, 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “offensive” as “1. Of or for attack…2. Unpleasant or 
disagreeable to the senses; obnoxious…3. Causing displeasure, anger, or resentment; esp., 
repugnant to the prevailing sense of what is decent or moral….” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
887 (7th ed. 2000). 
 The State presented substantial evidence that the Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee’s 
peace by offensive conduct. Nancy van Winkle testified that the email accused Hillary of 
inappropriate behavior and had pictures attached. The State presented four pictures, and Hillary 
Henslee testified that they were the four pictures sent with the email. See State’s Tr. Ex. 3-6. 
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Two of the photos depicted the inner thighs of a female seated in what appeared to be an office 
environment. One of the photos of the upper thigh included the vaginal area, although the subject 
wore what appeared to be black underwear. The subject’s hand covered the vaginal area in the 
second picture of the upper thigh. A third picture depicted an apparently nude Hillary Henslee 
seated with her knees drawn up to cover her chest. The fourth picture depicted the subject’s 
buttocks and pink underwear. Hillary Henslee testified that she was the subject of the pictures, 
that she had taken them of herself, and that she had sent the pictures to Aaron Lantis while the 
two were dating. Hillary Henslee further testified that she did not give the Defendant permission 
to show the pictures to anyone else, and had in fact asked the Defendant to delete them. Hillary 
Henslee testified that the recipient list included her immediate boss, the chief financial officer of 
the bank she worked at, a coworker, and several members of the bank’s board of directors. The 
State presented a recording of Aaron Lantis in which he admitted that he had sent the email and 
pictures to Hillary Henslee’s supervisor because he knew Hillary’s job was so important to her, 
and Lantis wanted her to lose her job. See State’s Tr. Ex. 1. The State presented substantial 
evidence that Hillary Henslee’s peace was disturbed by offensive conduct, particularly given the 
nature of the pictures, the fact that they were sent without consent, the nature of the recipients, 
and the Defendant’s stated intent in sending the email and pictures. Given this evidence, a jury 
could reasonably conclude that the act of sending the email or pictures constituted offensive 
conduct as that term is commonly understood.  
 The State provided substantial evidence at trial of each element of the crime of disturbing 
the peace such that a trier of fact could find the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
particularly when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. The Court 
should therefore deny the Defendant’s Rule 29(c) motion.  
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2. State v. Pierce is clearly distinguishable from the instant case and does not control. 
 
 Defendant’s motion relies on the court’s ruling in State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct. 
App. 2015), for the proposition that sending an offensive email or pictures cannot be made to 
resemble any of the elements of Idaho Code § 18-6409. Mot. J. Acquittal 5. In Pierce, the 
defendant and his ex-wife were in litigation over their divorce. 159 Idaho at 662. A magistrate 
had determined that the house in question was Pierce’s separate property, but Pierce’s ex-wife 
continued to live in the house without Pierce. Id. A protection order was entered, prohibiting 
Pierce from disturbing the peace of his ex-wife or her children. Id. Prior to the order, water 
service to the residence was terminated. Following the order, electrical service was also 
terminated, allegedly at Pierce’s request. Id. The state alleged that Pierce violated the terms of 
the protection order by turning off utilities, which disturbed the peace of the protected parties. Id. 
The state argued that it was not required to prove elements of a crime it had not charged, and that 
it met its burden by providing evidence that the defendant had generally disturbed the peace of 
his ex-wife by canceling electricity to his house. Id. at 663.The court found that the state did not 
provide evidence at trial that the defendant had engaged in acts constituting disturbing the peace 
as defined by Idaho Code § 18-6409. Id. 
 In the present case, the State alleged that Aaron Lantis disturbed the peace of Hillary 
Henslee by offensive conduct. The legislature specifically articulated acts constituting disturbing 
the peace and included offensive conduct. I.C. § 18-6409. The State, therefore, alleged that the 
Defendant committed the crime of disturbing the peace specifically by conduct that is statutorily 
included within the crime’s definition. The jury was not left to decide for itself what “disturbing 
the peace” meant, as the Defendant claims was the case in Pierce. See Mot. J. Acquittal 6 (citing 
the district court’s memorandum decision in stating “It was impermissible for the court to leave 
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the jury to decide what ‘breach the peace’ meant, and thus whether the charged actions were 
prohibited by the protection order”). The State alleged that the victim’s peace was maliciously 
and willfully disturbed by offensive conduct. The State articulated the specific conduct that was 
offensive. The instant case is therefore distinguishable from Pierce because the State alleged that 
the Defendant committed the crime of disturbing the peace by conduct that was specifically 
included in the statutory definition of the crime. 
 The facts of the two cases are clearly distinguishable. In Pierce, the defendant was 
accused of terminating electricity to his own house, a property he owned separately from his ex-
wife. See 159 Idaho at 662. In the instant case, the State presented evidence at trial that the 
Defendant sent sexually provocative pictures of his ex-girlfriend to her employers and coworkers 
for the purpose of getting her fired, despite his ex-girlfriend’s request that he delete the pictures. 
While there was insufficient evidence in Pierce for a trier of fact to find that the defendant had 
engaged in conduct fitting the definition of disturbing the peace, the State has clearly presented 
substantial evidence of every element of the crime as defined in Idaho Code 18-6409. As such, 
Pierce is distinguishable from the instant case and does not control.  
3. Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 
 Defendant contends that Idaho Code § 18-6409 is both impermissibly vague as applied to 
the facts of the case and facially overbroad. Mot. J. Acquittal 11. The Defendant’s argument 
revolves around the appropriate interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-6409. The Idaho Supreme 
Court divided the statute into three parts based on the three verbs used: “disturbs,” “fires,” and 
“uses.” Poe, 139 Idaho at 894. The Court further divided the portion of the statute related to 
“disturbs” into three sections of adverbial prepositional phrases that explain how someone can 
disturb the peace in order to violate the statute. Id. at 894-95. The statute is disjunctive. 
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Therefore, one can “disturb” the peace [a] by loud and unusual noise, or [b] by tumultuous or 
offensive conduct, or [c] by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting. 
See Id. at 894. The adverbs “maliciously” and “willfully” modify all three verbs. Id.at 895. Thus, 
one can violate Idaho Code § 18-6409 by maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace of 
another by offensive conduct.   
 To succeed on an “as applied” challenge the defendant must show that the statute, as 
applied to his or her conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant’s conduct was 
proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had unbridled discretion. 
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003). Given the plain meaning of “offensive conduct,” it 
seems highly unlikely that anyone would believe that sending sexually provocative pictures of an 
ex-girlfriend to her boss for the purpose of getting her fired would not fall under the purview of 
the statute. The Defendant’s conduct is clearly offensive, both to the victim and to society. A 
plain meaning reading of the statute could not but provide fair notice that such conduct was 
proscribed. As to whether the statute provides sufficient guidelines for enforcement, the statute 
itself limits its application to offensive conduct that disturbs another and is willful and malicious. 
“The requirement that the defendant must maliciously and willfully disturb the peace in one of 
the ways specified provides adequate standards to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.” Poe, 139 Idaho at 903. It is not merely offensive conduct that is proscribed, but 
offensive conduct that is purposive, intended to annoy, injure, or do a wrong, and that has its 
desired effect in that it disturbs another. As such, the statute itself provides adequate limitations 
to enforcement and is not impermissibly vague as applied.  
 For a facial challenge to be successful, “the complainant must demonstrate that the law is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712 (quoting Village of 
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Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)). The challenger must 
show that the statute is invalid in toto. Id. Where the statute proscribes conduct rather than 
merely spoken words, the overbreadth of the statute must be real and substantial, judged in 
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. Poe, 139 Idaho at 892. Idaho Code § 18-6409 
regulates speech and conduct. As narrowed by Idaho courts, the speech regulated by Idaho Code 
§ 18-6409 is largely unprotected. See Poe, 139 Idaho at 895-96 (stating that threatening, 
traducing, quarrelling, and challenging to fight are unprotected). Other portions of Idaho Code § 
18-6409 seek to regulate conduct and are “neutral as to any expressive element that may exist in 
a particular circumstance.” Id. at 895. The legislature is free to regulate conduct that does not 
infringe on Constitutional protections. As discussed above, the statute appropriately limits itself 
by specifying the manner, result, and intent that must exist for an act to be criminalized. The 
statute is therefore not invalid in all applications and is not substantially overbroad in relation to 
its plainly legitimate sweep. The statute is not overbroad on its face.   
CONCLUSION 
 The standard for motions pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29(c) is clear. In the light most 
favorable to the State, the State presented substantial evidence at trial upon which a rational trier of 
fact could find the Defendant guilty of Disturbing the Peace under Idaho Code § 18-6409 beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Defendant’s motion should therefore be denied. In addition, Defendant’s 
reliance on State v. Pierce is misplaced as Pierce is distinguishable from the present case. Finally, 
Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not impermissibly vague as applied or overbroad on its face.  
 WHEREFORE, the State objects to Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and 
respectfully requests this Court DENY the Defendant’s motion. 
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DATED this 25th day of September, 2017. 
      JAN M. BENNETTS 
      Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
 
 
      _______________________________________ 
      By: D. Garrett Swenson  
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Name and address: Anita Moore, Ada County Public Defender, Boise, ID 83702  
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
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Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
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Criminal No.  CR01-17-7609 
 
 
REPLY TO STATE’S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 
 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, AARON LANTIS, by and through his 
Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender’s Office, Anita Moore, handling attorney, 
and hereby replies to the State’s Objection to Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, filed herein on 
September 25, 2017 in response to his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, filed herein on August 
25, 2017.  The Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was made on the grounds that the state’s 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction in that it fails to prove an actus reus that falls 
within the strictures of § 18-6409, Idaho Code. 
ARGUMENT 
The state in its Objection entirely misses the point of State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 
(Ct.App.2015), rev. den. February 10, 2016, which is that the conduct must constitute an actus 
reus within the meaning of § 18-6409, Idaho Code.  The state goes through the elements 
instruction for disturbing the peace and focuses on the quantity of evidence it offered to support 
Electronically Filed
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Suzanne Simon, Deputy Clerk
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OF ACQUITTAL – 2 
each element.  The issue here, however, is not the quantity of evidence offered to support each 
element; it is that, however much proof the state offered, the state failed to prove acts that were 
loud, boisterous, tumultuous, quarrelsome, or tending to incite or provoke violence, such as 
constitute disturbing the peace.  As Mr. Lantis demonstrated in his post-verdict Rule 29 motion, 
the lesson of Pierce is that the conduct complained of must be prohibited by § 18-6409.  In part 
because the case against Pierce was based on conduct that did not fall within the strictures of that 
statute, the district court on intermediate appeal held that Pierce’s Rule 29 motions should have 
been granted.  The Court of Appeals quoted from and affirmed this holding, and the Idaho 
Supreme Court declined the state’s invitation to review. 
The state argues in this case that (a) the legislature included “offensive conduct” in its list 
of prohibited acts; (b) the state established that the conduct in question was indeed “offensive”; 
and that therefore (c) the conduct in question – sending an offensive email to the complaining 
party’s bosses – was “specifically included in the statutory definition of the crime,” (State’s 
Objection at 8), even though (d) neither email nor any other electronic communication is listed as 
a means whereby a person may commit the crime of disturbing the peace.  Although the Pierce 
court points out that “disturb the peace” is a term of art, not in common use, that describes 
specific prohibited conduct and cannot be imparted a common meaning (Pierce, 159 Idaho at 
663), the state asserts that “offensive conduct” is not a term of art and should be given its 
ordinary, dictionary meaning.  This is really just another way of asking the court to read 
“offensive conduct” in isolation from the surrounding text that sets the stage for what that term in 
fact means.  It stands on its head the rule of noscitur a sociis by arguing that “offensive conduct” 
introduces an entirely new and unforeseen class of behaviors into the statute, instead of the 
statute governing and restricting those acts that constitute “offensive conduct.”  If this reading of 
000119
REPLY TO STATE’S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
OF ACQUITTAL – 3 
§ 18-6409 is the correct one, then there is no conduct for which a citizen may not be prosecuted, 
provided only that the state can find someone willing to testify that he found that conduct 
offensive.   
But noscitur a sociis is still in effect, and still a factor to be reckoned with in the instant 
case; thus, the state’s very careful explanation of why the conduct at issue here was offensive 
serves only to underscore why it has nothing in common with the enumerated prohibited acts in 
the statute.  In the first place, the statute makes no mention whatever of email, texting or any 
other electronic communication, so that it cannot really be said – as the state declares on page 8 
of its Objection – that the conduct complained of here is “specifically included in the statutory 
definition of the crime.”  In the second place, § 18-6409 covers conduct that is loud, boisterous 
and tumultuous, disruptive of exterior quiet and tranquility rather than merely someone’s interior 
peace of mind.  Even when 18-6409 outlawed uttering profanity in front of children, the state 
still had to prove that this was done “in a loud and boisterous manner.”  To disturb the peace, 
then, the accused must have engaged in behavior that breaches the exterior peace of a person or 
community by means of some jarring or abrupt assault on the senses – particularly hearing – or 
that is calculated to incite or provoke violence.  Whatever else the state may have proven in the 
instant case, it has failed to prove conduct that matches this description.  This court should 
therefore grant Mr. Lantis’ motion for judgment of acquittal. 
The state further argues that Mr. Lantis’ argument of vagueness and overbreadth are not 
well taken because the constitutive elements of § 18-6409 are in the disjunctive, and thus the 
state had a wide variety of items to choose from in prosecuting him for disturbing the peace – 
including whatever conduct could conceivably be shoe-horned into the phrase “offensive 
conduct.”  This is just yet another way of arguing that “offensive conduct” needs to be read in 
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isolation from the surrounding text, and that it therefore can mean whatever the state wants it to 
mean, provided, again, it can find a complaining witness willing to testify as to its offensiveness. 
The state further argues that “It seems highly unlikely that anyone would believe that 
sending sexually provocative picture of an ex-girlfriend to her boss for the purpose of getting her 
fired would not fall under the purview of the statute.  The Defendant’s conduct is clearly 
offensive, both to the victim and to society.”  State’s Objection at 9.  What the state is really 
doing here, however, rather than addressing the question of whether the conduct in this case fits 
the statute, is appealing to the sense of indignation the conduct arouses by reason of its 
reprehensibility.  But this is a distraction – and a perilous one, in light of the need to interpret and 
apply the law objectively and impartially in all criminal cases.  It is possible for a thing to be 
reprehensible yet not criminal, and therefore it is neither possible nor appropriate to use the 
criminal justice system to redress every conceivable grievance between individuals.  The issue 
here is not whether the conduct in question is boorish or socially unacceptable, but whether it is 
criminal under the state’s theory of the case.  Mr. Lantis argues that, whatever else his conduct 
might be, it does not belong to the class of behaviors that is proscribed by § 18-6409.  Therefore, 
his motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
 As Judge McKee pointed out on intermediate appeal in Pierce, it is the province of 
neither juries nor judges to make the law: the jury is there to determine facts, and the court is 
there to instruct on the law and resolve ambiguities in the law.  Memorandum Decision at 9-10.  
“What a judge may not do is create law – identify new areas of conduct not included in the 
statute by the legislature, or within reach of the designated list of prohibited activities that is 
included….To allow the jury to interpret and determine the law according to the evidence in the 
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case means that the jury could subjectively decide, based upon its own personal values, customs 
and standards, what is and what is not against the law at any given time, then to decide if what 
the defendant did in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law thus created.  
Under any theory of law, this is impermissible.”  Id. at 10. 
Yet, by pressing the charge of disturbing the peace in the instant case, that is exactly what 
the state asked, and continues to ask, this court to do.  The state seeks to use a statute about 
tumultuous, boisterous, quarrelsome conduct to avenge perceived wrongs committed via the use 
of email, which is nowhere mentioned in the statute.  Taking the word “offensive” in isolation, as 
the state has done in the present case, and adding to it alleged conduct of a character that is 
highly likely to arouse strong emotions, left the jury free to apply its own subjective standards to 
convict Mr. Lantis of a crime of the jury’s own making and definition.  In such a situation, and 
with no other guidance than their own feelings on the meaning of “offensive conduct,” the jury 
was free to define a crime not contemplated by the legislature and return a verdict of guilty. 
This court should grant Aaron Lantis’ motion under Rule 29(c). 
DATED, this _____ day of October, 2017. 
___________________________________ 
ANITA MOORE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Case No. 2016-0000887; CR0l-17-07609 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: Anita Moore, Attorney of Record, you will please take notice that on 31st day of 
October, 2017 at the hour of 8:30 AM of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney D. Garrett Swenson, will move this Honorable Court regarding the 
oral argument on defense's motion for judgment of acquittal in the above-entitled action. 
DATED this _1_1_day of October, 2017. 
NOTICE OF HEARING (LANTIS) Page 1 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: D. Garrett Swenson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
NOTICE OF HEARING (LANTIS) Page 2 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _____ day of October, 2017 I caused to be served, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Hearing upon the individual(s) named below in the 
manner noted: 
Anita Moore, Ada County Public Defender, Boise ID  83702 
 By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
 By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
 By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _______________. 
 By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel. 
 By iCourt eFile and Serve. 
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CR01-17-07609
Order Denying Defendant’s Renewed Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal
State of Idaho
      Plaintiff,
vs.
Aaron Eugene Lantis
     Defendant.
The matter having come before the Court on October 31, 2017, on the 
Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29(c), and the Court having considered the written and oral 
arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, the 
Defendant’s Motion is DENIED for the reasons stated on the record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:  October 31, 2017
Michael  W. Lojek
      Magistrate Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on October 31, 2017, I served a copy of the attached to:
Anita Marie Elizabeth Moore  By mail
 By email
David Garrett Swenson  By mail
 By email
By:
          Deputy Clerk
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Judgment of Conviction 
471872 • • 
1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, ADA COUNTY 
){JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
~PROBATION ORDER 
STATE OF IDAHO vs. 
A!l.~D~ EUGENE lAl\1lG. 
0 WITHHELD JUDGMENT 
Expires __________ _ 
CASE NO. _ _::(.::._.,:R--.--0_('-----'l'--1'----7...:........::.6 _0---1 Digitals 
Prosecuting Agency: AC D BC D EC 0 GC 0 MC 
DEFENDANT having been charged with the following offenses: State's Attorney: ___ ..,.G."-'.'-.:?...::::...:W=.cE"'-!..::l...l,_S£... _,o:..J.N""------------
Count 1. 1/\l,-h-..r\n ~ i-ke Fe. a~ e \ <?-' y D j Count 3. ______________________ _ 
Count2. Count4. ______________________ _ 
DEFENDANT WAS: iX(' Present D In Custody D Not Present D Interpreter Present [8] Advised of all rights and penalties per ICR 5,11, IMCR S(f) 
~Represented by: A • M.DOF!--:t COURTENTERSJUDGMENTAFTER: OVoiGuiltyPiea ,8(Triai-FoundGuilty 
Defendant Waived Right: D To All Defenses D Against Self-Incrimination D To Jury Trial D To Confront and Cross Examine Accuser(s) DTo Counsel 
D ORDERED: DEFENDANT'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED days beginning ; or 
0 CONSECUTIVE TO ANY CURRENT SUSPENSION 0 Absolute Suspension days 0 Interlock from to ___ _ 
0 ORDERED: DEFENDANT TO PAY TO THE CLERK: 0 Apply cash bond$ _____ _ 
Count 1: Fine/Penalty$ WI$ Suspended + CT Costs $ = $. ______ _ 
Count 2: Fine/Penalty$ WI$ Suspended+ CT Costs$ = $. ______ _ 
Count 3: Fine/Penalty$ WI$ Suspended + CT Costs$ = $. ______ _ 
Co.unt 4: Fine/Penalty$ WI$ Suspended+ CT Costs$ = $. ______ _ 
~Reimburse Public Defender$ 15" 0' 0 0 D Workers' Comp ($.60/hr) $ TOTAL = $ ______ _ 
Restitution $ Defendant shall make 20 EQUAL MONTHLY PAYMENTS BEGINNING ONE MONTH FROM TODAY 
)(ORDERED: DEFEN~JO BE INCARCERATE~ IN: bfcount}! Jail 
Count 1: reo days w/~ 163suspended- Credit 2- total = I z:;: 
Count 2: days w/ Suspended- Credit Total = ___ _ 
Count 3: days w/ Suspended- Credit Total = ___ _ 
D Juvenile Detention Center 
TOTAL DAYS TO SERVE= I~ 
-~--------
D Concurrent to Case number(s): --------
Count 4: days w/ Suspended - Credit Total = . ~Concurrent D Consecutive 
~ to all cases to any other cases 
? days must be fully completed, with NO OPTIONS available.-~days must be fully completed, with INTERIM JAIL available. 
D Pay or Stay$ ___ _ DIn-Custody __ SAP ABC D Interlock Funds (after use of any cafeteria funds) 
D If approved by the Ada County Sheriffs Office, defendant is allowed to serve in County at defendant's expense. 
~THE FOLLOWING options offered by the County Sheriff are available to the defendant only IF defendant meets requirements of the program. 
tz§'AII Options I "2- days; D If defendant is in custody, release and re-book for any options. 
D Any combo of the following Options: Wk Rls __ days; SLD :-/;;;:; d,aYs; SCS __ hours; Hs. Arr. (2/1) __ days (1/1 y~ days 
~ROBATION CONDITIONS: Supervised Probation Expires: \ 'fZL U f, Unsupervised Probation Expires: \\ (Zt{l1 
[8] No new cri"Jes ~ Classes{treatment per P .0. D Discretionary jail to P .0. D Alcohol Monitor Device Authorized 
)d Nco wf~lC\\U.) M.CJ. t-la-lt;u:e -~o E)(LEFTill'\-.i«P • 
Programs Ordered: (Defined on Responsibilities Form) D No Alcohol Poss/Consume D Refuse no evidentiary test for drugs/alcohol (BAC) 
D Alcohol/Drug Trtmt Lvl ___ D Anger Management hrs D Tobacco Ed hrs __ D Driving School hrs __ _ 
0 Victim's Panel D Theft classes hrs Domestic Violence Trea&Reut IJ'iefks ~ D Cog Self Change ___ _ 
~OT A AA."-'?T Et;~D \ltc.llJJ.. IJ.t;.. UE)..l \1'2 + +f't\OW 
[8] De dant ace ted er sa condJJons d supplemental Notice of Responsibilities after Sentencing. 
0 EA AN E TENCE VIA D 0 IN CHAMBERS PER WRITTEN GUll TY PLEA 
~ n/ze/17 
DEFE ANT JUDGE Number Date of Order 
D Release Defendant this case only 
DISTRIBUTION: White-File Canary-Jail (in-custody} or File Pink-Defendant 
[REV 3-2-2016] 
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SUPERVISED MISDEMEANOR PROBATION ORDER . 
c -.)~:ts~-1~'·? 
Defendant: Aaron Eugene Lantis Case No. CR01-17-07609 
Date Ordered: 11/28/2017 Address: 1707 S 26th St 
Nampa, ID 83686 
Judge: Judge Lojek 
CR01-17- 07609 
SPROB 
Supervised Probation Ordered 
i~iiillllmllll~lllll~lllllllllll 
Prosecuting Attorney: David Garrett Swenson 
Defense Attorney: Anita Marie Elizabeth Moore 
Phone: 
You have been sentenced to the following term of supervised probation: _1.!...,Lye""a"""r ___________ _ 
Commencing on 11/28/2017 and terminating on 11/27/2018. 
~TIS HEREBY ORDERED THAT you comply with the following terms and conditions of supervision: 
~111itial Probation Contact: You understand that you MUST contact Ada County Misdemeanor Probation at the address 
below within one business day to schedule an appointment. Failure to do so may result in the issuance of a warrant for your 
arrest. You will bring all court paperwork with you to this appointment. 
Ada County Misdemeanor Probation 
7180 W. Barrister Dr., Entrance #4, Boise, Idaho 83704 
Phone: 208-577-3380 I FAX: 208-577-3389 
laws: You shall respect and obey all laws and comply with all terms of probation as ordered by the court or directed by a 
probation officer. You shall comply with all lawful requests of a probation officer. 
Compliance: You shall comply with all lawful direction given to you by a probation officer. 
Notification: You will notify your probation officer within 24 hours (or within one business day) following any contact with law 
enforcement, including but not limited to citations, arrests, or investigations. You will fully cooperate in a respectful manner 
with any law enforcement requests and advise them that you are on supervised probation and provide them with the name of 
your assigned probation officer. 
Residence/Contact: You shall notify your probation officer prior to making any changes to your residence, phone numbers 
or email addresses. You will submit any changes to your probation officer for approval. You must notify your probation 
officer within one business day of making any approved changes. You will maintain a contact phone with voice messaging. 
You are responsible for checking this phone number at least daily and complying with any instructions given by a probation 
officer. 
Reporting: You shall check in at the Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Office on a monthly basis, unless directed 
otherwise by a probation officer. You shall truthfully submit any written or oral reports requested by a probation officer. 
Atte111dance: You understand that failure to appear for any assigned/scheduled appointments with any service providers, 
c;rug testing service, or your probation officer may result in a probation violation being filed with the court or the imposition of 
ciscretionary jail time. 
Con~rolled Substances and Alcohol: You will not use, possess, or distribute any alcoholic beverages, controlled 
substances or intoxicants while on probation unless lawfully prescribed by a licensed physician. You shall submit to any 
testing of breath and bodily fluids for these substances as directed by the court, law enforcement, treatment providers or the 
probation officer. You shall be truthful in said testing and shall not ingest substances or take any actions in an attempt to 
mask or alter the test results. Any attempts shall be considered the same as a presumptive positive result. You shall pay all 
fees and costs of such testing. 
!Employment/Education: You will obtain and maintain appropriate full-time employment and/or participate in an educational 
program as directed by a probation officer. 
Electronic Monitoring Device/Alcohol Monitoring Device/Interlock Device: You understand that you may be placed on 
eleGtronic monitoring device/alcohol monitoring device/Interlock device as deemed necessary by the probation officer. You 
shall pay the daily monitoring costs and any costs associated with any damages or lost equipment. 
SUPERVISED MISDEMEANOR PROBATION ORDER (D44)- Page 1 [Rev. 6-2017] 
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Court Fines and Restitution: You shall pay any and all court fines, restitution and other costs as ordered by the Court and 
defined in your fine agreement. 
!Programs & Treatment: You shall cooperate and successfully complete any and all assessments and/or treatment 
programs ordered by the Court. You shall pay all costs and fees for the programs in a timely manner. 
Classes or Treatment: You shall comply, cooperate and successfully complete any assessments and/or treatment 
program required by the probation officer. You shall pay all costs and fees for the programs in a timely manner. 
Review Hearings: You understand that you must appear before the Court as scheduled to review your compliance with the 
conditions of your probation. 
Costs of Supervision: You must pay a fee for misdemeanor probation services. The fee is on a sliding scale, but will not 
be more than $75/month. This is true regardless of how many active probation cases you may have. The probation 
department will assist in monitoring the fee. 
Release of Information: You authorize the release and exchange of confidential information to and from your probation 
officer, including but not limited to evaluations, medical history, reports, and treatment records related to your probation. 
Travel: You will not leave the state of Idaho without first obtaining a travel permit from your probation officer. 
Addntionallnstructions: You will comply with any and all additional instructions given by a probation officer. 
fOURTH AMENDMENT WAIVER: 
){The Judge is ordering a 4th Amendment Waiver in this case pursuant to the following terms: Defendant agrees and 
consents as a term and condition of probation to a search of his or her person, automobile, residence, and any property 
under their control, any place, anytime, by any parole or probation officer or any law enforcement officer acting at the 
direction of a parole or probation officer. Any right to the contrary under the United States and Idaho Constitutions is 
hereby waived by the Defendant for the term of probation." 
0 The Judge is NOT ordering a 41h Amendment Waiver in this case 
other: 
'' z~ 
Supervised Misdemeanor Probation Order 
SUPERVISED MISDEMEANOR PROBATION ORDER (D44)- Page 2 [Rev. 6-2017] 
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RMAN • • Remanded ~l1MII~IIIIIWIII~IIImllllllll 
FILED l\l2SSlll AT ?_t:;/..p .M. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, 
CLERK OF WTRJCT COURT 
BY ~ e . 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
CASE NO. CRot -t 1-l (.p D:l Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) ORDER REMANDING DEFENDANT TO THE 
/ta.RD~ LOlV1-f, s 
) CUSTODY OF THE ADA COUNTY SHERIFF 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) gsecuting Agency: 
 ) Ada County D Boise D Eagle 
 ) D Garden City D Meridian 
) 
TO: THE SHERIFF OF ADA COUNTY: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take custody of the above-named defendant 
D until further order of this Court I Judge-----------
0 until the defendant posts a new bond in the amount of $ ______ cash or surety 
(previous bond was revoked by this Court). 
D until at------a.m./p.m., at which time you shall return 
the defendant to open Court before Judge----------
D until at a.m./p.m., at which time you shall release 
the defendant on his/her own recognizance. 
~other Ul-J11L \-\E WA'7 C,Ef<.\IEI:? '"t14(<e:E AD>l/tno~AL 
PAY'? ( ~ ~AtL w l\1-t ~D OP"flo~~ 
IT IS SO ORDERED on 7. <6 N b \l \ f 




No Contact Order 
i\\ii~IMII\II~Imlll\llll\~ll! 
NOV 2 S 2m7 
~HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTr:O.fisrc) _., 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
- ' ' 
[01] 
[04] 




Protected Person(s) Identifiers: 
\..\- \L-\...AtL"'{ \4 t::N St.-IE6 
Name (First, Middle, Last) 
Case No. __ t..._)Z_o_\ -_l_r_-_7_6_l'1_ 
No Contact Order I.C. 18-920 -I.C.R 46.2 
r1foriginal QQ Amended 
/_ t.-'5 o) 
Law enforcement agency "Zb [ 7- lll.f"Z.S.S ~ 
Expires at 11:59 p.m. on H_z.7 {I 'I or 
upon dismissal of this case, whichever occurs first 
Defendant's Identifiers: 
ender: M. Race: L J 
(Date of Birth (optional) 
TO THE DEFENDANT: You have been charged with or convicted of the following crime(s): 
Count Statute Charge Description 
-, - I 'i' ""lP4oq t) \!) f'Vl'l..S \ tJl':=t f"\.4 S Z>s~& 
Relationship to protected person(s), if any: 
This COURT, having personal and subject matter jurisdiction, finds that a no contact order is appropriate 
and HEREBY ORDERS THAT, with regard to the protected person(s) named above, YOU must not 
engage in any of the following conduct: 
Do not contact or attempt to contact, either personally or through another person, the protected person(s) 
named above in any manner, including: 1) do not communicate in person or in writing or through any 
electronic means, including telephone, email, text, through social networking, or facsimile 2) do not 
harass, stalk, threaten, use, attempt to use or threaten use of physical force, engage in any other conduct 
that would place the protected person(s) in reasonable fear of bodily injury 3) do not knowingly remain 
within 100 feet of the protected person(s) 4) do not go within and/or knowingly remain within 500 feet of 




However, you may attend court proceedings involving you and the protected person(s), and you may 
communicate through attorneys about legal issues involving you and the protected person(s). 
[OS] ~ THERE ARE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE ORDER. 
0 THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE ORDER ABOVE AS FOLLOWS: 
D to contact by telephone between .M. and __ .M. 
for the following purposes: ----,--~--:--------------------
0 to participate in court ordered mediation 
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D to provide for the exchange of children between the protected person and defendant 
through: --------------------------------------------------------
D to retrieve personal necessities from the residence/protected address one time 
through:--:--:----------:---,-----:-------------:-------:-----:---:---:----------------0 to respond to emergencies involving your natural or adopted children 
D other:----------------------------------
[03] [ ] IF THIS ORDER REQUIRES YOU TO LEAVE A RESIDENCE SHARED WITH THE PROTECTED 
PERSON, you may contact a law enforcement officer who may make arrangements to accompany you to 
the residence to remove items and tools necessary for employment and personal belongings. The officer 
may determine what constitutes necessary personal belongings. 
Yes r.M No [ ] Defendant appeared or had actual notice of this hearing and the opportunity to participate. 
If N6,'" then upon service, Defendant is notified of the right to request a hearing before a judge on this 
Order. The request must be filed within 7 days of service. To request a hearing you must contact the 
clerk of the court at (address) (phone) 
---:----:----:-:-:----::----:-::-:-:----:· The court must hold a hearing within 14 days of the filing of the request 
and must provide notice of the hearing to the protected person and the parties. 
A violation of this order is a separate crime under Idaho Code § 18-920, for which no bail will be set 
until you appear before a judge. The maximum penalty for a violation of this Order is one year in jail 
and/or up to a $1000 fine. However, if the violation is a third offense, the violation is a felony, which is 
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for up to five years and/or up to a $5000 fine. If any other 
Civil Protection Order or Criminal No Contact Order is in place you must abide by the terms in the most 
restrictive order. Dismissal of any other order will not result in a dismissal of this Order. ONLY A JUDGE 
CAN MODIFY THIS NO CONTACT ORDER. 
The court clerk must immediately send a copy of this Order to 
this Order was originally issued for entry into record systems. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: -zq ~0\l l7 
Judge 
WARNINGS: As a result of this Order, it may be unlawful for you to purchase or possess a firearm, 
including a rifle, pistol, or revolver, or ammunition pursuant to federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) . If 
you have any questions whether these laws make it illegal for you to possess or purchase a firearm, you 
should consult an attorney. 
This Order is valid and entitled to enforcement in each jurisdiction throughout the 50 states of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, all tribal lands, and all U.S. territories, commonwealths, and possessions 
and shall be enforced as if it were an order of that jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. § 2265). 
~~~-grm·~er. ate;igned IJ bJ.2 
Served by: .f:Atlf-.&:1:~~~~~~~=-- Law Enforcement I d.#: Bi.,..ts= Date seJed"'# e I~ 
D File DProsecutor D Defense Attorney 
D Protected person(s) D Protected person(s) via prosecuting attorney 
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Lojek Zuber 11/28/17 1A-CRT402 
Time Speaker Note 
02:36:04 PMI i Lantis CR01-17-7609 Sentencing 
··a2·:·3·a:3·s···P·MTJLia9e .. Lo]ek·T·c·as·e···c;ane·ci···G-~irrefs·wenson .. prese.ilHor·"Aaa ... colii1tY::··Anlfa·· 
l l Moore present for the defense . .. 0'2:3.if·1·t=fi5MTAilHa ... riJi'o·o-re ... rRev·iews .. vi'airn .. 'fm·p·a"Ct .. siaie·m-enr ..................................................................................  
1 l .. a2·:·4-3:3'9 ... i3.MlJLia9eToJe.i< ... fR.ev.iews .. aocumenf .................................................................................................................................. .. 
.. a2·:·4·3·:4s ... i5M't';t.:i1Ha .. iVioo.re .. "lo5Ieds .. to ... eve·;:ytt1Til.9 ... o.ti1er.1:h'an ... ti1e .. ctiTia ............................................................. .. 
.. a2·:·44·: .. 1 .. 4 ... i3.Ml"Garrett .................... rR·es·p·o·il·se ................................................................................................................................................................. .. 
! Swenson ! .. a2·:·s·a:4Y.i5MlJLia9eToJe.i< .... [Vis ... i).rov·iaea .. 'is ... appro·p·ri'ate ..........................................................................................................  
.. a2·:·s-2:3·2 ... i5Ml"Ga.rrett ................... lAr~iues ... s.e·n·tend'il.9 .................................................................................................................................... .. 
lSwenson l .. 0"3:·a'1':·s·4 ... P.MlAnHa .. iVioo.re .. l·R·e·s·p·a·il·se ..................................................................................................................................................................  
.. 0"3:·0"t:f:"04 ... F>MlA·a·roi1 .. Laniis·rrvfa'kes .. stateme.ilt .......................................................................................................................................... .. 
.. O'i.O'a·:-4f .. F>MlJLia9e .. Lo]e.i< .... t.Aad·res·s·e·s .. aete·il·aant" ............................................................................................................................  
l ! .. 6'3:·1"r3·s ... i3.M't' ............................................ t .. D'ec.is.io.il ...................................................................................................................................................................... .. 
.. o.3:·34.:4·4 ... i3.MT ........................................... T'End ... o¥ .. c·as·e .........................................................................................................................................................  
"63·:·34.:44 ... i3.MT .......................................... r ................................................................................................................................................................................................. .. 
"6'3·:·34:44 ... i3.MT .......................................... f ................................................................................................................................................................................................. . 
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MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
ANITA M. E. MOORE, ISB #5885 
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA





MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF 
SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, AARON EUGENE LANTIS, by and through his 
Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender’s Office, ANITA MOORE, handling attorney, and 
hereby moves this Honorable Court for its Order staying the execution of the sentence pending appeal in 
the instant case pursuant to I.C.R. 54.5 (a).
DATED December 05, 2017.




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Brenda Ruckdashel, Deputy Clerk
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MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 05, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the within 




ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
ANITA M. E. MOORE, ISB #5885 
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA






TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF IDAHO, BY AND THROUGH 
THE ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named Defendant-Appellant, AARON EUGENE LANTIS, appeals 
against the State of Idaho to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 
from the order denying Judgment of Acquittal in Case No. CR 01 17 07609, 
entered on the 2nd  day of November, 2017, in the Magistrate Division of the 
Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, the Honorable Judge Michael Lojek  
presiding.
2. Mr. Lantis has a right to appeal to the District Court, and the judgment described 
in the preceding paragraph is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 54(a)(1)(F)
3. The following additional transcript(s) are requested:




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Brenda Ruckdashel, Deputy Clerk
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a) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated 
transcript fee because he is an indigent person and is unable to 
pay said fee.
b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for 
preparation of the record because he is an indigent person and is 
unable to pay said fee.
c) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee 
because he is indigent and is unable to pay said fee.
d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served, 
pursuant to I.A.R. 20.
5. That the appeal is taken upon all matters of law and fact.
6. That the Defendant-Appellant anticipates raising issues including but not 
limited to:
a) The Trial Court erred in denying Appellant’s motions for judgment of 
acquittal under Rule 29 of the Idaho Criminal Rules.
DATED December 05, 2017.
Anita M. E. Moore
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 05, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of the within 
instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor.
Debbie Florence
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NOTICE OF REASSIGNMENT 1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF




      Plaintiff,
vs.
Aaron Eugene Lantis
     Defendant.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case has been reassigned to the 




Clerk of the District Court
By: Bob Aspiri
      Deputy Clerk
ANY OTHER HEARING S CURRENTLY SET WILL HAVE TO BE RESET WITH THE NEWLY 
ASSIGNED JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this day I served a copy of the attached to:
David Garrett Swenson
200 W Front Street Rm 3191
Boise ID  83702
acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
[X] By email   [  ] By mail
Anita Marie Elizabeth Moore
200 W Front Street Rm 1107
Boise ID  83702
amoore@adaweb.net 
[X] By email    [  ] By mail 
Aaron Eugene Lantis
1707 S 26th St
Nampa, ID  83686
[  ]  By mail
[  ]  By personal delivery
      Clerk_______ Date ____
Dated: 12/6/2017 By: 
Deputy Clerk
Filed: December 6, 2017 at  9:22 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Bob Aspiri   Deputy Clerk
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Signed: 12/6/2017 09:23 AM
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ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Defendant
ANITA M. E. MOORE, ISB #5885 
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA





ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF 
SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL
The above entitled matter, having come before this Court, and good cause appearing 
therefrom;






I HEREBY CERTIFY that on 
, I served a true and correct electronic copy to:
X Ada County Prosecutor acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net
X Ada County Public Defender public.defender@adacounty.id.gov
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
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Signed: 12/6/2017 03:46 PM
, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54(e).
Signed: 12/7/2017 08:41 AM




DEC 0 8 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEBBIE PERKINS 
OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Aaron Eugene Lantis, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR0117-7609 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all the 
testimony of the original trial or hearing is required by Appellant to resolve the issues on appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That Appellant shall order and pay for the estimated cost of the transcript within 14 
days after the filing of the notice of appeal. 
2) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the date of the notice 
of the filing of the transcript. 
3) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within 28 days after service of 
appellant's brief. 
4) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within 21 days after service 
of respondent's brief. 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 1 
000141
5) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument in writing after all briefs are 
filed, and that if within fourteen ( 14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so notice 
for oral argument, the Court may deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs and 
the record. 
Dated this 8th day of December 2017. 
GERALD F. SCHROEDER 
Senior District Judge 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 2 
000142
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of December, 2017. I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Anita Marie Elizabeth Moore 
VIA Email: Amoore@adaweb.net 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
David Garrett Swenson 
VIA Email: acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPARTMENT 
VIA Email: transcripts@adaweb.net 
ORDER GOVERNING PROCEDURE ON APPEAL - Page 3 
000143
NO·----:::::-:::=:--~~,_-­FILED : A.M., ____ ..r .. M,__~=---
DEC 1 3 2017 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
ByP. BOURNE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






AARON EUGENE LANTIS, 
Defendant/ Appellant, 
) Case No. CR01-17-07609 
) 
) NOTICE OF PREPARATION 
) OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT 
) _____________ ) 
A Notice of Appeal was filed in the above-entitled matter on December 5, 2017 and a copy of said 
Notice was received by the Transcription Department on December 11, 2017. I certify the 
estimated cost of preparation of the appeal transcript to be: 
Type of Hearing: Jury Trial 
Date ofHearing: August 11,2017 Judge: Michael Lojek 
Type ofHearing: Oral Argument 
Date of Hearing: October 31, 2017 Judge: Michael Lojek 
335 Pages x $3.25 = $1,088.75 
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83(k)(l), the appellant must, unless otherwise 
ordered by a District Judge, pay the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript within 
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, and the appellant shall pay the balance of 
the fee, if any, for the transcript upon completion. 
In this case, the Ada County Public Defender has agreed to pay for the cost of the transcript 
fee upon completion of the transcript. 
The Transcription Department will prepare the transcript and file it with the Clerk of the District 
Court within thirty-five (35) days from the date of this notice. The transcriber may make 
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT - Page 1 
CR01 -17- 07609 
NOPT 




application to the District Judge for an extension of time in which to prepare the transcript. 
Dated this Wednesday, December 13, 2017 
Ada Co Transcripts Department 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on December 13,2017 a true and correct copy ofthe Notice of Preparation of Appeal 
Transcript was forwarded to Appellant or Appellant's attorney of record, by electronic mail, at: 
Ada County Public Defender 
public.defender@adacounty. id. gov 
ANITA M.E. MOORE 
P AMj?LA BOURNE 
Ada County Transcripts Department 
NOTICE OF PREPARATION OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT - Page 2 
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~~-. -+~~~7:rfr-~~F~~;~~M.======== 
JAN 0 3 2018 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEBBIE PERKINS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DEPUTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. CR0117-7609 
CONDITIONAL ORDER 
DISMISSING APPEAL 
Aaron Eugene Lantis , 
Defendant/~ppellant. 
It appearing to the Court upon a review of the record in the above-entitled action 
that an Estimated Cost of Appeal Transcript dated December 13th, 2017 was emailed to 
Defendant/Appellant counsel requiring payment of the estimated transcript fee within 
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The time for making said 
payment has now expired ; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the appeal in the action be and the same is 
hereby dismissed fourteen (14) days from the filing date of this order, unless on or before 
that date the appellant takes the necessary steps to furnish payment for the transcript. 
Dated this <;? day of --r=-----'--,1'---='~ 
GERALD F. SCHROEDER 
Senior District Judge 
CONDITIONAL ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL- PAGE 1 
000146
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this _l_ day of _ ____;::5=-::;o~V1 .....:.· ___ , 201 ..[, I mailed a 
true and correct copy of the within instrument to : 
Ada County Public Defender 
Anita M.E. Moore . 
Via Email: public.defender@adacounty.id .gov 
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPT 
VIA EMAIL: transcripts@adaweb.net 
CONDITIONAL ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL - PAGE 2 
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JAN 0 3 2018 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEBBIE PERKINS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
Criminal Court - Traffic Division 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
MEMO FOR THE RECORD 
Date: I - ~ - LO I g 
Case Number: C ~ 0 \ \ -:f - -=f toOC, 
Defendant: Aa.rot\ f.v~efLe, LaflfiS 
Subject: Condi±iontd Or-hv Di.sm lss-,~ Y\~ A-py-eal ti\.Ja..S +fte..J 
\ n e rtor . Cta r-r'fi e.el w ;.+J, Tc A. 771 e., &ce 0 ofA cR vJ I I I 
ttl¥ ~y +ranJco'p-h upon CtJrnpfe:6'o tt. 
/- 3> -2Dtf' 
DEBBIE PERKrNS 
Date 
MEMO FOR THE RECORD [REV 9-200 1 ) 
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JAN 0 3 2018 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By OE88iE PERKINS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF nr;"''1" 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, iN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
Aaron Eugene Lantis. 
Defendant/~ppe!lant. 
Case No. CR0117-7609 
CONDITIONAL ORDER 
DISMISSING APPEAL 
It appearing to the Court upon a review of the record in the above-entitled action 
that an Estimated Cost of Appeal Transcript dated December 13th, 2017 was emailed to 
Defendant/Appellant counsel requiring payment of the estimated transcript fee within 
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of AppeaL The time for making said 
payment has now expired; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the appeal in the action be and the same is 
hereby dismissed fourteen (14} days from the filing date of this order, unless on or before 
Senior District Judge 
CONDITIO 
JAN 0 4 2018 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 








CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
true and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
Ada County Public Defender 
Anita M.E. Moore 4 
Via Email: public.defender@adacounty.id.gov 
ADA COUNTY TRANSCRIPTS DEPT 
VIA EMAIL: transcripts@adaweb.net 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 










A.M._ ~t---41£_,.--.... __ :_ 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Case No. CR01-17-07609 
JAN 2 2 2018 
vs. 
AARON EUGENE LANTIS, 
NOTICE OF LODGING 
APPEAL TRANSCRIPT 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk 
By P. BOuRNE ' 
DEPUTY 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
To: DAVID G. SWENSON, Attorney for Respondent. 
To: ANITA M. MOORE, Appearing Appellant 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT a transcript ofthe proceeding in this action was 
lodged with the Court on January 22, 2018. 
Unless objections to the content of the transcript are received within 
twenty-one (21) days from the date of mailing of this notice, such transcript shall be 
deemed settled. 
Dated January 22, 2018. 
PAMEL BOURNE 
Deputy Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on Monday, January 22,2018, I served a true and correct 
electronic copy to: 
David D. Swenson acpocourtdocs@adaweb.net 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Anita M. Moore gublic.defender@adacounty.id.gov 
Ada County Public Defender 
PAMEL~BOURNE 
Deputy Clerk of the District Court 
NOTICE OF LODGING - 1 -
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF APPLLANT
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
ANITA M. E. MOORE, ISB #5885 
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA





MOTION  TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE 
BRIEF OF APPLLANT
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant/Appellant, AARON LANTIS, by and through his 
Attorney of Record, the Ada County Public Defender’s Office, ANITA MOORE, handling attorney, and, 
pursuant to Rule 34 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, hereby moves this Honorable Court for its Order 
granting an extension of fourteen (14) days to file the Brief of Appellant.  This Motion is supported by the 
Affidavit of Anita Moore, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit A.
DATED February 23, 2018.




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Maura Olson, Deputy Clerk
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MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF APPLLANT
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 23, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the within 
instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor.
Kari Bankston




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Maura Olson, Deputy Clerk
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 














Criminal No. CR01-17-7609 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANITA MOORE IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND 
TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
--------------------------~) 
State of Idaho 




1. I am counsel for Aaron Lantis in the above-entitled appeal. 
2. Brief of Appellant in the above-entitled appeal is currently due on February 26, 2018. 
3. No previous extensions of time for filing Brief of Appellant have been requested, granted 
or denied in the above-entitled appeal. 
4. This request is made upon the following grounds: 
a. I am a deputy in the magistrate division of the Ada County Public Defender's 
Office, and have had a heavy caseload. 
b. My caseload has left me with insufficient time in which to complete the Brief of 
Appellant in this appeal. 
c. I am in the process of transitioning onto a felony trial team and am already 
beginning to be assigned new cases. I am also concluding business from my old 
calendar and clearing out my office in preparation for my new caseload.-
AFFIDAVIT OF ANITA MOORE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO 
FILE BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Page 1 
000154
5. I am requesting an extension of 14 days, with an expected due date ofMarch 12, 2018. 
6. I believe 14 additional days will be sufficient time to complete the Brief, given all the 
factors with which I am contending. 




Subscribed and sworn to before me this ~ 3 day ofFebruary, 2018 . 
• 111£ f. Van~ 
Notary Public 
(SEAL) I reside at 
-4~~~+--=~-+---
My Commission Expires: {~ 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANITA MOORE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO 
FILE BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Page 2 
Electronically Filed
2/26/2018 10:22 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
D. Garrett Swenson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State BarNo. 10054 
200_W, Front Street, Rm. 3191 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Fax: (208) 287-·7709 
acpocourtdocscwadaweb.net 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




) Case No. CROl-17-07609 
) 
) STATE'S OBJECTION TO 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND 
) TIME TO FILE BRIEF OF 
) APPELLANT 
) ___________________________ ) 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State ofldaho, and hereby objects to the Defendant's Motion 
to Extend Time to File Brief of Appellant for the following reason: 
Rule 34 states that " [ e ]xtensions of time for filing briefs shall not be favored and will be 
granted .... only upon a clear showing of good cause .... " Defendant/Appellant has failed to show good 
cause for an extension oftime. The State respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion to Extend 
Time to File Brief of Appellant be denied. 
STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME (LANTIS) 
Page 1 
000156
DATED this k{a day of February, 2018. 
JAN M. BENNETTS 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
~ .. ~ 
By: D. Garrett Swenson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of February, 2018, I caused to be served, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Objection to Defendant's Motion upon the 
individual(s) named below in the marmer noted: 
Anita Moore. Ada Count Public Defendant. Boise ID 83 702 
~ By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
~ By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail. 
0 By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the 
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor. 
0 By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: ______ . 
CJ By hand delivering copies of the same to defense counsel. 
~ By iCourt eFile and Serve. 
Legal 




Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Chynae Hull, Deputy Clerk
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7400 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7419 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 













) ____________________________ ) 
Criminal No. CR01-2017-7609 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE MICHAEL LOJEK, MAGISTRATE, PRESIDING 
Anita Moore 
Ada County Public Defender's Office 
200 W. Front St. #1102 
Boise ID 83702 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
Garrett Swenson 
Ada County Prosecutor 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise ID 83702 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
000158
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Aaron Lantis, the Appellant, was charged with the misdemeanor offense of disturbing the 
peace in violation of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code. The state alleged that Mr. Lantis committed this 
crime by sending sexually suggestive pictures of the alleged victim, Hillary Henslee, to her 
employers in an attempt to have her fired from her job. Mr. Lantis exercised his right to a trial 
by jury on this charge, and was found guilty. He also made pre- and post-verdict motions under 
Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, both of which were denied. Aaron Lantis asks this 
Court to hold that a conviction cannot stand under § 18-6409 on the facts of the present case, or, 
alternatively, that § 18-6409 is vague and overbroad, and that therefore the trial court erred in 
denying his Rule 29 motions and Mr. Lantis' conviction should be reversed. 
Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On July 4, 2016, Nancy Van Winkle was working as a branch manager and commercial 
lender at the Idaho Independent Bank in Star, Idaho. Trial Transcript (Tr.) at 44-45. Hillary 
Henslee at that time was the assistant manager and under Ms. Van Winkle's direct supervision. 
Tr. at 45. Ms. Henslee had been friends with Aaron Lantis for six years, and then were in an on-
and-off relationship for eight months. Tr. at 52, 11. 10-12. This relationship ended in May of 
2016. Tr. at 52, ll. 22-23. 
On July 4, 2016, Ms. Van Winkle received an email from someone calling himself"Santa 
Claus," which was addressed not only to her but also to several other bank officers. Tr. at 45-46. 
The email contained photographs as attachments, one of which Ms. Van Winkle looked at and 
recognized as Ms. Henslee depicted in a sexual-type manner. Tr. at 47. On July 5, 2016, Ms. 
Van Winkle forwarded the email to Ms. Henslee and also called Ms. Henslee to ask if she knew 
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about the email. Tr. at 47, 55 at 11. 12-14. Ms. Van Winkle described her discomfort at seeing 
the email, but also testified that Hillary Henslee was not fired from her job as a result of the 
email. Tr. at 47-49. 
Ms. Henslee was at her desk at work when she received the email forwarded by Ms. Van 
Winkle. Tr. at 55, 11. 11-18. At trial, Ms. Henslee described her feelings of humiliation, 
annoyance and hurt at the dissemination of pictures she had sent to Mr. Lantis "for his eyes only" 
to people that she worked with. Tr. at 56; 59; 78, 1. 18. These sexually suggestive images were 
pictures that Ms. Henslee had taken of herself and sent to Mr. Lantis. Tr. at 57, 11. 1-2. One had 
been taken at Mr. Lantis' residence. Tr. at 67 11. 23-25. She took one picture either at Ms. 
Henslee's own bathroom or in the bathroom at her work. Tr. at 69, 11. 2-10. She took one at her 
office. Tr. at 70, 11. 3-5. She took one in the bathroom at U.S. Bank, where she was then 
working. Tr. at 70, 11. 16-22. The pictures she took at her places of employment may or may not 
have been taken during business hours. Tr. at 72-73. Mr. Lantis is not the only person to whom 
Ms. Henslee had sent pictures similar to the ones at issue at trial. Tr. at 75, ll. 20-22. 
On July 5. 2016, Off. Jeremy Miller of the Nampa City Police Department took a report 
from Hillary Henslee about the email sent to her supervisors. Tr. at 82-83. He then phoned 
Aaron Lantis, who admitted to sending the email. Tr. at 83-84. He further admitted to sending 
the email in order to cause Ms. Henslee to lose her job. Tr. at 87, 11. 14-18. 
On March 7, 2017, a criminal complaint and summons issued as a result of the foregoing. 
The summons returned unserved, so the court issued a warrant, which was served on about May 
7, 2017. The case came on for pretrial conference on June 20, 2017, and the matter was set for 
trial on August 10, 2017. The trial began as scheduled on August lOth but mistried and was 
started over with a new jury panel on August 11th. After the state rested, the defense moved for 
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judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, and, alternatively, dismissal under Rule 48, which motion 
was denied. Tr. at 90-110. The defense then rested, the case proceeded to the jury, and the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty. 
The defense filed a post-verdict Rule 29 motion, which came on for hearing on October 
31, 2017. Tr. at 167-195. This motion too was denied. The case then proceeded to sentencing 
on November 28, 2017. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the conduct complained of in the above-entitled case falls outside the purview of 
of § 18-6409, Idaho Code, such that the court erred in denying Aaron Lantis' motions under 
Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules? 
Whether, if the conduct complained of in the above-entitled case does fall within the 
purview of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code, that statute is void for vagueness and overbroad? 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Idaho Court of Appeals Case of State v. Pierce Is Not Distinguishable from the 
Present Case in Its Most Critical Aspects; Pierce Strongly Supports Reversing the 
Trial Court. 
After the state rested, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal and dismissal, 
respectively, pursuant to Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, citing in support State v. 
Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct.App.2015), rev. den. State v. Pierce,_ Idaho_, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 
28 (2016). Tr. at 90-110. After studying the Pierce decision, the court denied the defense's 
motion, holding that the present case was distinguishable. In support of its ruling, the court cited 
the Court of Appeals' comment, 159 Idaho at 664, that "[i]t is undisputed that the state did not 
provide evidence at trial that Pierce disturbed the peace of his ex-wife and her children, within 
the meaning ofi.C. § 18-6409." The court tendered the following comments: 
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So, the Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court's decision in that 
case. And the case, in the - in my mind, is different from what we have before us 
today in one important way. And this is, I think, the third full paragraph before 
the end of the opinion in the Pierce [sic] case. 
What the Court of Appeals says is that it is undisputed that the State did 
not provide evidence at trial that Pierce engaged in acts constituting disturbing the 
peace, as prohibited by 18-6409. And the issue was here whether or not the State 
had to do that, or whether or not they could prove something else that constituted, 
quote, disturbing the peace, but somehow met that definition without also falling 
within the gambit [sic] of 18-6409. 
And in this particular case, the Pierce matter, nobody disagreed with the 
idea that the State had not proven 18-6409 Disturbing the Peace. And the Court 
of Appeals went through the analysis and recognized that the state did not provide 
any sort of a definition of a common sense meaning of what disturbing the peace 
is. And their conclusion was that it can't be imparted a common meaning, as the 
State suggests. 
And so, this was really part of the basis of their decision in this case. 
So, what happened is that the Court of Appeals concluded as follows: It is 
undisputed that the State did not provide evidence at trial that Pierce disturbed the 
peace of his ex-wife and her children within the meaning of 18-6409. 
Accordingly, he could not have been found guilty of violating the protection order 
by disturbing the peace. 
And what they mean by that is, if you disturb the peace at all, if you're 
accused by that [sic], then the state is required to prove that you violated 18-6409. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order vacating Pierce's 
Judgment of Conviction in that case. 
So, what we have before us in Mr. Lantis' case is a little bit different, in 
the sense that there is a dispute, first of all, as to whether or not the State has 
established - or provided evidence that could support a conviction for violating 
18-6409. Where it was undisputed that the State did not do that in the Pierce [sic] 
decision, that is not the situation before us here in this Lantis case. 
Tr. at 106-108. 
The trial court apparently interpreted the Court of Appeals' comment to mean that the 
state in Pierce had failed to offer any evidence as to the effect of Pierce's conduct upon the 
complaining parties, since it contrasted this with the state of the evidence in the present case, 
which included Hillary Henslee's testimony that Mr. Lantis' conduct left her feeling humiliated, 
fearful for her job, and worried what recipients of the email in question thought of her. Tr. at 
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108-110. This, the court held, was sufficient grounds to deny Mr. Lantis' motion and send the 
case to the jury. !d. 
The Pierce case, however, bears closer examination. Pierce went to trial in Canyon 
County, the Hon. Dayo Onanubosi presiding, and was convicted of violating a protection order 
in violation of§ 39-6312, Idaho Code. The state's theory of the offense was that the standard-
form protection order, entered during the course of a contentious divorce, contained a clause 
directing Pierce not to disturb the protected party's peace; and that he disturbed her peace on two 
separate occasions by having the water and the electricity, respectively, shut off at his home 
where she was residing. Pierce made pre-verdict and post-verdict motions for judgment of 
acquittal under Rule 29, which motions were denied. He then appealed to the district court, the 
Hon. Duff McKee presiding. The district court reversed on several grounds, the most pertinent 
of which for purposes of the instant case was that the conduct alleged did not constitute 
disturbing the peace within the meaning of§ 18-6409.1 
The state appealed further, raising the single issue whether the district court on 
intermediate appeal erred by holding the state to the standards set by § 18-6409 when it had not 
chosen to charge Pierce with a violation of that statute. Although Pierce raised additional issues 
in his respondent's brief, the Court of Appeals did not address these; instead, it rejected the 
state's argument that§ 18-6409 was inapplicable, and affirmed the district court, holding that it 
was undisputed that the state offered no evidence that Pierce had disturbed the peace within the 
meaning of§ 18-6409. The Idaho Supreme Court then, without opinion, declined the state's 
invitation to review the Court of Appeals. 
1 A copy of Judge McKee's opinion on intermediate appeal (State v. Pierce, Canyon County case no. CR-2013-
13285-C) is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Appendix A. 
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In considering the clause "within the meaning ofl.C. § 18-6409" it is instructive to study 
Judge McKee's memorandum decision, which the Court of Appeals affirmed and quoted from. 
To begin with, the memorandum decision makes clear that, so far from failing to proffer 
evidence about the effects of Pierce's conduct on the complaining party, the state elicited the 
testimony of "several witnesses including the ex-wife on the consequences suffered on account 
of the breach." Appendix A at 4. The court summed up "the turmoil all of this caused in the life 
of the protected party and her children .... ": 
!d. at 8. 
With respect to the water service, it appears there was little disruption. The 
situation was handled with several telephone calls, with the water service being 
restored within a few hours. The electrical service caused greater disruption. 
Power was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did not 
treat this as a weekend emergency, and power was not restored until sometime the 
next week. There was testimony that refrigerated and frozen foods were lost, and 
the protected party and her children had to impose upon friends for lodging for the 
several days until the power was turned back on. This, the state contends, was 
sufficient to constitute a "breach of the peace," with the jury being allowed to 
determine for themselves whether the actions in question should be deemed 
illegal .... 
The district court went on to note that disturbing the peace is a "well-recognized and 
useful catch-all" for plea bargaining purposes, but that in the absence of a stipulation to a factual 
basis, the state has to prove at least one of the "specific elements designated in the statute": 
No matter how this statute is dissected or rearranged, the circumstances of the 
case at bar do not fit. Telephoning a utility to arrange termination of service, no 
matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual noises, 
(b) tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, (d) 
anything related to guns or pistols, or (e) any use of vulgar or obscene language 
around children. 2 If the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the 
misdemeanor statute, the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred. 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court, of course, struck down as unconstitutional this last provision pertaining to vulgar 
language in front of children in State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885 (2004). 
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!d. at 8-9 (emphasis added). Thus, the key to the district court's holding on intermediate appeal 
was not that the state failed to offer evidence that the complaining party's peace was disturbed: 
the state clearly presented copious evidence to that effect. Rather, one of the problems for the 
state was that the charged conduct did not fit the legislature's definition of disturbing the peace. 
The instant case presents essentially the same problem. The amended complaint alleged 
that Aaron Lantis "did willfully and maliciously disturb the peace of a person, to-wit [sic] : 
Hillary Henslee, by offensive conduct by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to Hillary 
Henslee's employer." The charging instruction read to the jury in this case (No. 11) puts it in the 
following terms: "3. the defendant, Aaron Eugene Lantis, maliciously and willfully 4. disturbed 
the peace or quiet of Hillary Henslee 5. by offensive conduct." Judge McKee's analysis ofthe 
facts in Pierce is squarely on point in the instant case. Sending an offensive email to the 
complaining party's bosses, no matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or 
unusual noises, (b) tumultuous or offensive conduct, (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, or 
(d) anything related to guns or pistols. Since the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of 
the misdemeanor statute, the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred, and this court 
should reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Lantis' motions. 
An important issue on appeal in Pierce was the lack of a jury instruction to clarify the 
meaning of "breach of the peace" or "disturbing the peace," which the district court held - and 
the Court of Appeals agreed - is a term of art, not carrying the plain, ordinary dictionary 
meaning of those words or combination of words. Appendix A at 9; Pierce, 159 Idaho at 663-
64. The jury was left to decide for itself what "disturbing the peace" meant, and, at one point in 
its deliberations, asked a question that made its level of confusion obvious. Appendix A at 5. 
The state's whole theory of the offense in the case at bar raises substantially the same problem, 
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namely, that the jury had too much scope to apply its own subjective standards in determining 
whether the charged conduct- sending an email to the complaining party's bosses- rose to the 
level of "offensive conduct" within the meaning of§ 18-6409. 
The district court in Pierce expanded on this problem, noting that it is the province of 
neither juries nor judges to make the law: the jury is there to determine facts, and the court is 
there to instruct on the law and resolve ambiguities in the law. Appendix A at 9-10. "What a 
judge may not do is create law - identify new areas of conduct not included in the statute by the 
legislature, or within reach of the designated list of prohibited activities that is included." Id. at 
10. It was impermissible for the court to leave the jury to decide what "breach the peace" meant, 
and thus whether the charged actions were prohibited by the protection order at issue in the case. 
"To allow the jury to interpret and determine the law according to the evidence in the case means 
that the jury could subjectively decide, based upon its own personal values, customs and 
standards, what is and what is not against the law at any given time, then to decide if what the 
defendant did in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law thus created. 
Under any theory of law, this is impermissible." I d. 
The district court then went on to elucidate the dangers of applying subjective 
assessments in determining whether a crime has been committed: 
... [T]he law is clear that where the courts do interpret the law to determine their 
application to particular facts, the interpretation must be based upon an objective 
standard relative to society generally, and not a subjective measure to the 
particular desires of any single individual. [Case cite omitted.] This is 
necessarily so, because the criminal law is an expression of what is and is not 
acceptable to society generally. It is not necessarily the measure of what is or is 
not acceptable conduct to an individual in any given situation between 
individuals. One can think of countless situations where conduct was somewhat 
sharp but not rude or tumultuous, positions that were stated firmly and with vigor, 
but were not loud or obnoxious, or conduct that was confrontational and perhaps 
contentious, but without threats, violence, firearms or the like. Few would 
seriously argue that any of these situations approach the level of misconduct 
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required by the statute. Yet all of them include conduct that could be upsetting or 
unpleasant to a more sensitive individual at any given time. It would be 
impermissible under any theory of law to allow the criminal code to be bent in 
such fashion that such a sensitive or perhaps irate individual could bring about 
the imposition of society's criminal sanctions upon nothing more than such 
personal and individual demands. 
!d. at 10-11 (emphases added). 
The district court went on to note that courts have routinely stricken down enactments 
that sought to have illegal conduct determined on a case-by-case basis, citing the example of 
laws in the South against disturbing the peace based on general terms such as "'offensive 
conduct':" in one such case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that such a law could not be invoked to 
prosecute black people for sitting at a whites-only lunch counter, even though such conduct was 
considered by many at the time to be offensive. Appendix A at 12. "The point is that it is not a 
subjective evaluation of the conduct in these cases, it is a careful catalog of objective elements 
that can be uniformly applied. This need for uniformity necessarily excludes jury participation 
in the definition of what is and what is not permitted. The jury measures the conduct to be sure; 
but only after the boundaries and intricacies in application have been defined by the court." Id. 
at 13. 
There is nothing absurd or far-fetched about the problem of the slippery slope. We 
currently live in an age when the nation is in a fever pitch of touchiness and highly overwrought 
sensibilities. We see people coming to blows over mere political differences, and destroying or 
calling for the destruction of historic monuments that they find offensive. We have even, in 
recent months, been treated to the spectacle of a popular cable sports network pulling a reporter 
off an assignment on the grounds that he bears a name very similar to that of a leading Civil War 
Confederate general. "Offensive conduct" is at present, and given the current national mood, an 
extremely big and ever-expanding tent. 
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But it is imperative that in the criminal justice system, where life, liberty and property are 
at stake, cooler heads prevail. In the instant case, we have a charge of disturbing the peace based 
solely on the theory of "offensive conduct." As we have seen, an extremely broad range of 
behaviors may be - and very often is - swept within the ambit of the word "offensive," viewed 
in isolation. Taking the word "offensive" in isolation, as the state has done in the present case, is 
the source of the slippery slope problem: it leaves the jury free to apply its own subjective 
standards to convict Mr. Lantis of a crime of the jury's own making and definition. The danger 
is all the greater when, as here, the conduct described in the complaint is of a character that is 
highly likely to arouse strong emotions. In such a situation, and with no other guidance than 
their own feelings on the meaning of "offensive conduct," the jury is free to define a crime not 
contemplated by the legislature and return a verdict of guilty. 
The Pierce case clearly supported Aaron Lantis' motions for judgment of acquittal and 
dismissal in the above-entitled case, and these should have been granted. The trial court should 
be reversed. 
II. Either "Offensive Conduct" Must Be Interpreted in its Textual Context to Exclude 
the Charged Conduct or § 18-6409 is Void for Vagueness and Overbroad. 
Although the state's theory of the offense cannot stand without taking the word 
"offensive" in isolation, the word "offensive" does not in fact occur in isolation in the statute, 
and the canons of statutory construction require that it not be read in isolation. The statute must 
be read as a whole, with its components taken in the light of the surrounding text. 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative 
body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language 
of the statute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted 
in the context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a 
whole, and words should be given their plain, usual and ordinary meanings. It 
should be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of 
the statute so that none will be void, superfluous or redundant. 
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State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863, 867 (20 11) (holding that "household member" for 
purposes of the attempted strangulation statute includes only those in an intimate relationship 
and excludes the parent-child relationship), quoting Ferber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 
307, 310 (2009). Further, "[i]n determining legislative intent, this Court applies the maxim 
noscitur a sociis, which means "a word is known by the company it keeps." Schultz, 151 Idaho 
at 867, citing State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816 (2000), overruled in part by State v. Poe, 139 
Idaho 885 (2004). 
Reading the word "offensive" in its proper context as part of a whole, and recognizing the 
word by the company it keeps, supports the McKee analysis as applied above. The type of 
conduct outlawed in § 18-6409 is clearly of the loud, boisterous and tumultuous variety that 
disrupts not merely a person's interior peace of mind but exterior quiet and tranquility: 
• Loud or unusual noise 
• Tumultuous or offensive conduct 
• Threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting 
• Firing any gun or pistol 
• Disrupting services connected with the burial of the dead 
Even the now-stricken-down provision against using profane language in front of 
children is modified by the phrase "in a loud and boisterous manner." There is not even any 
reference in the statute to email or any other kind of electronic communication. 3 It must be the 
case, then, that the "offensive conduct" the statute contemplates needs to be tumultuous, noisy, 
and generally part of a class of behaviors that breaches the exterior peace of a person or a 
community by means of some jarring and abrupt assault on the senses, or conduct calculated to 
3 The legislature has proven itself capable of criminalizing specific types of electronic communication; cf. § 18-
6609, criminalizing video voyeurism (sometimes known as Idaho's "revenge porn" statute) or § 18-6710, 
criminalizing harassment by telephone. 
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incite or provoke violence. That necessarily excludes the state's theory that Aaron Lantis 
disturbed the peace by sending an offensive email to Hillary Henslee's bosses: sending an 
upsetting email to third parties simply does not fall into this category of conduct. 
If, on the other hand, the state is right, and the word "offensive" is properly read in 
isolation and outside the context of the words that surround it, and it encompasses that which 
breaches only a persons' interior peace by provoking some negative emotional response, then § 
18-6409 must be void for vagueness and overbroad, since no one, including Mr. Lantis, is on fair 
notice as to what kind of conduct is prohibited, and since there is almost no behavior that it 
would not reach, including constitutionally protected conduct. 
The United States Supreme Court "has on more than one occasiOn invalidated 
statutes ... because they contained no standard whatever by which criminality could be 
ascertained, and the doctrine of these cases has subsequently acquired the shorthand description 
of 'void for vagueness."' Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 (1974), citing Lanzetta v. New 
Jersey, 306 U.S. 45 (1939); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). "In these cases, the 
criminal provision is vague 'not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to 
an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of 
conduct is specified at all."' Id., quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,614 (1971). 
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 457 (2001). This "doctrine requires that a 
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citation omitted). 
"The more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other 
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principle element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines 
to govern law enforcement."' Id. at 358, quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974). 
"Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a 
'standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal 
predilections."' Id., quoting, Smith, 415 U.S. at 575. "Legislatures may not so abdicate their 
responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law." Smith, 415 U.S. at 575. Rather, 
the "absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion or exclusion is precisely what offends 
the Due Process Clause." I d. at 578 (citation omitted). Simply put, a law is void for vagueness 
when it subjects a person "to criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that police, court, 
and jury [are] free to react to nothing more than their own preferences .... " Id. When the 
accused asserts that a statute is vague as applied to the facts of his particular case, he must 
demonstrate the that statute "failed to provide fair notice that his conduct was proscribed or 
failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in 
determining whether to arrest him." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712 (2003). 
In this case, the state alleged that Mr. Lantis disturbed the peace of Ms. Henslee by using 
email to cause her embarrassment and hurt her employment situation. Since, as noted above, 
there is no reference to email or any other electronic communication in § 18-6409, there is 
nothing in the statute that puts the accused on notice that sending an email might constitute 
disturbing the peace. The state's reading of§ 18-6409 leaves it with far too much discretion to 
use the criminal law to avenge perceived wrongs committed via email without notice to 
reasonable persons that such perceived wrongs are criminal in nature. 
If the state's theory of the offense in this case is justified, then § 18-6409 is also facially 
overbroad. The first step in determining whether a statute is facially overbroad is to determine 
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whether that statute regulates constitutionally protected conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 614 (1973); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714. The next step in the analysis is to determine 
whether the statute precludes a significant amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Korsen, 
138 Idaho at 713. "Ifthe statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent ofthe 
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion to consider rules of statutory 
construction. The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed 
legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." State v. Dickerson, 
142 Idaho 514, 517 (Ct.App.2006) (internal quotation marks and cites omitted). Courts "are not 
free to rewrite a statute under the guise of statutory construction." State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326 
(2009). 
Speech in its various forms is obviously protected by the First Amendment. While it is 
true that the right to free speech is not 100% unqualified, nevertheless, if the state is right in this 
case, and sending an "offensive" email can constitute disturbing the peace, then anyone who 
sends an email or indeed any sort of communication that someone else might deem "offensive" 
needs to fear the risk of being charged with a crime for doing so. Thus, the state's theory of the 
offense in this case, if justified, means that § 18-6409 is overbroad, and the conviction herein 
must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Pierce case - both at the level of intermediate appeal and at the Court of Appeals 
level - instructs us that there are limits to the kinds of upsetting conduct that can be addressed by 
the criminal justice system. In that case, as in the case against Aaron Lantis, the state presented 
plenty of evidence as to how disturbed the complaining parties were by the conduct alleged. 
Also, as in the Pierce case, the state's theory of the offense in the instant case left the jury free to 
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apply its own subjective standards in determining whether the act of sending an "offensive" 
email was criminal. But, as in Pierce, the acts alleged did not fall within the strictures of § 18-
6409, Idaho Code. 
A proper reading of § 18-6409 requires the exclusion of the actus reus described in the 
complaint in this case, which means that the state failed to offer evidence sufficient to sustain a 
conviction. Otherwise, if the state's reading of § 18-6409 is true, then that statute must be 
facially overbroad, as sweeping a great deal of protected conduct within its ambit, and void for 
vagueness facially and as applied, for putting no one on notice that sending an "offensive" email 
may constitute the crime of disturbing the peace. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court below should have granted Aaron Lantis' 
motions under Rules 29 and 48, and this court should reverse the trial court's denial of those 
motions and the conviction entered herein. 
DATED, this.J1®'day of February, 2018. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 27, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TilE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Case No. CR-2013-13285-C 
v. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
BRIAN W. PIERCE, 
Defendnat/Appellant 
This case is before this court on appeal from a judgment of conviction entered on 
a jury verdict by the magistrate below, and the subsequent denial of a post judgment 
motion for acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rule 29. The appellant herein, Brian W. 
Pierce, appears by and through counsel, Nolan Sorenson, Office of Public Defender, 
Caldwell. The state appears by and though counsel. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Nancy 
Hurd, canyon County Prosecutor's Office, Caldwell. The matter has been fully briefed, 
and submitted for decision on the briefs without argument. 




For reasons stated, the judgment of conviction entered herein is reversed. The 
motion for acquittal presented to the court under Rule 29 is granted. The defendant is 
acquitted and all charges are dismissed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
The salient facts are not in dispute. At the time of the events in question in 2013, 
Pierce was in litigation with his ex~wife over issues pertajning to their divorce. On May 
15, 2013, an order was entered in the divorce proceeding directing that the house the 
parties had been living in was Pierce's separate property. The wife and her two children 
were permitted to live there. The two children were not Pierce's children. A domestic 
violence order was entered against Pierce- the temporary order was issued May 8, 2013, 
and the permanent order replaced the temporary after hearing on May 16, 2013. This 
order was to remain in place for a full year, unless modified by the court. The operative 
provisions of this ordert as are relevant here, was apparently an identical provision in 
both orders which provided: 
Personal Conduct Order: Respondent shall not harass, annoy, disturb the 
peace ot: telephone, contact, or otherwise communicate with (either 
directly or indirectly, in person or through any other person): The 
protected person [and] The minor children residing in the Protected 
Person's household. 
Both of the orders, including this paragraph, were pre-printed forms used by the court in 
connection with domestic abuse orders in Canyon County. Other than filling in names 
and addresses, and several blanks, the magistrate made no manuscript entries on either 
fonn. There is no dispute in this case that this order was entered, serially on the dates 
indicated, that both orders had been served on Pierce, and that he was aware of it. 
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On May 10,2013, service for water to the subject house was cut offby the utility. 
On May 31, 2013, service for electricity to the subject house was cut off by the utility. 
The state alleged that both shut-offs were accomplished by Pierce calling the utilities and 
requesting that the services be terminated. At trial, the only evidenc::e of Pierce's 
involvement was the testimony of the investigating detective, who testified that Peirce 
admitted to him that he (Pierce) had called the power company to shut off the power. 
There was no direct evidence of Pierce's involvement with the water shut off. 
Pierce was charged in a single count complaint with the misdemeanor offense of 
willfully violating the terms of the domestic abuse protection order, with knowledge of 
the prohibitions contained within the protection order, by twning off the utilities at the 
residence where the protected person and her children were residing, alleging tbat such 
disturbed the peace of the protected person and her children. 
Following a trial that was completed in less than one day, the jury retmned a 
verdict finding the defendant guilty of the charge. A post trial motion for acquittal under 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 was denied. The defendant was sentenced on January 16,2014. 
This appeal followed. 
Analysis 
The charge was violating a domestic violence order, with the charging language 
being that the defendant breached the peace of the protected party by his action in 
causing the water and power utilities to be shut off. The magistrate ruled that the phrase 
''breached the peace" was a tenn of art, and that reference to the Idaho Code criminal 
provision of disturbing the peace would be the criteria for defining the offense in the 
protective order. The crime, a misdemeanor, is at I.C. § 18-6409, and provides as follows: 
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Disturbing the feace: {1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the 
peace and quiet of any neighborhood, family or person by loud or unusual noise, 
or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, ttaducing. quarreling, 
challenging to fight or fighting, or fires and gun or pistol or uses vulgar, profane 
or indecent language within the presence ofhearing of children, in loud and 
boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
The tdal consisted of the testimony of the investigation detective from the Canyon 
County Sheritrs office on the occurrence of the breach, and several witnesses including 
the ex-wife on the consequences suffered on account of the breach. The 1rial took less 
than one day. 
The charging instruction was a single instruction to the jury. The instruction was 
~ by drawing some specific language from the code section on the misdemeanor 
crime of breach the peace, adding this to ~ standard elements instruction for violation of 
a domestic protection order. This instruction, numbered for the jury as Instruction No. 
204 and edited here slightly to emphasize the relevant portions, read as follows: 
Instruction 204 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of violating a protection order, the 
State must prove each of the following elements: 
1. That on or about May 8, 2013 and June 1, 2013; 
2. In the State ofldaho; 
3. The Defendant Brian Wade Pierce; 
4. Did willfully violate the temporary domestic violence order ... and 
the amended domestic violence order ••. by turning off the utilities 
at the residence where [the protected parties] were residing which 
disturbed the peace of [the protected parties] with knowledge that a 
domestic violence protection order prohibits him from doi 
5. Before such violation, the defendant had notice of the Older. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
The jury sent a question through the bailiff that :frames the issue in this analysis; 
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Are we deciding if he willfully violated the order, i.e., did he shut off the utilities 
to disturb her peace or are we deciding if he willfully shut off the utilities and it 
disturbed her peace but he didn't necessarily know he was violating the order? 
Despite this red flare from the jury that plainly demonstrated that they were confused by 
the instructions and did not undeiStand the issues to be resolved, the solution reached by 
the court below, with the concurrence of counsel, was to advise the jury that the answer 
was within the instructions they already had, and that no further instruction would be 
given. The error in not clarifying the jury's confusion is subsumed completely by the 
mors in the instructions themselves. discussed within. 
The charging instruction is wrong. The grammatical construction of the fourth 
element awkwardly attempts to put three concepts for the jury to decide into one 
sentence: (1) did or did not the state prove that the defendant shut off the utility in 
question. which act (2) did nor did not constitute a breach of the peace of the protected 
person. and (3) of which the defendant did or did not willfully intended to breach. As is 
apparent from the jury's question. the awkward sentence was confusing. The sentence 
could be read to mean that the court has already determined that shutting off the utility 
was a breach of the peace, and the only thing to be decided is whether the defendant 
intended or knew of the consequences. The instruction set as a whole was wrong in that 
the set did not include an instruction defining what would have been necessary to find 
that acts in question did constitute disturbing the peace - something to relate the acts in 
question to the elements contained in the statute, I.C. §18-6409. 
For the jury to determine its verdict, the jury must be able to determine and 
complete answer to each of these questions from the evidence at trial; 
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(a) Do the acts described in the charge (the termination of utilities) constitute one 
or more of the enumerated elements of"disturbing the peace,. under the law of 
Idaho? 
(b) Did the defendant do one of these acts (cause termination of utilities); 
(c) If so, did he do so willfully and with malice? 
(d) Did the defendant know of the existence of a protective order that prevented 
him ftom doing the acts? 
In my view, there is no way the circumstances described by the evidence should 
or could constitute a crime under the criminal statute, and therefore they could not form 
the basis for a charge of breach of the protective order by disturbing the peace. There is 
no other clause or part of the protective order that comes into play, and the state has not 
alleged any. The case should not have survived the Rule 29 motions; one of the defense 
motions for a directed verdict of acquittal at close of the state's case, or at the close of 
evidence, or post-trial should have been granted. 
According to the proof at trial, when the electrical power was shut off on or about 
May 31, the house belonged to the defendant. The final divorce orders were entered on or 
about May 1 S, 2013, which confirmed the house as being the separate property of the 
husband. Yet the protected parties continued to remain in the house, although it is not 
clear under what authority. There was no proof that the defendant had been ordered to 
allow the protected parties to remain in the house, or that he had to provide them with 
utilities. The protected parties were, in effect, tenants at sufferance of the defendant -
continuing to occupy the house after it had been awarded to him in the divorce, but 
before any legal steps had been taken either to clarify what their rights and obligations on 
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continuing occupancy would be or to evict them. None of this was brought into evidence 
at trial. 
The situation with respect to the water service is a little different, in that it is 
alleged that this utility was shut off on or about May 10, 2013, before the final divorce 
orders were entered. While the defense maintained that the house had always been the 
defendant's separate property, no evidence was offered at the trial here and, depending 
upon what the evidence might show in this issue. this position may not appear so clearly 
defined - the status of this property as marital property may still have been open in early 
May. But even then, it is not alleged that the defendant was legally obligated to provide 
water service to the house where is soon-to-be ex-wife and her children were living. 
Although there were allegations about the water service, there was no competent 
proof at trial that the defendant bad anythins to do with the termination of water service. 
In readins the complete transcript, it tmns out that minutes before the trial started, the 
court struck the witness from the water utility on motion of the defense for a discovery 
rule inftaction. This meant that the only proof at trial of the defendant's involvement in 
any of the acts alleged consisted of the investigating detective's testimony that the 
defendant admitted to calling the power company on or about June 1, because he did not 
want to be liable for the power bills. (Tr. p. 110, 1. 1-5.) The detective did not follow up 
with any specific inquiry about the water utility. 
The defendant's admission to the sheriffs detective as to the power was the sum 
total of the evidence on defendant's guilt. The rest of the testimony was devoted to proof 
of the consequences - the turmoil all of this caused in the life of the protected party and 
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her children. On this proot the issue of the water utility termination should not have 
gone to the jury. 
With respect to the water service, it appears there was little disruption. The 
situation was handled with several telephone calls, with the water service being restored 
within a few hours. The electrical service termination caused greater disruption. Power 
was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did not treat this as a 
weekend emergency, and power was not restored until sometime the next week. There 
was testimony that reftigerated and frozen foods were lost, and the protected party and 
her children had to impose upon friends for lodging for the several days until the power 
was turned back on. This, the state contends, was sufficient to constitute a "breach of the 
~" with the jury being allowed to determine for themselves whether the actions in 
question should be deemed illegal. I conclude this to be error. 
I fully recognize that the charge of "disturbiug the peace" is a well-recognized 
and useful catch-all into which all manner of questionable conduct can be cataloged for 
the purpose of closing troublesome cases. Invariably, these questionable situations tum 
up by stipulation in plea agreements whereby more significant charges are being 
dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to a disturbing the peace charge. These deals are 
usually at the defendant's request, and there is no one calling for any inquiry into whether 
the specific acts fit the statute. 
Without a stipulation, the State would be obligated to prove one or more of the 
specific elements designated in the statute had been violated or breached in order to 
sustain a conviction. No matter how this statute is dis~ted or rearranged, the 
circumstances of the case at bar do not fit. Telephoning a utility to arrange termination of 
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service, no matter how phrased, cannot be made to resemble (a) any loud or unusual 
noises, (b) tmnultuous or offensive cond~ (c) anything related to a fight or fighting, (d) 
anything related to guns or pistols, or (e) any use of vulgar or obscene language around 
chilcben. If the circumstances do not fit any of the elements of the misdemeanor statute, 
the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred. 
And if the crime of disturbing the peace has not occurred, neither has the 
circumstance of violating a protective order by disturbing the peace. The magistrate 
below correctly observed that the term "disturbing the peace" is a term of art. It does not 
carry the plain ordinary dictionary meaning of the words, or combination of words. It 
carries the meaning of the statute-here, I. C. § 18-6409. 
The state argues that a jury can decide whether a given circumstance could be said 
to breach the peace of a given individual. The argument is wrong on two counts. The jury 
does not make the law, it is to determine the facts, and it is the responsibility oftbe judge 
to define the law, to set the frame for decision. State v. Golden, 67 Idaho 497, 186 P .2d 
485; State y. Bet/well. 11 Idaho 57, 61-62, 286 P.2d 641, 644 (1955). The judge may not 
make up law out of whole cloth but is bound by case precedent and by the acts of the 
legislature. State v. Delling. 152 Idaho 122, 131,267 P.3d 709,718 (2011). Ifthere is an 
ambiguity in the law, the judge must resolve the ambiguity - it would be improper to 
permit the jury to do so. But that is as far as it goes. The judge would also not be 
permitted to create new categories of conduct for sanction under the misdemeanor statute, 
absent a stipulation. Barnes v. Hinton, 103 Idaho 619, 620, 651 P.2d 553, 554 (Ct. App. 
1982)(Courts are empowered to resolve ambiguities in statutes, but have no power to 
Memorandum Decision Page- 9 
000185
( 
change the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature and cannot insert into 
statutes terms or provisions which are obviously not there.) 
The principle is that the legislature makes the law, the judge identifies and 
explains the law to the jury, and the jury determines whether facts exist or do not exist 
within the framework of the law as instructed by the court. The court may interpret the 
law, and break down complex provisions to provide relevant extracts for the jury's use. 
The court may fill in gaps, if such occur, but must do so consistently with what the 
legislature has enacted. What a judge may not do is create law - identify new areas of 
conduct not included in the statute by the legislature, or within reach of the designated list 
of prohibited activities that is included. 
In this case, the trial judge left for the jury to decide what the phrase "breach the 
peace" meant (which was CIIOr; this was a decision for the judge in instructing the jury); 
to then decide if what they thought the phrase meant was what the law intended when the 
phrase was used in the domestic protection order (which was error; the interpretation of 
the law is for the judge to determine and instruct). To allow the jury to interpret and 
determine the law according to the evidence in the case means that the jury could 
subjectively decide, based upon its own personal values, customs and standards, what is 
and what is not against the law at any given time, then to decide if what the defendant did 
in doing the acts as described in the complaint violated the law thus created. Under any 
theory of law, this is impermissible. 
The second flaw in the state's argument is that it presupposes as proper a 
subjective assessment of what might be considered a breach of the peace to a given 
individual. To the contrary, the law is clear that where the courts do interpret the law to 
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objective standard relative to to society generally, and not a subjective measure to the 
particular desires of any single individual. See State v. Hairston. 133 Idaho 496, 508, 988 
P.2d 1170, 1182 (1999). This is necessarily so, because the criminal law is an expression 
of what is and is not acceptable to society generally. It is not necessarily the measure of 
what is or is not acceptable conduct to an individual in any given situation between 
individuals. One can think of countless situations where conduct was somewhat sharp but 
not rude or tumultuous, positions that were stated firmly and with vig!Jf, but were not 
loud or obnoxious, or conduct that was confrontational and perhaps contentious, but 
without threats, violence, firearms or the like. Few would seriously argue that any of 
these situations approach the level of misconduct required by the statute. Yet all of them 
include conduct that could be upsetting or unpleasant to a more sensitive individual at 
any given time. It would be impermissible under any theory of law to allow the criminal 
code to be bent in such fashion that such a sensitive or perhaps irate 'individual could 
bring about the imposition of society's criminal sanctions upon nothing more than such 
personal and individual demands. 
If the test here is to be under an objective standard of what is or should be 
acceptable or unacceptable to society generally, can it be said that a property owner's 
decision to notify a utility to terminate service could be considered wrongful or illegal? In 
the instant case, there was no evidence that the defendant instructed the power company 
not to tell the occupant or warn the occupant the power was being terminated. There is no 
evidence that the defendant was in any way involved with the actual action of shutting off 
the power. There is no claim that he was present to cheer on the power crew or to gloat 
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over his ex-wife•s ptedicament The transaction was handled in the manner of hundreds 
of transactions at the power company where a property owner is telephoning in with an 
instruction for his account. 
The point here is that there is nothing about the transaction, when viewed in 
isolation, that could be consider wrong or improper or illegal in any respect. Insofar as 
defendant•s expectations of his ex-wife's reaction, if the water company example applies, 
he would expect that with a few phone calls, the power would be restored in his ex-wife's 
name. Is not this exactly what a tenant moving out would think when advising the power 
company to terminate service in the tenant,s name on a given date? How was the 
defendant to know that the power company would act on a Friday afternoon, or that the 
power company would not treat the issue as a weekend emergency, or that they would not 
notify he occupant if the power is being shut down. 
Where attempts have been made to leave such statutes open for case by case 
assessment of what was legal and illegal conduct, the courts have routinely stricken such 
laws as unconstitutional. The widest examples of such were the broadly drawn statues in 
the south that expressed the prohibitions in general terms such as "offensive conduct," 
without more. The United State Supreme Court, for example, held that a disturbing the 
peace ordinance could not be used where the only conduct being charged was against 
some black teenagers for sitting at a white-only lunch counter. See, Garner v. State of 
La., 368 U.S. 157, 82 S. Ct. 248, 7 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1961). It did not matter that the 
conduct was offensive to many. It would not be a jury question for the jury to decide 
whether the conduct under examination should be considered criminal. Under our law, it 
is the legislature in the first instance, and the judge where discretionary flexibility may 
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appears to exist, that is responsible to define where the division lines are between the 
merely rude and insulting and that which crosses the line into the sufficiently obnoxious 
to be criminal; between the innocently enthusiastic protest march, and one that involves 
the looting and destruction that accompanies the march that crosses the line. The point is 
that it is not a subjective evaluation of the conduct in these cases, it is a careful catalog of 
objective elements that can be uniformly applied. This need for uniformity necessarily 
excludes jury participation in the definition of what is and what is not permitted. The jury 
measures the conduct to be sure; but only after the boundaries and intricacies in 
application have been defined by the court. That was not done in this case, and the 
omission is reversible error. 
To summarize: there is no proof in this case that the defendant was involved in 
the termination of water to the property at all. For reasons not part of this appeal, the 
magistrates struck the state's witness on the water circumstance. However, for some 
reason, having stricken the witness, the state left the charge in for instructions and 
argument, and the jury apparently included it as part of their verdict. Since a guilty 
verdict could have been based upon either one of the circumstances alleged, or on bo~ it 
was reversible error to leave this charge in through the final instruction's and argument 
The act of a property owner asking the power company to shut off service is not, 
in the abstract, wrongful. It is a routine business decision carried out by countless 
property owners every day. There is no evidence that the defendant directed the power 
company to act in an underhanded, mean or evil manner. There was no evidence of 
whether the power company attempted to contact the occupants before the power was 
shut off. It is not explained why the power company did not treat the matter as a weekend 
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emergency when it learned the actual circumstances. There is no proof that the defendant 
knew how the power company was going to act. 
The conduct in question does not fit within any of the categories of conduct 
proscribed by the criminal statute, which is the necessary measure of action under the 
protective order. In my view, that is the end of it Domestic protection orders are 
intended. as a matter of legislative policy, to protect the person of the protected parties-
to prevent violence and abusive misconduct In the case of the addition of an ill-defined 
catch-all term - such as "breach the peace" - the law requires that conduct falling into 
this catch-all be of the same general character or caliber as the conduct in the more 
clearly defined areas. This means the catch-all terms are limited to proscribing conduct 
directed at, or at least in the area of, the violent or abusive misconduct that precipitated 
this law in the first place. It would not countenance extending the law into every comer 
of commerce and business, making every business decision subject to examination over 
whether unexpected inconveniences might spring up. 
The magistrate erred in not defining specifically the conduct that would have been 
subject to sanction under the criminal code or that was included within the call of the 
protective order. The magistrate was bound to explain to the jury where the lines were 
that would have to be crossed in order for what would otherwise be routine business 
decisions to be turned into criminal activity - whether under the disturbing the peace 
statute that was incorporated into the order or under any of the direct prohibitions of the 
protective order. 
The magistrate•s error in failing to instruct meant that the jury was free to make 
up its own criminal boundaries or standards, and then determine whether this defendant 
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had crossed the line or violated the standard which the jury had created. This is not 
permitted to the jury under any application of law. There simply was no evidence that the 
defendant acted with malicious intent or wanton disregard to harm his wife or her 
property. There was no evidence that the defendant knew the power company was going 
to act on a weekend, and then not respond to requests to restore service. There is no basis 
to place this on the back of the defendant in this case. Further, there was no reason for the 
defendant not to expect the power company to notify the occupants before the power was 
shut off, to give them time to act and restore service. Or if interrupted, not to expect that 
the interruption would have been brie~ while the arrangements were made. There is no 
showing that the reasonable expectations of this case would have been any more onerous 
or inconvenient than befalls many a landlord or tenant caught up in identical situations in 
the ordinary process of moving in or out 
Whatever the disagreements were that continued to plague these parties after their 
divorce, there is no sufficient evidence in his case that any of it crossed the line into the 
arena of the violent or abusive misconduct which is the gravamen of the protective order 
issued in this case. 
Conclasion 
For reasons stated, the judgment of conviction is and ruling denying the 
defendant's motion for acquittal are vacated and reversed. The case is remanded with 
directions to enter a directed verdict of acquittal and dismiss all charges. 
!J!JP.--Dated thisu day of December, 2014. 
Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee 
Memorandum Decision Page-15 
000191
·. ( ( 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy~ fo~egoing Memorandum 
Decision was forwarded to the following persons on this~ day of December, 2014: 
Canyon County Public Defender 
111 N. lllh Ave.; Ste 120 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Mark 1. Mimura 
MIMURA LAW OFFICE 
S 10 Arthur St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Ty K.etlinski 
Deputy Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Theresa Randall 
Appeals Clerk 








Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Maura Olson, Deputy Clerk
000192
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 


















BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE MICHAEL LOJEK 
MAGISTRATE, PRESIDING 
Anita Moore 
Ada County Public Defender's Office 
200 W. Front Street, Room 1102 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Tel: (208)-287-7400 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jan M. Bennetts 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
D. Garrett Swenson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Tel: (208) 287-7700 
Attorneys for Respondent 
000193
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................. 2 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................ 3 
A. Procedural History ............................................................................ 3 
B. Statement of Facts ............................................................... . ............ 3 
III. ARGUMENT .................................................................................... 4 
A. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Idaho Criminal 
Rule 29 motions because the State provided substantial evidence 
to support the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt ..................... .4 
1. The State presented substantial evidence that the 
alleged conduct occurred on or about July 4, 2016 .. .. .. ......... .... ............... 5 
2. The State presented substantial evidence that the 
alleged crime occurred in Idaho ......................... ......... . ... ......... ......... 5 
3. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant 
acted maliciously and willfully .......................................................... 5 
4. The State presented substantial evidence that 
Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee's peace .................. ..................... 6 
5. The State presented substantial evidence that 
Defendant's conduct was "offensive." ................................................. 6 
B. The trial court's denial of Defendant's Rule 48 motion was 
an appropriate exercise of discretion ............................................. ..... .... 9 
C. State v. Pierce does not support the proposition that the conduct 
in the present case falls outside the scope of Idaho Code § 18-6409 ............... 1 0 
D. Idaho Code§ 18-6409 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad ............... 12 
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 14 
V. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............ ... ...... ..... ........ ..... ........ ..... ........ ... 15 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF (LANTIS), Page 1 
000194
II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-6409 ......................................................................................... 4, 10, 12 
I.C. § 18-101 .... ....... .... ........ .... ........ .... ......... ...... ...... .... ........ ....... ....... .... ....... 4-5 
CASES 
Ada Countv Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425 (1993) ........... ..... . . ............. 6 
Members of City Counsel v. Taxpavers ofVincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) ..................................... 14 
State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584 (1990) .............................................................................................. 13 
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679 (2004) ............................................................................................... 4 
State v. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131 (Ct. App. 2010) ........................................................................... 9 
State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706 (2003) ..... .... ........ .... ........ ... ......... ..... .................. 12-13 
State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780 (1999) ............................................................... 12-14 
State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 2015) . .. ......... ... ........ .... ........ ...... ........... 9, 10-11 
Statev. Poe, 139 Idaho 885 (2004) ................................................................................... 6-7, 12-14 
Statev. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863 (2011) .............................................................................................. 6 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ..................................................... 13 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. Hoffman Estates. Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982) . .. ........... 13 
OTHER 
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 887 (7th ed. 2000) ........................................................................... 7 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29 . . ........ .... ....... ...... .................................... ......... ..... ... . passim 
Idaho Criminal Rule 48 ......... ..... ....... ...... ...... ...... ....... .... ....... ...... ................. . passim 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offensive 
(24 March 20 18). .. ........................................................................................................................ 7 
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 790 (G&C Merriam Co. 1979) ................................ 7 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF (LANTIS), Page 2 
000195
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Procedural History 
On March 7, 201 7, the State of Idaho charged Aaron Lantis ("Defendant") with one count 
of disturbing the peace in violation of Idaho Code § 18-6409. On August 10, 2017, the State filed 
an amended complaint alleging that Defendant willfully and maliciously disturbed the peace of 
Hillary Henslee by sending an offensive email and/or pictures to Ms. Henslee's employer. On 
August 11, 2017, the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Defendant guilty. Defendant moved 
for a judgment of acquittal under Idaho Criminal Rules 29 and 48 both before and after the 
verdict. Both motions were denied. 
B. Statement of Facts 
In July of2016, Hillary Henslee was an assistant manager at the Idaho Independent Bank 
in Star, Idaho, under branch manager Nancy Van Winkle. Trial Transcript (Tr.) at 44-45. Ms. 
Henslee had known Defendant for six years, and had been in an on-and-off relationship for eight 
months until the relationship ended in May 2016. Tr. at 52, 11. 10-12, 22-24. During the course of 
their relationship, Ms. Henslee took sexually suggestive pictures of herself and sent them to 
Defendant. Tr. at 57-58; State's Trial Exhibits 3-6. No one else was present when Ms. Henslee 
took the pictures. Tr. at 79 11. 18-22. Ms. Henslee did not send the pictures to anyone else, did 
not give Defendant permission to share the pictures, and later asked Defendant to delete the 
pictures. Tr. at 58 11. 14-22, 77ll. 23-25. 
On July 4, 2016, Defendant sent an email containing provocative pictures of Hillary 
Henslee to multiple supervisors at Idaho Independent Bank. Tr. at 83 l. 23-84 1. 3. He sent the 
email to Ms. Henslee's direct supervisor, the CFO of the bank, three members of the Board of 
Directors, and another bank employee. Tr. at 54 l. 21- 55 l. 10. Ms. Henslee testified that she was 
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humiliated and annoyed that the pictures were sent. Tr. at 5611. 2-9, 78 1. 18. She further testifieq 
that the email affected the way she felt at work, and that she was nervous about losing her job 
when the pictures were sent. Tr. at 59 11. 10-24. In a phone interview with Officer Jeremy Miller, 
Defendant admitted that he sent the pictures because he wanted Hillary to lose her job. Tr. at 87, 
11. 14-18; State's Tr. Ex. 1. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Idaho Criminal Rule 29 
motions because the State provided substantial evidence to support the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motions. When 
reviewing a decision on a motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, the appellate court must 
determine "whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684 
(2004). Idaho Code section 18-6409 provides: 
Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of any 
neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or 
offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or 
fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, profane or indecent language 
within the presence or hearing of children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor. 
I.C. § 18-6409. 
The elements of disturbing the peace were submitted to the jury without objection: 
(1) On or about July 4, 2016, (2) in the state of Idaho, (3) the defendant, Aaron Eugene 
Lantis, maliciously and willfully (4) disturbed the peace or quiet of Hillary Henslee (5) by 
offensive conduct. Jury Instruction 11; Tr. at 119 1. 25-120 1. 7. "Maliciously" was defined 
as the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do a wrongful act. I. C. § 18-101; Jury 
Instruction 13; Tr. at 120 11. 15-20. "Willfully" was defined as doing an act on purpose, 
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without necessarily the intent to violate the law, to injure another, or to acquire any 
advantage. I.C. § 18-101; Jury Instruction 14; Tr. at 120 11. 21-24. The State presented 
substantial evidence to support each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Ru1e 29 motions. 
1. The State presented substantial evidence that the alleged conduct occurred on or about 
July 4. 2016. 
Three witnesses testified to the date the email and pictures were sent, and it was 
confirmed by a recorded phone call with the Defendant. Nancy Van Winkle testified that she 
received the email and pictures on July 4, 2016. Tr. at 45 ll. 15-20. Hillary Henslee testified that 
her boss forwarded the email to Hillary on July 5. Tr. at 54 11. 12-14. On a recorded phone call, 
Defendant admitted that he sent the email and pictures on "Monday morning." State's Trial Ex. 
1. Officer Jeremy Miller testified that, in context, Defendant's statement meant July 4, 2016. Tr. 
at 87 11. 9-13. The State presented substantial evidence that the conduct occurred on or about July 
4, 2016. 
2. The State presented substantial evidence that the alleged crime occurred in Idaho. 
Hillary Henslee and Nancy van Winkle testified as to the bank's location in the state of 
Idaho. Tr. at 44 11. 16-23, 52 11. 1-6. Hillary Henslee testified that she was in Idaho when the 
email and pictures were sent. Tr. at 55ll. 11-18. The State presented substantial evidence that the 
alleged crime occurred in the state of Idaho. 
3. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant acted maliciously and willfully. 
Hillary Henslee identified the Defendant as Aaron Lantis in court. Tr. at 52 11. 13-18. 
Officer Jeremy Miller testified that he called the Defendant's phone number and verbally 
identified the speaker as Aaron Lantis. Tr. at 83 11. 5-18. The State presented a recording of the 
phone call wherein Defendant admitted that he sent the email and pictures because he knew 
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Hillary's job was important to her. State's Trial Ex. 1; Tr. at 87 1. 3. Defendant admitted on the 
recording that his intent in sending the email and pictures was to cause Hillary Henslee to lose 
her job. State's Trial Ex. 1; Tr. at 87 ll. 14-18. The State provided substantial evidence ofthe 
Defendant's identity and that he purposely acted with the specific intent to annoy or injure 
Hillary Henslee. 
4. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee's 
peace. 
Hillary Henslee testified that she was humiliated that the email and pictures had been sent 
to her employers and coworkers. Tr. at 56 11. 2-9, 78 1. 18. She felt uncomfortable at work, and 
continues to feel uncomfortable when she sees a recipient of the email. Tr. at 59 ll. 10-18. She 
testified that she was concerned because she is a single mother and did not know if she would 
lose her job. Tr. at 59 11. 19-24. The State presented substantial evidence that Hillary Henslee's 
peace was disturbed. 
5. The State presented substantial evidence that Defendant's conduct was "offensive." 
"Offensive conduct" must be defined by its plain meaning. In the absence of a statutory 
definition, words should be given their commonly understood, everyday meanings. Ada County 
Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 428 (1993); see also State v. Schulz, 151 
Idaho 863, 866 (2011) (stating that words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meanings) (citations omitted). The Court should give effect to all words and provisions so that 
none would be void, superfluous, or redundant. Schulz, 151 Idaho at 863 (citations omitted). 
Courts frequently refer to a word's dictionary definition to determine its commonly 
understood meaning. See Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867 (citing the Webster's Dictionary and Black's 
Law Dictionary definitions of "cohabit" in addition to its common law meaning); State v. Poe, 
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139 Idaho 885, 895-96 (2004) (using Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary to define 
"traducing," "quarrelling," "vulgar," "profane," and "indecent"). 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines "offensive" as: "1. making attack ... 2. 
Giving painful or unpleasant sensations ... 3. Causing displeasure or resentment." See WEBSTER'S 
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 790 (G&C Merriam Co. 1979); see also Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offensive (24 March 2018). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "offensive" as ''1. Of or for attack ... 2. Unpleasant or 
disagreeable to the senses; obnoxious ... 3. Causing displeasure, anger, or resentment; esp., 
repugnant to the prevailing sense of what is decent or moral.. .. " BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 
887 (7th ed. 2000). 
Defendant proposes to interpret "offensive" as a loud, boisterous, or tumultuous assault 
on the senses or conduct calculated to incite violence. Appellant's Br. 11-12. This interpretation 
is inadequate in a number of ways. First, as is clear from the standard definitions cited above, it 
would cover only a very small fraction ofthe plain meaning of"offensive." Second, Defendant's 
proposed interpretation makes "offensive" superfluous in the context of § 18-6409. If the 
legislature intended "offensive" to mean loud, boisterous, or tumultuous, then it would not have 
made "offensive" disjunctive with "loud or unusual noise" and "tumultuous."1 Further, if 
"offensive" was to be interpreted as conduct calculated to incite violence, it would be redundant 
for the legislature to then prohibit threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or 
fighting. Defendant's proposed interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the term and 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court divided the statute into three parts based on the three verbs used: "disturbs," "fires," 
and "uses." Poe, 139 Idaho at 894. The Court further divided the portion of the statute related to "disturbs" into three 
sections of adverbial prepositional phrases that explain how someone can disturb the peace in order to violate the 
statute. Id. at 894-95. The statute is disjunctive. Therefore, one can "disturb" the peace [a] by loud and unusual 
noise, or [b] by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or [c] by threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or 
fighting. See Id. at 894. The adverbs "maliciously" and "willfully" modify all three verbs. Id.at 895. Thus, one can 
violate Idaho Code § 18-6409 by maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace of another by offensive conduct. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF (LANTIS), Page 7 
000200
makes "offensive" superfluous or redundant. "Offensive conduct" must be interpreted in accord 
with its plain meaning and given validity within the statute. 
The State presented substantial evidence that the Defendant disturbed Hillary Henslee's 
peace by offensive conduct. Nancy Van Winkle testified the email had pictures attached of a 
sexual nature. Tr. at 4 7 11. 1-17. The State presented four pictures, and Hillary Henslee testified 
that they were the four pictures sent with the email. State's Tr. Ex. 3-6; Tr. at 57. Hillary Henslee 
testified that she was the subject of the pictures, that she had taken them of herself, and that she 
had sent the pictures to Defendant while the two were dating. Tr. at 56 1. 24-58 1. 13. Hillary 
Henslee further testified that she did not give Defendant permission to show the pictures to 
anyone else, and had in fact asked Defendant to delete them. Tr. at 58 11. 19-22, 77 11. 23-25. 
Hillary Henslee testified that the recipient list included her immediate boss, the chief financial 
officer of the bank she worked at, a coworker, and several members of the bank's board of 
directors. Tr. at 54 l. 21-55 1. 10. The State presented a recording of Defendant in which he 
admitted that he had sent the email and pictures to Hillary Henslee's supervisor because he knew 
Hillary's job was so important to her, and Defendant wanted her to lose her job. State's Tr. Ex. 1; 
Tr. at 87 11. 3, 14-18. This conduct is offensive. There is no other reasonable way of viewing it. 
Defendant's act was, without question, "repugnant to the prevailing sense of what is decent or 
moral." While it was not physical in nature, it was an attack on Hillary Henslee. Defendant was 
willfully trying to harm Ms. Henslee's career; a career that was crucial for Ms. Henslee to 
maintain so that she could support her children. As such Defendant's attack reasonably caused 
Ms. Henslee displeasure, anger, and resentment. Any reasonable person would have felt the 
same. 
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The State presented substantial evidence that Hillary Henslee's peace was disturbed by 
offensive conduct, particularly given the nature of the pictures, the fact that they were sent 
without consent, the nature of the recipients, and Defendant's stated intent in sending the email 
and pictures. Given this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that the act of sending the 
email or pictures constituted offensive conduct as that term is commonly understood. 
The State provided substantial evidence of each element of the crime of disturbing the 
peace such that a trier of fact could find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial 
court properly denied Defendant's Rule 29 motions. 
B. The trial court's denial of Defendant's Rule 48 motion was an appropriate 
exercise of discretion. 
The trial court did not err in denying the Defendant's Idaho Criminal Rule 48 motion. 
Appellate courts review motions made under Idaho Criminal Rule 48 for abuse of discretion. State 
v. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131, 138 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). The appellate court must 
determine: "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. (citations omitted). 
In the present case, the trial court found that it could dismiss the action e~ther on its own 
motion or on motion of any party, if the appropriate grounds existed. Tr. at I 04 11. 1-6. The court 
reasoned that the conduct at issue was distinguishable from Defendant's analogies to political 
conversations and bad table manners because the statute required criminal conduct to be willful and 
malicious in disturbing the peace of another. Tr. at 103 11. 14-24. The court further reviewed 
Defendant's arguments in regard to State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661 (Ct. App. 2015), and stated that 
the holding in Pierce meant simply that if an individual is accused of disturbing the peace then the 
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state is required to prove the elements as defined in Idaho Code§ 18-6409. Tr. at 107 11. 5-24. The 
court determined that the State in the present case had presented evidence that could support a 
conviction of disturbing the peace under Idaho Code§ 18-6409. Tr. at 108 1. 3-109 1. 9. The court 
reviewed the grounds for a dismissal under Rule 48 and found that neither ground was met in the 
present case before denying Defendant's Rule 48 motion. Tr. at 10411. 1-21. Defendant has failed to 
establish that denying the Rule 48 motion was an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not err in 
denying Defendant's Rule 48 motion. 
C. State v. Pierce does not support the proposition that the conduct in the present 
case falls outside the scope ofldaho Code § 18-6409. 
Defendant' s brief relies on the court's ruling in Pierce for the proposition that sending an 
offensive email or pictures does not fall under any of the elements of Idaho Code § 18-6409. 
Appellant's Br. 7. Pierce is clearly distinguishable from the present case, however, and does not 
support the claim that the conduct in the present case is beyond § 18-6409. In Pierce, the 
defendant and his ex-wife were in litigation over their divorce. 159 Idaho at 662. A magistrate 
had determined that the house in question was Pierce's separate property, but Pierce's ex-wife 
continued to live in the house without Pierce. Id. A protection order was entered, prohibiting 
Pierce from disturbing the peace of his ex-wife or her children. Id. Prior to the order, water 
service to the residence was terminated. ld. Following the order, electrical service was also 
terminated, allegedly at Pierce's request. ld. The state alleged that Pierce violated the terms of 
the protection order by turning off utilities, which disturbed the peace of the protected parties. I d. 
The state argued that it was not required to prove the elements of disturbing the peace under 
Idaho Code § 18-6409 because it was not charging the defendant with a violation of Idaho Code 
§ 18-6409, and that it met its burden by providing evidence that the defendant had generally 
disturbed the peace of his ex-wife by canceling electricity to his house in violation of the terms 
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of the protective order. I d. at 663. The court found that "disturbing the peace" was a term of art 
and that the state did not provide evidence at trial that the defendant had engaged in acts 
constituting disturbing the peace as defined by Idaho Code§ 18-6409. Id. at 663-64. 
In the present case, the State alleged that the Defendant committed the cnme of 
disturbing the peace under Idaho Code § 18-6409 by engaging in conduct that qualifies as a 
violation under the statutory language. The State alleged that Defendant maliciously and 
willfully disturbed the peace of Hillary Henslee by offensive conduct. The legislature 
specifically articulated acts constituting disturbing the peace and included offensive conduct. I.C. 
§ 18-6409. The jury was not left to decide for itself what "disturbing the peace" meant, as was 
the issue in Pierce. Nor was the jury here tasked with enforcing a law of its own creation, 
because the jury here was provided with the relevant elements of the charged offense as defined 
by statute. The State articulated the specific conduct that was offensive. The jury was asked to 
determine whether the evidence presented proved the alleged crime according to the statutory 
definition of the offense, which is precisely what juries are supposed to do. The instant case is 
therefore distinguishable from Pierce because the State alleged that the Defendant committed the 
crime of disturbing the peace by conduct that was specifically included in the statutory definition 
of the crime and presented significant evidence that the Defendant violated each specific element 
of the crime as defined by statute. 
The facts of the two cases are also clearly distinguishable. In Pierce, the defendant was 
accused of calling a utility company to terminate electricity to his own house, a property he 
owned separately from his ex-wife. See 159 Idaho at 662. It is unclear what evidence was 
presented as to Pierce's intent. In the instant case, the State presented evidence at trial that the 
Defendant sent sexually provocative pictures of his ex-girlfriend to her employers and coworkers 
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for the purpose of getting her fired, despite his ex-girlfriend's request that he delete the pictures. 
It strains reason to claim that the two scenarios are factually similar. While there was insufficient 
evidence in Pierce for a trier of fact to find that the defendant had engaged in conduct fitting the 
definition of disturbing the peace, the State has clearly presented substantial evidence of every 
element ofthe crime as defined in Idaho Code§ 18-6409. As such, Pierce is distinguishable from 
the instant case and does not control. The trial court's ruling that Pierce is distinguishable from 
the present case should be affirmed. 
D. Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 
Idaho Code § 18-6409 is neither impermissibly vague as applied to the facts of the case, 
vague on its face, nor overbroad. "There is a strong presumption that legislative enactments are 
constitutional." State v. Leferink, 133 Idaho 780, 784 (1999). "A statute may be challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to a defendant's conduct." State v. Korsen, 138 
Idaho 706, 712 (2003). "To succeed on an 'as applied' vagueness challenge, a complainant must 
show that the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the 
defendant's conduct was proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that police had 
unbridled discretion in determining whether to arrest him." Id. Given the plain meaning of 
"offensive conduct," no reasonable person would believe that sending sexually provocative 
pictures of an ex-girlfriend to her boss for the purpose of getting her fired would not fall under 
the purview of the statute. The Defendant's conduct is clearly offensive, both subjectively to the 
victim and objectively to a reasonable person. A plain meaning reading of the statute would 
provide fair notice that such conduct was proscribed to all but the most unreasonable. As to 
whether the statute provides sufficient guidelines for enforcement, the statute itself limits its 
application to offensive conduct that disturbs another and is willful and malicious. See I.C. § 18-
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6409. "The requirement that the defendant must maliciously and willfully disturb the peace in 
one of the ways specified provides adequate standards to protect against arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Poe, 139 Idaho at 903. It is not merely offensive conduct that is 
proscribed, but offensive conduct that is purposive, intended to annoy, injure, or do a wrong, and 
that has its desired effect in that it disturbs another. As such, the statute itself provides adequate 
limitations to enforcement and is not impermissibly vague as applied. 
For a facial challenge to be successful, "the complainant must demonstrate that the law is 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712 (quoting Village of 
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. Hoffman Estates. Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)). The challenger must 
show that the statute is invalid in toto. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712. The challenger must establish 
that no set of circumstances exist under which the law would be valid. I d. (citing United States 
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Defendant does not claim that Idaho Code§ 18-6409 is 
vague in all of its applications. Defendant's argument that "offensive conduct" must be 
interpreted in terms of the other provisions of the statute presupposes that there are applications 
for which the terms of the statute are not unconstitutionally vague. As limited by the 
requirements that the conduct at issue be malicious and willful, with the end result of one's peace 
being actually disturbed, Idaho Code § 18-6409 is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. 
Defendant's argument that Idaho Code § 18-6409 is facially overbroad is also without 
merit. In order to make this determination, a court first must determine whether the statute 
regulates constitutionally protected conduct. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713 (citing State v. Bitt, 118 
Idaho 584, 589 (1990)). If it does, the court then must determine whether the statute precludes a 
significant amount of the protected conduct. I d. Where the statute proscribes conduct rather than 
merely spoken words, the overbreadth of the statute must be real and substantial, judged in 
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relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Poe, 139 Idaho at 892. Overbreadth is not 
substantial if, "despite some possibly impermissible application, the remainder of the 
statute ... covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally 
prescribable ... conduct .... " Leferink, 133 Idaho at 785 (citations omitted). A statute will not be 
invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible to imagine some unconstitutional 
applications. Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714 (citing Members of City Counsel v. Taxpayers of 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)). 
Idaho Code § 18-6409 regulates speech and conduct. As narrowed by Idaho courts, the 
speech regulated by Idaho Code § 18-6409 is largely unprotected. See Poe, 139 Idaho at 895-96 
(stating that threatening, traducing, quarrelling, and challenging to fight are unprotected). Other 
portions of Idaho Code § 18-6409 seek to regulate conduct and are "neutral as to any expressive 
element that may exist in a particular circumstance." Id. at 895. The legislature is free to regulate 
conduct that does not infringe on Constitutional protections. As discussed above, the statute 
appropriately limits itself by specifying the manner, result, and intent that must exist for an act to 
be criminalized. Merely sending an email or pictures that could be offensive is not sufficient to 
bring the conduct under the purview of§ 18-6409 as the Defendant claims. Rather, the offensive 
conduct would have to be malicious and willful in addition to actually disturbing someone's 
peace. As such, the statute does not substantially infringe on protected conduct. The statute is not 
overbroad in relation to its plainly legitimate application. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Rule 29 motions because the State 
presented substantial evidence of each element of disturbing the peace as defined in I. C. § 18-6409. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's Rule 48 motion. Pierce is 
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distinguishable from the present case and does not control. Finally, I.C. § 18-6409 is not void for 
vagueness as applied, impermissibly vague on its face, or overbroad on its face. The rulings of the 
trial court and Defendant’s conviction should be affirmed. 
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JAN M. BENNETTS 
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I. The State Argues for the Criminalization, Under § 18-6409, Of Anv and All 
Offensive Conduct Whatsoever. 
The state claims that § 18-6409 "itself provides adequate limitations to enforcement and 
is not impermissibly vague as applied." Respondent's Brief at 13. It purports to describe the 
sort of "offensive conduct" that is actionable in the criminal courts as "not merely offensive 
conduct that is proscribed, but offensive conduct that is purposive, intended to annoy, injure, or 
do a wrong, and that it has its desired effect in that it disturbs another." !d. It argues that this 
definition constitutes a limit to the types of conduct that will trigger criminal liability; but in fact, 
the class of behaviors that may fall within its purview is without limit. Elsewhere in its brief, 
the state asserts: 
Defendant [that is, Aaron Lantis] proposes to interpret "offensive" as loud, 
boisterous or tumultuous assault on the senses or conduct calculated to incite 
violence. [Cite omitted.] This interpretation is inadequate in a number of 
wavs. First, as is clear from the standard definitions cited above, it would 
cover only a very small fraction of the plain meaning of "offensive." Second, 
Defendant's proposed interpretation makes 'offensive" superfluous in the context 
of § 18-6409. If the legislature intended "offensive" to mean loud, boisterous, or 
tumultuous, then it would not have made "offensive" disjunctive with "loud or 
unusual noise" and "tumultuous." [Footnote omitted.] Further, if"offensive" was 
to be interpreted as conduct calculated to incite violence, it would be redundant 
for the legislature to then prohibit threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging 
to fight or fighting. Defendant's proposed interpretation conflicts with the plain 
meaning of the term and makes "offensive" superfluous and redundant. 
"Offensive conduct" must be interpreted in accord with its plain meaning and 
given validity within the statute. 
Respondent's Brief at 7 (emphasis added). 
What the state is arguing here is that there ought to be no limit whatsoever to the kind of 
offensive conduct that its coercive police power can reach. The state continues to argue on 
appeal, as it did below, that the conduct forming the basis for the instant charge of disturbing the 
peace is specifically included in § 18-6409. Respondent's Brief at 11. It appeals, not to the 
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language of the statute, but to the sensibilities of a reasonable person, to make this determination 
(Respondent's Brief at 12) - as indeed it must, since no language in the statute specifically 
includes disturbing the peace by electronic communications. It urges on this Court the dictionary 
definition of "offensive conduct" and complains that the defense argues too narrow an 
interpretation - certainly too narrow to include all the conceivable "offensive conduct" that the 
state would like to be actionable under the statute. 
On appeal, as at the trial level, the state entirely misses the point of State v. Pierce, 159 
Idaho 661 (Ct.App.2015), rev. den. February 10, 2016, which is that the conduct charged must 
constitute an actus reus within the meaning of § 18-6409, Idaho Code. The state goes through 
the elements instruction for disturbing the peace and focuses on the quantity of evidence it 
offered to support each element. The issue here, however, is not the quantity of evidence offered 
to support each element; it is that, however much proof the state offered, the state failed to prove 
acts that were loud, boisterous, tumultuous, quarrelsome, or tending to incite or provoke 
violence, such as constitute disturbing the peace. The lesson of Pierce is that the conduct 
complained of must be prohibited by § 18-6409. In part because the case against Pierce was 
based on conduct that did not fall within the strictures of that statute, the district court on 
intermediate appeal held that Pierce's Rule 29 motions should have been granted. The Court of 
Appeals quoted from and affirmed this holding, and the Idaho Supreme Court declined the 
state's invitation to review. 
The state's argument is, essentially, that (a) the legislature included "offensive conduct" 
in its list of prohibited acts; (b) the state established that the conduct in question was indeed 
"offensive"; and that therefore (c) the conduct in question - sending an offensive email to the 
oomplaining party's bosses - was "conduct that was specifically included in the statutory 
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definition of the crime," (Respondent's Brief at 11), even though (d) neither email nor any other 
electronic communication is listed as a means whereby a person may commit the crime of 
disturbing the peace. 
Although the Pierce court points out that "disturb the peace" is a term of art, not in 
common use, that describes specific prohibited conduct and cannot be imparted a common 
meaning (Pierce, 159 Idaho at 663), the state continues to argue in the case at bar that "offensive 
conduct" is not a term of art and should be given its ordinary, dictionary meaning. This is really 
just another way of asking this Court to read "offensive conduct" in isolation from the 
surrounding text that sets the stage for what that term in fact means. The state argues that Mr. 
Lantis would have this court interpret § 18-6409 in such a way as to render much of it 
superfluous; but in fact, so far from arguing superfluity, Mr. Lantis asserts that the rest of the 
statute is crucial to getting at the meaning of the phrase "offensive conduct." The state stands on 
its head the rule of noscitur a sociis by positing that "offensive conduct" introduces an entirely 
new and unforeseen class of behaviors into the statute, instead of the statute governing and 
restricting those acts that constitute "offensive conduct." If this reading of§ 18-6409 is the 
correct one, then there is no conduct for which a citizen may not be prosecuted, provided only 
that the state can find someone willing to testify that he found that conduct offensive. Indeed, 
the state gives this away as the result it hopes for when it complains that Mr. Lantis is urging an 
"inadequate" interpretation of "offensive conduct" that "would cover only a very small fraction 
of the plain meaning of' offensive.'" Respondent's Brief at 7. 
But noscitur a sociis is still in effect, and still a factor to be reckoned with in the instant 
case; thus, the state's very careful explanation of why the conduct at issue here was offensive 
serves only to underscore why it has nothing in common with the enumerated prohibited acts in 
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the statute. In the first place, the statute makes no mention whatever of email, texting or any 
other electronic communication, so that it cannot really be said- as the state declares on page 11 
of its Respondent's Brief- that the conduct complained of here is "specifically included in the 
statutory definition of the crime." As noted in the Brief of Appellant at 11, fu. 3, the legislature 
has proven itself perfectly capable of criminalizing certain electronic communications; it has not 
done so with respect to § 18-6409. In the second place, § 18-6409 covers conduct that is loud, 
boisterous and tumultuous, disruptive of exterior quiet and tranquility rather than merely 
someone' s interior peace of mind. Even when 18-6409 outlawed uttering profanity in front of 
children, the state still had to prove that this was done "in a loud and boisterous manner." To 
disturb the peace, then, the accused must have engaged in behavior that breaches the exterior 
peace of a person or community by means of some jarring or abrupt assault on the senses -
particularly hearing - or that is calculated to incite or provoke violence. Whatever else the state 
may have proven in the instant case, it has failed to prove conduct that matches this description. 
The trial court should therefore be reversed on appeal. 
The state's position is not saved by its argument that the element of "maliciousness" 
prevents the prosecution of all "offensive conduct." It argues that criminally offensive conduct 
means "not merely offensive conduct that is proscribed, but offensive conduct that is purposive, 
intended to annoy, injure, or do a wrong, and that it has its desired effect in that it disturbs 
another." Respondent's Brief at 13. But, as noted above, this is no sort of limitation at all. 
Speech itself is an action that is purposive in that it is engaged in for the purpose of 
communicating a specific thing, and it is very often intended to annoy or disturb another. In a 
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world where the state's theory of disturbing the peace prevails, any and every annoying action 
that is not inadvertent would be a potential object for criminal prosecution. 1 
The state further argues that Mr. Lantis' argument of vagueness and overbreadth are not 
well taken because the constitutive elements of § 18-6409 are in the disjunctive, and thus the 
state had a wide variety of items to choose from in prosecuting him for disturbing the peace -
including whatever conduct could conceivably be shoe-homed into the phrase "offensive 
conduct." This is just yet another way of arguing that "offensive conduct" needs to be read in 
isolation from the surrounding text, and that it therefore can mean whatever the state wants it to 
mean, provided, again, it can find a complaining witness willing to testify as to its offensiveness. 
The state further argues the reprehensibility of the conduct in question. State's Objection 
at 9. What the state is really doing here, however, rather than addressing the question of whether 
the conduct in this case fits the statute, is appealing to the sense of indignation the conduct 
arouses by reason of its reprehensibility. But this is a distraction - and a perilous one, in light of 
the need to interpret and apply the law objectively and impartially in all criminal cases. It is 
possible for a thing to be reprehensible yet not criminal, and therefore it is neither possible nor 
appropriate to use the criminal justice system to redress every conceivable grievance between 
individuals. The issue here is not whether the conduct in question is boorish or socially 
unacceptable, but whether it is criminal under the state's theory of the case. Mr. Lantis argues 
that, whatever else his conduct might be, it does not belong to the class of behaviors that is 
proscribed by § 18-6409. Therefore, the trial court should be reversed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The criminal law is a blunt instrument, and not fit to be invoked in every single grievance 
that one person may have against another. There are various levels of sanctions - social, 
1 Not that inadvertence necessarily shields an accused from prosecution, since intent will be an issue for a jury. 
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religious, civil, and criminal — that may be invoked against bad behavior, and the lowest possible 
level of sanctions should be applied to each bad act. It is an abuse to apply criminal sanctions to 
a bad act that would more properly be dealt with Via civil sanctions, religious sanctions or social 
sanctions. Yet the state would make a catch-all of § 18-6409 that would permit it to mobilize its 
coercive police power against all kinds of bad conduct that falls more properly within the domain 
of lesser sanctions. 
As Mr. Lantis has previously argued, as in the Pierce case, the acts alleged here did not 
constitute an actus reus within the meaning of § 18-6409, Idaho Code, which means that the state 
failed to offer evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. Otherwise, if the state’s reading of § 
18-6409 is true, then that statute must be facially overbroad, as sweeping a great deal of 
protected conduct within its ambit, and void for vagueness facially and as applied, for putting no 
one on notice that sending an “offensive” email may constitute the crime of disturbing the peace. 
For all the reasons argued in this appeal, the trial court below should have granted Aaron 
Lantis’ motions under Rules 29 and 48, and this court should reverse the trial court’s denial of 
those motions and the conviction entered herein. 
DATED, thisgfiflj day of March, 2018. 
ANITA MOORE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 9t  , 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to the Ada County Prosecutor. 
@Mm 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR01-17-7609 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. OPINION ON APPEAL 
AARON LANTIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
A DORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: ANITA MOORE 
A DORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: GARRETI SWENSON 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant appeals his conviction of Disturbing the Peace following a jury trial. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Appellant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of disturbing the peace in 
violation of § 18-6409, Idaho Code. The state alleged that he committed the crime by 
sending sexually suggestive pictures of the alleged victim, Hillary Henslee, to her employers 
in an attempt to have her fired from her job. A jury found him guilty. He made pre- and post-
verdict motions under Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. They were denied. 
This appeal followed. 
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Ill. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The appellant asserts the following issues: (1) the conduct complained of falls outside 
the purview of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code; and, (2) if the conduct complained of does fall within 
the purview of§ 18-6409, the statute is void for vagueness and overbroad. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a 
trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. 
Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or 
statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 
458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
V. ANALYSIS 
The appellant contends the magistrate erred in failing to grant his Rule 29 and Rule 
48 motions because the conduct he was charged with and convicted of committing does not 
constitute disturbing the peace, as set forth in the Idaho Code. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a) provides that the trial court on motion of the 
defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of 
one or more charged offenses after the evidence on either side is closed if the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The 
test applied when reviewing the ... court's ruling on a motion for judgment of 
acquittal is to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a 
conviction of the crime charged. State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 818, 186 
P.3d 670, 674 (Ct. App. 2008). 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence where a judgment of conviction 
has been entered upon a jury verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the 
jury's guilty verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 
trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of 
proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We do 
not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, 
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be 
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drawn from the evidence. Moreover, we consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution. /d. 
"This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss a criminal 
action for an abuse of discretion." When a trial court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with 
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Johnston, 2016 WL 1569522, *2 (ld. 
Ct. App.) (citing State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778, 275 P.3d 1, 
4 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Hodges, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(1989). 
However, an appellate court exercises free review over questions of law and the 
application and construction of statutes. 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. 
The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for 
the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. State 
v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 968-69, 318 P.3d 955, 958-59 (Ct. App. 2014). 
(citations omitted). 
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. 
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the 
context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole, 
and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should 
be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the 
statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory 
language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body 
must be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory 
construction. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67, 264 P.3d 970, 973-74 
(2011) (emphasis added). See also Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho 
Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 226, 108 P.3d 370, 373 (2005) ('It is 
a cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute should be 
given meaning. We will construe a statute, "so that effect is given to its 
provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant.") (citations 
omitted). 
Courts must construe statutes "under the assumption that the legislature knew 
of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was 
passed." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint lndep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 
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150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994). Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 
214, 218, 254 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011). 
We assume that the legislature knew of other statutes in existence at the time 
a given statute was passed, particularly statutes of a similar concern . State v. 
Betterton, 127 Idaho 562, 563, 903 P.2d 151, 152 (Ct. App. 1995). In 
deference to legislative expertise, we therefore decline to presume a 
redundancy between entire statutes. Rather, statutes in pari materia (relating to 
the same subject) are construed as complementary and cohesive. State v. 
Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 75, 57 P.3d 782, 786 (2002). State v. Folsom, 139 
Idaho 627, 630, 84 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2003). 
The defendant was convicted of Disturbing the Peace, which is found within Chapter 
64 of Title 18 of the Idaho Code, and which is entitled "Riot, Rout, Unlawful Assembly, Prize 
Fighting, Disturbing Peace." 
Idaho Code§ 18-6409 ("Disturbing the Peace.") provides: 
(1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of 
any neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by 
tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, 
challenging to fight or fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, 
profane or indecent language 1 within the presence or hearing of children, in 
a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(2) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the dignity or 
reverential nature of any funeral, memorial service, funeral procession, 
burial ceremony or viewing of a deceased person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
The appellant was charged and convicted pursuant to the "offensive conduct" portion 
of the statute. He argued before the magistrate and argues on appeal that his conduct does 
not constitute a violation of Idaho's disturbing the peace statute. 
The evidence presented at trial was that the appellant and the victim were previously 
in a relationship. During this relationship the victim sent the appellant, then her boyfriend, 
1But see State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 901 , 88 P.3d 704, 720 (2004) ("Considering these decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, we are constrained to hold that the third part of Idaho Code § 18-6409 is 
unconstitutional because as written it criminalizes speech that is protected by the First Amendment, and we 
therefore strike that portion of the statute.") . 
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"sexually provocative" photographs she had taken of herself. See Jury Trial Transcript, at 52-
57. After their relationship ended, the appellant emailed four of these photos to the victim's 
workplace, including to her supervisor and members of the company's board of directors, in 
an unsuccessful effort to have her fired from her job. See id. at 81-87. The victim testified 
that the appellant's conduct "humiliated" and "annoyed" her. See id. at 56, 79. 
Reading the Disturbing the Peace statute in its entirety, as required, this conduct, 
however reprehensible it is, does not constitute a violation of the statute. The statute clearly 
and plainly prohibits disturbing, for lack of a better term, the "exterior" or "sensory" peace of a 
neighborhood, family, or person. It does not prohibit offending someone's "internal" 
sensibilities by sending an email to them or to their co-workers, as occurred here. It does not 
prohibit embarrassing someone by sending an offensive electronic communication. This is 
demonstrated by the placement of the statute in the chapter entitled "Riot, Rout, Unlawful 
Assembly, Prize Fighting, Disturbing Peace," (see State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 445, 362 
P.3d 514, 520 (2015) (Idaho Supreme Court relied on the context of the placement of the 
statute in the code in construing the statute)), as well as the related terms of the statute 
requiring that the disturbing the peace conduct include loud or unusual noise, gun fire, 
challenging someone to a fight, loudness or boisterousness, or tumultuous conduct. 
Rioting requires physical injury, damage or destruction to public or private property, or 
a disturbance of the public peace. I. C. § 18-6401. 
Unlawful assembly requires two or more persons assembled to perform an unlawful 
act or the doing of a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or tumultuous manner. I. C. § 18-6404. 
The words "offensive conduct" cannot properly be removed from the context of the 
statute and applied to the appellant's conduct to make it a crime. Looking at the words 
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preceding it, the conduct that is deemed "offensive" would need to be similar to "tumultuous"2 
conduct, which is defined as "marked by tumult: loud, excited, and emotional." Support for 
this view is found, as the appellant argues, in a recent decision of the Idaho Court of 
Appeals: State v. Pierce, 1591daho 661,365 P.3d 417 (Ct. App. 2016). The Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated "[i]t is undisputed that the state did not provide evidence at trial that Pierce 
engaged in acts constituting disturbing the peace, as prohibited by I.C. § 18-6409." 159 
Idaho at 663, 365 P.3d at 419. The Court of Appeals noted "[i]n Idaho, the prohibited conduct 
constituting disturbing the peace is defined by statute. In I.C. § 18-6409 as quoted above, 
the legislature of Idaho has provided guidance regarding specific conduct that constitutes 
disturbing the peace. It is undisputed that the state did not provide evidence at trial that 
Pierce disturbed the peace of his ex-wife and her children, within the meaning of I.C. § 18-
6409." 159 Idaho at 664, 365 P.3d at 420. 
The conduct that resulted in Mr. Pierce, who was in litigation with his ex-wife "over 
issues related to their divorce," being charged and found guilty, by a jury, of disturbing the 
peace was that he "called the electrical power company to terminate service," to the house 
(which was Mr. Pierce's separate property) where she and her children, who were not his 
biological children, "continued to live in the house without Pierce." 159 Idaho at 662, 365 
P.3d at 418. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court which vacated 
the Judgment of Conviction entered in the magistrate court. The district court decision gave 
the following analysis concerning disruption of power service to the house. 
2https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tumultuous 
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This disruption in electrical service to the house: 
Power was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did 
not treat this as a weekend emergency, and power was not restored until 
sometime the next week. There was testimony that refrigerated and frozen 
foods were lost, and the protected party and her children had to impose upon 
friends for lodging for the several days until the power was turned back on. 
This, the state contends, was sufficient to constitute a "breach of the peace" 
with the jury being allowed to determine for themselves whether the actions in 
question should be deemed legal. I conclude this to be error. Memorandum 
Decision (CR-2013-13285-C), at 8.3 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the state failed to present evidence supporting a 
conviction for disturbing the peace for conduct that was clearly offensive but outside the 
statutory definition of disturbing the peace. The same reasoning applies to the facts of this 
case. 
VI. THE VOID FOR VAGUE ARGUMENT 
The appellant also asserts a void for vagueness challenge to the statutory term 
"offensive conduct," which was relied upon by the State to obtain his conviction for Disturbing 
the Peace. This issue was raised before the magistrate in his Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal. 
"'It is well established that when a case can be decided upon a ground other than a 
constitutional ground, the Court will not address the constitutional issue unless it is 
necessary for a determination of the case."' City of Sandpoint v. Independent Highway 
District, 161 Idaho 121, 124, 384 P.3d 368, 371 (2016) (citing Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon 
River Fruit Co., 1581daho 269, 279, 346 P.3d 286,296 (2015)). 
3
The Court takes judicial notice of this decision. See I.R.E. 201 . 
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It is not necessary to address the constitutional analysis in this appeal. This Court will 
avoid the morass of constitutional hypotheticals in this case in view of the decision on 
statutory construction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The conviction for Disturbing the Peace is vacated and this case is remanded for the 
entry of a judgment of acquittal and a dismissal of the charge. 
Dated this / <2 day of June 2018. 
Senior District Judge 
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 COMES NOW, D. Garrett Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County, State of 
Idaho, and objects to the entry of acquittal and dismissal of the charge prior to the district court’s 
filing of remittitur. The State has 42 days to appeal before remittitur is filed and the decision 
becomes final. The State requests that the Court wait for the appeal period to pass and for the district 
court to finalize its decision before entering a judgment of acquittal and dismissing the charge. 
I. BACKGROUND 
  Defendant was found guilty of Disturbing the Peace, I.C. § 18-6409, at trial on August 
11, 2017. Defendant appealed his conviction to the district court on December 5, 2017. The 
district court filed an opinion on June 14, 2018, vacating the conviction and remanding the case 
for acquittal and dismissal of the charge. The district court has not yet filed a remittitur. At a 
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk of the Court
By: Sara Markle, Deputy Clerk
000230
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(LANTIS) Page 2 
review hearing on June 28, 2018, the State requested more time to determine whether to appeal 
the decision of the district court.  
II. ARGUMENT 
 The State objects to the entry of acquittal and dismissal of the charge prior to the district 
court’s filing of remittitur because the appeal period has not passed and the appellate decision is 
not yet final. The State may appeal a decision by the district court on criminal appeals from a 
magistrate as a matter of right. See I.A.R. 11. An appeal from the district court must be made 
within 42 days of the entry of the order. I.A.R.14. Idaho Criminal Rule 54, outlining procedure 
for appeals from the magistrate court to the district court, states: 
“If no appeal to the Supreme Court is filed within 42 days after the clerk files the 
appellate decision, the clerk must issue and file a remittitur with the magistrate 
court....The remittitur must advise the magistrate judge that the decision has 
become final and that the magistrate must immediately comply with the directive 
of the decision.”  
 
I.C.R. 54(r)(1)(A).  
  In the present case, the 42-day appeal period runs from June 14, 2018, through July 25, 
2018. The State is in the process of screening the case for further appeal and is provided 42 days 
to do so under Idaho Appellate and Criminal Rules. Therefore, the district court has not yet filed 
a remittitur finalizing the case. The Court should not enter the acquittal and dismiss the case until 
the appeal period runs and the district court finalizes its opinion by the filing of a remittitur.  
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State objects to the entry of an acquittal and the dismissal of 
the charge at this time. The State respectfully requests that the Court wait for the district court to file 
a remittitur after the appropriate appeal period before the Court carries out the district court’s 
instructions.  
 DATED this 2nd day of July 2018. 
       
  JAN M. BENNETTS 
  Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
 
  ______________________________
  By:  D. Garrett Swenson 
  Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
mam
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) Supreme Court No. 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
AARON LANTIS, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
TO: AARON LANTIS, THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, ANITA MARIE 
ELIZABETH MOORE, ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, 200 W. FRONT 
ST., RM. 1107, BOISE, ID 83702 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the above-named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the OPINION ON APPEAL, entered in the above-
entitled action on the 14th day of June, 2018, the Honorable Gerald F. Schroeder presiding. A 
copy of the order being appealed is attached to this notice. 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
Rule 11(c)(10), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district court erred on 
intermediate appeal by reversing the jury's verdict of guilt for disturbing the peace. 
4. To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been sealed. However, 
State's Exhibits 3-6, admitted at trial, are of a sensitive nature. The State requests that these 
photographs be sealed in the appellate record. 
5. The appellant does not request the preparation of a reporter's transcript: 
The State believes that a transcript, including the 8111/17 trial and the 10/31/17 hearing 
on the motion to dismiss, was prepared for the appeal to the district court. The State requests 
that this transcript be included in the record as an exhibit. 
6. Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R. 
7. I ce1iify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the email address set out below: 




(b) That arrangements have been made with the Ada County Prosecuting 
Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript; 
(c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because the State ofldaho is the appellant (Idaho Code § 31-3212); 
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(d) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal 
case (I.A.R. 23(a)(8)); 
(e) That service is being made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2018 . 
Deputy Attorney Gener 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. LOJEK 
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acpocomidocs@adaweb.net 
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Ada County Public Defender's Office 
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County 
Christopher Rich, Clerk of the Court 
By: Deputy Clerk- Lyke, Martha 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR01-17-7609 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. OPINION ON APPEAL 
AARON LANTIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
ATTORNEY FOR THE APPELLANT: ANITA MOORE 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: GARRETT SWENSON 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant appeals his conviction of Disturbing the Peace following a jury triaL 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Appellant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of disturbing the peace in 
violation of § 18-6409, Idaho Code. The state alleged that he committed the crime by 
sending sexually suggestive pictures of the alleged victim, Hillary Henslee, to her employers 
in an attempt to have her fired from her job. A jury found him guilty. He made pre- and post-
verdict motions under Rules 29 and 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. They were denied. 
This appeal followed. 
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Ill. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The appellant asserts the following issues: (1) the conduct complained of falls outside 
the purview of§ 18-6409, Idaho Code; and, (2) if the conduct complained of does fall within 
the purview of§ 18-6409, the statute is void for vagueness and overbroad. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not involving a 
trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. 
Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The interpretation of law or 
statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 
458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
V. ANALYSIS 
The appellant contends the magistrate erred in failing to grant his Rule 29 and Rule 
48 motions because the conduct he was charged with and convicted of committing does not 
constitute disturbing the peace, as set forth in the Idaho Code. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a) provides that the trial court on motion of the 
defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of 
one or more charged offenses after the evidence on either side is closed if the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The 
test applied when reviewing the ... court's ruling on a motion for judgment of 
acquittal is to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a 
conviction of the crime charged. State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 818, 186 
P.3d 670, 674 (Ct. App. 2008). 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence where a judgment of conviction 
has been entered upon a jury verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the 
jury's guilty verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable 
trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of 
proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We do 
not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, 
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be 
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drawn from the evidence. Moreover, we consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution. /d. 
"This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss a criminal 
action for an abuse of discretion." When a trial court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with 
any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Johnston, 2016 WL 1569522, *2 (ld. 
Ct. App.) (citing State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778, 275 P.3d 1, 
4 (Ct. App. 2012): State v. Hodges, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 
(1989). 
However, an appellate court exercises free review over questions of law and the 
application and construction of statutes. 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. 
The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for 
the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. State 
v. Trusda/1, 155 Idaho 965, 968-69, 318 P.3d 955, 958-59 (Ct. App. 2014). 
(citations omitted). 
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. 
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the 
context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole, 
and words should be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should 
be noted that the Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the 
statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory 
language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body 
must be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory 
construction. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67, 264 P.3d 970, 973-74 
(2011) (emphasis added). See also Idaho Cardiology Associates, P.A. v. Idaho 
Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 226, 108 P.3d 370, 373 (2005) ('It is 
a cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute should be 
given meaning. We will construe a statute, "so that effect is given to its 
provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant.") (citations 
omitted). · 
Courts must construe statutes "under the assumption that the legislature knew 
of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was 
passed." City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint lndep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 
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150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994). Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 
214, 218, 254 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011). 
We assume that the legislature knew of other statutes in existence at the time 
a given statute was passed, particularly statutes of a similar concern. State v. 
Betterton, 127 Idaho 562, 563, 903 P .2d 151, 152 (Ct. App. 1995). In 
deference to legislative expertise, we therefore decline to presume a 
redundancy between entire statutes. Rather, statutes in pari materia (relating to 
the same subject) are construed as complementary and cohesive. State v. 
Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 75, 57 P.3d 782, 786 (2002). State v. Folsom, 139 
Idaho 627, 630, 84 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 2003). 
The defendant was convicted of Disturbing the Peace, which is found within Chapter 
64 of Title 18 of the Idaho Code, and which is entitled "Riot, Rout, Unlawful Assembly, Prize 
Fighting, Disturbing Peace." 
Idaho Code § 18-6409 ("Disturbing the Peace.") provides: 
(1) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or quiet of 
any neighborhood, family or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by 
tumultuous or offensive conduct, or by threatening, traducing, quarreling, 
challenging to fight or fighting, or fires any gun or pistol, or uses any vulgar, 
profane or indecent language 1 within the presence or hearing of children, in 
a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
(2) Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the dignity or 
reverential nature of any funeral, memorial service, funeral procession, 
burial ceremony or viewing of a deceased person is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
The appellant was charged and convicted pursuant to the "offensive conduct'' portion 
of the statute. He argued before the magistrate and argues on appeal that his conduct does 
not constitute a violation of Idaho's disturbing the peace statute. 
The evidence presented at trial was that the appellant and the victim were previously 
in a relationship. During this relationship the victim sent the appellant, then her boyfriend, 
1But see State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 901, 88 P.3d 704, 720 (2004} ("Considering these decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, we are constrained to hold that the third part of Idaho Code § 18-6409 is 
unconstitutional because as written it criminalizes speech that is protected by the First Amendment, and we 
therefore strike that portion of the statute."}. 
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"sexually provocative" photographs she had taken of herself. See Jury Trial Transcript, at 52-
57. After their relationship ended, the appellant emailed four of these photos to the victim's 
workplace, including to her supervisor and members of the company's board of directors, in 
an unsuccessful effort to have her fired from her job. See id. at 81-87. The victim testified 
that the appellant's conduct "humiliated" and "annoyed" her. See id. at 56, 79. 
Reading the Disturbing the Peace statute in its entirety, as required, this conduct, 
however reprehensible it is, does not constitute a violation of the statute. The statute clearly 
and plainly prohibits disturbing, for lack of a better term, the "exterior" or "sensory" peace of a 
neighborhood, family, or person. It does not prohibit offending someone's "internal" 
sensibilities by sending an email to them or to their co-workers, as occurred here. It does not 
prohibit embarrassing someone by sending an offensive electronic communication. This is 
demonstrated by the placement of the statute in the chapter entitled "Riot, Rout, Unlawful 
Assembly, Prize Fighting, Disturbing Peace," (see State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 445, 362 
P.3d 514, 520 (2015) (Idaho Supreme Court relied on the context of the placement of the 
statute in the code in construing the statute)), as well as the related terms of the statute 
requiring that the disturbing the peace conduct include loud or unusual noise, gun fire, 
challenging someone to a fight, loudness or boisterousness, or tumultuous conduct. 
Rioting requires physical injury, damage or destruction to public or private property, or 
a disturbance of the public peace. I. C. § 18-6401. 
Unlawful assembly requires two or more persons assembled to perform an unlawful 
act or the doing of a lawful act in a violent, boisterous, or tumultuous manner. I. C.§ 18-6404. 
The words "offensive conduct" cannot properly be removed from the context of the 
statute and applied to the appellant's conduct to make it a crime. Looking at the words 
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preceding it, the conduct that is deemed "offensive" would need to be similar to "tumultuous"2 
conduct, which is defined as "marked by tumult: loud, excited, and emotional." Support for 
this view is found, as the appellant argues, in a recent decision of the Idaho Court of 
Appeals: State v. Pierce, 159 Idaho 661, 365 P.3d 417 (Ct. App. 2016). The Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated "[i]t is undisputed that the state did not provide evidence at trial that Pierce 
engaged in acts constituting disturbing the peace, as prohibited by I.C. § 18-6409." 159 
Idaho at 663, 365 P.3d at 419. The Court of Appeals noted "[i]n Idaho, the prohibited conduct 
constituting disturbing the peace is defined by statute. In I.C. § 18-6409 as quoted above, 
the legislature of Idaho has provided guidance regarding specific conduct that constitutes 
disturbing the peace. It is undisputed that the state did not provide evidence at trial that 
Pierce disturbed the peace of his ex-wife and her children, within the meaning of I.C. § 18-
6409." 159 Idaho at 664, 365 P.3d at 420. 
The conduct that resulted in Mr. Pierce, who was in litigation with his ex-wife "over 
issues related to their divorce," being charged and found guilty, by a jury, of disturbing the 
peace was that he "called the electrical power company to terminate service," to the house 
(which was Mr. Pierce's separate property) where she and her children, who were not his 
biological children, "continued to live in the house without Pierce." 159 Idaho at 662, 365 
P.3d at 418. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court which vacated 
the Judgment of Conviction entered in the magistrate court. The district court decision gave 
the following analysis concerning disruption of power service to the house. 
2https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tumultuous 
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This disruption in electrical service to the house: 
Power was terminated on a Friday, for some reason the power company did 
not treat this as a weekend emergency, and power was not restored until 
sometime the next week. There was testimony that refrigerated and frozen 
foods were lost, and the protected party and her children had to impose upon 
friends for lodging for the several days until the power was turned back on. 
This, the state contends, was sufficient to constitute a "breach of the peace" 
with the jury being allowed to determine for themselves whether the actions in 
question should be deemed legal. I conclude this to be error. Memorandum 
Decision (CR-2013-13285-C), at 8. 3 
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the state failed to present evidence supporting a 
conviction for disturbing the peace for conduct that was clearly offensive but outside the 
statutory definition of disturbing the peace. The same reasoning applies to the facts of this 
case. 
VI. THE VOID FOR VAGUE ARGUMENT 
The appellant also asserts a void for vagueness challenge to the statutory term 
"offensive conduct," which was relied upon by the State to obtain his conviction for Disturbing 
the Peace. This issue was raised before the magistrate in his Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal. 
'"It is well established that when a case can be decided upon a ground other than a 
constitutional ground, the Court will not address the constitutional issue unless it is 
necessary for a determination of the case."' City of Sandpoint v. Independent Highway 
District, 161 Idaho 121, 124, 384 P.3d 368, 371 (2016) (citing Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon 
River Fruit Co., 1581daho 269,279,346 P.3d 286,296 (2015)). 
3The Court takes judicial notice of this decision. See I.R.E. 201. 
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It is not necessary to address the constitutional analysis in this appeal. This Court will 
avoid the morass of constitutional hypotheticals in this case in view of the decision on 
statutory construction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The conviction for Disturbing the Peace is vacated and this case is remanded for the 
entry of a judgment of acquittal and a dismissal of the charge. 
Dated this 1 -=) "-- day of June 2018. 
~~ GedF.Chroe~ e:-
Senior District Judge 
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